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Abstract 
 
The paradigm shift in Saudi Arabia’s regional foreign policy in the wake of the Arab 
upheavals serves as the rationale for the thesis. Prior to the Arab Spring, the Kingdom has 
been known for conducting a cautious foreign policy in order to retain regional stability and 
ensure regime security. However, the Saudi regime has conducted an aggressive and 
confrontational foreign policy in light of the revolutionary wave that rolled across the region 
from 2011. The objective of the study was to investigate the driving force(s) behind the 
paradigm shift and to discuss whether Saudi Arabia has, in fact, led a counterrevolutionary 
foreign policy in the time period of 2011-2014. The thesis relies on case study, complemented 
with theory triangulation as the method. The cases include four cases of Saudi foreign policy 
behaviour in Bahrain, Egypt, Syria/Iraq, and Yemen. The theories that are used in the thesis 
relies on offensive realism and constructivism, in addition to an analytical framework 
provided by foreign policy analysis (FPA).  
 
The Arab upheavals served as a catalyst for Saudi Arabia to undertake a change in their 
regional foreign policy behaviour, as new challenges and opportunities arose for the 
Kingdom. Political aspirations and ideologies from states, transnational actors and the 
demonstrating masses were perceived to question the legitimacy of the Saudi regime. In 
addition, transnational actors posed a realistic military threat towards Saudi sovereignty and 
its political interests abroad. Moreover, the Arab Spring served as an opportunity for Saudi 
Arabia to challenge the Iranian political influence in the Middle East, which has increased 
following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
 
The Saudi regime has conducted counterrevolutionary politics on the domestic level in order 
to ensure its position. However, the Saudis have not led counterrevolutionary politics in all 
cases on the external level. King Abdullah undertook counterrevolutionary actions in Bahrain 
in order to prevent a democratic revolution on the Arabian Peninsula. The Kingdom supported 
the counterrevolution in Egypt, implying, in this case, to support the notion of Saudi Arabia to 
act counterrevolutionary while the cases of Syria/Iraq and Yemen show the opposite. The 
Saudis have supported different opposition groups in the attempt to remove the Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad, while the Saudis through Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) created 
a transition plan for the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
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Notes on translation and transliteration 
 
Arabic terms have been translated directly in accordance with John L. Esposito (2003: 39-
345) The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, except for the word Dāʿesh, which is new phenomena. 
Whenever I used Arabic words in the thesis, they are written in Italic. I have followed the 
IJMES transliteration system, where the Arabic consonant -Ayn is transliterated as /ʿ/, the 
glottal stop hamza transliterated as /ʾ/, the long Arabic vowels /ا/, /و/, /ي/ are transliterated as 
/ā/, /ū/, /ī/, while the doubled diftong /ي / is transliterated as -iyy, as for instance Islāmiyya.  
 
Bayʿa: Oath of allegiance to a leader. Unwritten pact given on behalf of the subjects by 
leading members of the tribe with the understanding that, as long as the leader abides by 
certain responsibilities towards his subjects, they are to maintain their allegiance to him.  
 
Dāʿesh: Arabic acronym for al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya bil-Iraq wa al-Sham, meaning The Islamic 
state of Iraq and the Levant. Often referred to as ISIL, ISIS or IS. 
 
Fatwā: Authoritative legal opinion given by a mufti (legal scholar) in response to a question 
posed by an individual or a court of law. […] Present-day Muslims states have tried to control 
fatwas through official consultative advisory organizations within religious ministries. 
 
Hajj: The annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of Dhu al-Hijjah. Approximately two 
million Muslims worldwide participate annually. The performance of the Hajj is one the five 
pillars of Islam, and all adult Muslims are required to perform it at least once in their lives if 
they are physically and financially able. […] The government of Saudi Arabia currently 
oversees the hajj.  
 
Imām: One who stands in front; a role model for the Muslim community in all its spiritual 
and secular undertakings. The title is used interchangeably with the word khalīfa for the 
political head of the Sunni Muslim state.  
 
Jihād: From the Arabic root meaning “to strive,” “to exert,” “to fight”; exact meaning 
depends on context and interpretation. May express a struggle against one’s evil inclinations, 
an exertion to convert unbelievers or a struggle for the moral betterment of the Islamic 
community. […] Jihad is the only legal warfare in Islam, and it is carefully controlled in 
Islamic law. 
 
Khārijis / Khārijites: Seceders. Early sectarian group in Islam, neither Sunni nor Shii, 
although they originally supported Ali’s leadership on the basis of his wisdom and piety. […]  
The group survives today, known as the Ibadis, with fewer than one million adherents.  
 
Muftī: Jurist capable of giving, upon request, an authoritative nonbinding opinion (fatwa) on 
a point of Islamic law. 
 
Salaf: Predecessors or ancestors. Usually used in the sense of “pious ancestors,” especially 
the first three generations of the Muslim community, who are considered to have lived the 
normative experience of Islam. Often referred to in works by Hanbali jurists, particularly Ibn 
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Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabis called for the implementation of 
the social organization of salaf as a means of restoring Islamic ethics and piety to original 
purity.  
 
Saudi Arabia, Islam: Islam is the religion of the state in Saudi Arabia and is interpreted 
according to the conservative Wahhabi ideology. The legitimacy of the monarchy rests on an 
alliance between the Saudi royal family and the Ulamaʾ, who serves as consultants.  
 
Sharīʿa: God’s eternal and immutable will for humanity, as expressed in the Quran and 
Muhammad`s example (Sunnah), considered binding for all believers; ideal Islamic law.  
 
Shiite Islam: Shiite Muslims, the followers or party of Ali, believe that Muhammad’s 
religious leadership, spiritual authority, and divine guidance were passed on to his 
descendants, beginning with his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ibn Abi Talib, his daughter, 
Fatimah, and their sons, Hasan and Hussein. The defining event of Shiism was the martyrdom 
of Husayn, at Karbala (Iraq) in 681[…]. Shii political thought entered its modern phase during 
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, when Shiites was divided between the 
forces of constitutionalism, modernism, reason, and secularism, on one hand, and more 
traditional interpretations of faith, religious law, and the role of clerics, on the other. […] The 
most important event of the 1960s was the 1963 uprising led by Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 
1989), who called for the ouster of the Shah. […] Khomeini was the most rhetorically 
successful revolutionary Shii. Opposed to the increasing secularization of Pahlavi society and 
American domination of Iranian political, social, economic, and cultural life, Khomeini 
introduced the principle of vilayet-i faqih as the foundation for Islamic government. 
According to this principle, in the absence of an imām, the leadership of Muslim nations is to 
be entrusted to Shii jurists, who are to rule by virtue of their knowledge of sacred law and 
their ability to regulate the daily affairs of Muslims. This form of governance is what differ 
from a Sunni Muslim governance. The resultant Islamic revolution of 1979 and Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran represent the ideological institutionalization of modern Shii 
political ideas.  
 
Sunni Islam: The Sunnis are the largest branch of the Muslim community, at least 85 percent 
of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims. The name, derived from the Sunnah, the exemplary 
behavior of the Prophet.  
 
Ulamaʾ (Sunni): Men of knowledge. Refers to those who have been trained in religious 
sciences. Will be referred to as the “religious establishment” in the thesis. 
 
Wahhabis: Eighteenth-century reformist/revitalist movement for the socio-moral 
reconstruction of society. Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a Hanbali scholar, in 
Arabia (present-day Saudi Arabia). Proclaimed tawhid (uniqueness and unity of God) as its 
primary doctrine. Proposed a return to an idealized Islamic past through reassertion of 
monotheism and reliance on the Quran and hadith, rejecting medieval interpretations of Islam 
and jurisprudence. Emphasized education and knowledge as a weapon in dealing with 
nonbelievers. Formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1747, which served as the 
basis for the consolidation of the present-day Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia.  
 
Zakāt: Required almsgiving that is one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims with financial 
means is required to give 2.5 percent of their net worth annually as zakat. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Arab upheavals, Saudi Arabia has carried out an aggressive foreign policy 
and has actively tried to manipulate the regional political situation to the kingdom’s favour. 
There are several perspectives on how to describe the new trend in Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy, with the majority of the analysis describing Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy as 
‘counterrevolutionary’. There exist different perceptions related to Saudi interests, the 
instruments used, and the desired impact for the Saudis to engage in counterrevolutionary 
politics. Madawi al-Rasheed (2011: 513) states, “In response to the Arab Spring, sectarianism 
became a Saudi pre-emptive counter-revolutionary strategy that exaggerated religious 
difference and hatred […]”. The use of the sectarian instrument as a counterrevolutionary 
strategy is also highlighted by Frederick M. Wehrey (2014: 136), who argues that the 
sectarian instruments were applied at the domestic level as a strategy to counter a potential 
united Sunni and Shiite anti-regime block in the wake of the Arab Spring in order.    
 
Lawrence Rubin (2014: 119) notes that, “Other states, such as Saudi Arabia, led the 
counterrevolutionary charge by offering payoffs to their own citizens as well as their allies in 
an effort to ensure regime stability.” While Toby C. Jones (2011b: 43) states, “Saudi Arabia is 
determined to crush the Arab Spring. Both at home and throughout the region the kingdom’s 
leaders have doggedly been pursuing the path of counterrevolution.” This notion is also 
supported by Mehran Kamrava (2012: 96) who writes that, “In fact, the kingdom has 
positioned itself as the chief architect of a counterrevolution to contain, and perhaps to even 
reverse, the Arab Spring as much as possible”.   
 
Mohamad Bazzi (2015), suggests that King Abdullah, who ascended the Saudi throne on 
August 1, 2005 and who died on January 23, 2015, has shaped a muscular foreign policy, and 
that the Saudis have tried to block the revolutionary momentum in the region since 2011. 
While Neil MacFarquhar (2011, May 27) in New York Times, wrote that the Saudis gave $4 
billion in support to the established military council in Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak 
had to relinquish his position. He further highlights the kingdom’s proposal to expand the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to include Jordan and Morocco, in order to build the GCC 
into a political alternative to the Arab League, and the kingdom’s push for stability of the Gulf 
monarchies, including Jordan and Morocco.  
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According to Saudi Prince Waleed bin Talal, a nephew of King Abdullah, in reference to the 
unrest in Bahrain, the Saudi engagement there following the GCC-led intervention, was 
motivated by a need to send “a message that monarchies are not where this is happening. We 
are not trying to get our way by force, but to safeguard our interests,” according to Neil 
MacFarquhar (2011, May 27) in New York Times. Renè Rieger (2014: 6) highlights Saudi 
reactions towards the uprisings in Bahrain as a prime example of Saudi counterrevolutionary 
politics. Rieger suggests that the Saudi regime was afraid of a spillover effect and that a 
potential overthrow of the Al Khalifa monarchy could challenge the domestic legitimacy of 
the Saudi monarchy itself. Another motivation was, according to Rieger, the potential Iranian 
political influence in Bahrain, which might have increased after the fall of Al Khalifa.  
 
Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have tried to prevent further democratic aspirations in the 
region. This strategy was most noticeably pursued in the neighbouring Gulf states in light of 
the Arab Spring, according to Ana Echagüe (2014: 1–20). She refers to how the two states 
gave an economic package of $20 billion to Bahrain and Oman. Ana Echagüe further argues 
that the strategy for both countries has been to take a more active role in the region through 
influencing transitions of government in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Syria, while 
highlighting that Saudi Arabia has focused on gaining influence over Iran. Guido Steinberg 
(2014: 15-21) argues that the Saudis have engaged in counterrevolutionary politics at a 
regional level. The Kingdom has sought to stabilise Jordan and Morocco and gave support for 
the Egyptian military establishment in order to preserve the status quo of its authoritarian 
regime. March Lynch (2011 a: 3) stresses the Saudi viewpoint towards the uprisings in Syria, 
where King Abdullah gave an unusual statement to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on 
August 7, 2011, urging him to stop the killings and to begin initiating reforms for maintaining 
regional stability.  
 
A political activist in Riyadh, Mohammed F. al-Qahtani, stated, “We are back to the 1950s 
and early 1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the 
revolutions of Arabism,” according to Neil MacFarquhar (2011, May 27) ) in New York 
Times. The Saudi regime has historically been countering regional revolutionary ideologies 
such as Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and the doctrine of Shiite Islam, as all were 
considered to threaten Al Saʿud’s political legitimacy. Certainly, there is a broad consensus 
among leading researchers and analysts of the Middle East that Saudi Arabia has been a 
counterrevolutionary force within the region.  
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In light of this debate, Saudi King Abdullah appears as the reborn Prince Klemens Von 
Metternich (1773–1859). Von Metternich played a significant role in European politics, 
strongly opposed to liberalism, nationalism, democracy, and revolution – all of which swept 
through Europe during the mid-18th century and threatened the very existence of Europe’s 
monarchies. The Austrian Prince Metternich fought to keep the traditional aristocratic order in 
Europe and urged the monarchies to unite, in order to ensure the survival of monarchy as the 
system of governance. However, the common ‘agreement’ of Saudi Arabia being a 
counterrevolutionary force within the Middle East is what is being critically discussed 
throughout the thesis.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s instruments for promoting its foreign policy interests have traditionally been 
cautious and soft. The Saudi soft power capabilities include economic support, public 
diplomacy, and religious and ideological influence. Ana Echagüe (2014: 13) states that, “In an 
effort to uphold the internal security of the Kingdom and maintain regional stability, Saudi 
Arabia had traditionally conducted a consensual, cautious foreign policy that avoided open 
confrontation and favoured accommodation.” Abdulrhman A. Hussein (2012: 67), Gregory F. 
Gause III (2002: 194), and Mehran Kamrava (2013: 5) follow these lines and suggest that 
Saudi foreign policy has been defensive and cautious in its character. They validate their 
argument by referring to that Saudi Arabia has sought to reconcile externally and competing 
pressure to ensure regime stability, due to the political dynamics of the Middle East. 
 
I would argue that the Arab upheavals were likely to serve as a catalyst for Saudi Arabia to 
conduct a far more aggressive and confrontational foreign policy. Indeed, there are several 
examples of a paradigm shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards aggressively defending 
its regional interests. The use of military force in the neighbouring country Bahrain in 2011, 
for instance, or the arming of insurgent groups in the civil war in Syria from 2012. Moreover, 
the Saudi support for the coalition led by United States in the military campaign against 
Dāʿesh (IS/ISIL) from September 2014, in addition to the Saudi-led military campaign in 
Yemen March 2015, follow the pattern of Saudi behaviour that breaks with the former 
cautious foreign policy undertaken by Saudi Arabia. 
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1.1 Research questions 
 
In accordance with these claims, the thesis will critically discuss the following questions: 
 
What has been the driving force(s) for Saudi Arabia’s more aggressive foreign policy in the 
time period of 2011–2014? Did Saudi Arabia lead a counterrevolutionary foreign policy in 
the Middle East during this period?  
 
Highlighting these two questions is important for several reasons in order to understand the 
nature of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, a country that plays an important regional and global 
role. Saudi Arabia possesses one of the world’s largest oil reserves, is one of the world’s most 
strategically located countries and holds Islam’s two most holy places. Other reasons for 
giving attention to Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy center around the dynamics of the tense 
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The bilateral tension affects Middle 
Eastern security and stability, as both countries are trying to position themselves as the 
region’s most influential actor. Moreover, the longstanding alliance between Saudi Arabia and 
the United States provides Saudi Arabia security and affects the regional balance of power.  
 
First, Saudi Arabia has historically played the role as a swing producer in the international oil 
market. The Kingdom has the world’s second-largest known oil reserves, is the world’s 
greatest oil exporter and is capable to adjust the global oil supply within a short time-frame. 
Saudi Arabia possesses a leading voice in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC): an influential organisation in the international oil market. Due to the 
acquisition of oil and its historical role as a swing producer, Saudi Arabia has become an 
important country both in a regional and global context. The kingdom is the only country in 
OPEC and the Arab world that is a member of the G20, an organization of the world’s largest 
economies. Saudi Arabia has played a critical role in ensuring moderate and stable oil prices. 
Stable oil supply and oil prices are important for the world’s oil importing countries in their 
quest for oil in a period of high uncertainty. Oil prices are also important for oil exporting 
countries, such as Norway, that base much of their economies on stable market prices. Saudi 
Arabia has the potential for using its enormous economic power as a foreign policy 
instrument to promote its national interests, as it did with the 1973 oil embargo. The wealth 
that accompanies oil also ensures domestic stability, as the royal family can, in contrast to the 
other medium or non-exporting countries in the Middle East, co-opt compliance from their 
population. 
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Second, Saudi Arabia is of great importance when it comes to Islam. There are around 1.5 
billion Muslims globally, with the vast majority being Sunni Muslims. Saudi Arabia contains 
the holy place of Mecca, where Prophet Mohammed was born and where the foundation and 
spread of Islam took place. The Hajj finds millions of Muslims travelling to achieve one of 
the five pillars of Islam. The Saudi king has the title Custodian of the two holy mosques, a title 
previously been used by former Islamic rulers such as the Ottomans and the Mamluks of 
Egypt. The kingdom also plays an important role in various international Islamic 
organisations. These include the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and the Muslim World League (MWL). The 
kingdom’s position within these organisations provides Saudi Arabia with significant 
influence among the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims. 
 
Third, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia also affects the regional 
balance of power. The United States has, for many years, been a close and valued ally with 
Saudi Arabia. Diplomatic relations were established in 1933, a year after the foundation of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 1943, during the Second World War, the US President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt declared that the defence of Saudi Arabia was of vital interest to the United 
States. The underlying reason for making Saudi Arabia as vital interest is the kingdom’s 
enormous reserves of oil, its strategic geographical position, and, later, its ability to help limit 
the Soviet Union’s influence in the region. Although the alliance has remained robust and 
stable for decades, there have also been incidents that have strained the relationship. The 
strong US support for Israel has met with skepticism in Riyadh, even though the relationship 
between Israel and Saudi Arabia has become closer to their common understanding of Iran as 
a regional security threat. More recent incidents of the strained relationship between United 
States and Saudi Arabia have also occurred. Lisa Watanabe and Christian Nünlist (2014: 3) 
states, “From the viewpoint of Riyadh, US engagement in the MENA region is jeopardizing 
regional security, with implications for Saudi domestic stability.” The Saudis fear that United 
States will implicitly allow the Iranians greater regional influence, which may lead Iran to 
becoming a hegemon in return for a solution on the Iranian nuclear problem. US involvement 
in the Iranian nuclear issue, and the talks in P5+1, where Saudi Arabia is excluded, are, 
according to Lisa Watanabe and Christian Nünlist (2014: 3), perceived as a confirmation of 
the Saudi fear. Saudi Arabia has also been negative towards the US role in the civil war in 
Syria.   
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Moreover, according to SIPRI (2014), Saudi Arabia’s defence spending ranks fourth in the 
world in 2013, with an increase of 14 percent in comparison to the previous year. In fact, 
SIPRI (2015) notes that Saudi Arabia’s defence spending increased by 17 per cent in 2014 in 
comparison to 2013. According to IHS (2015) the Middle Eastern region is considered the 
largest regional market for arms import and this trend will increase in the coming years. 
Mohamad Bazzi (2015) argues that King Abdullah has taken the lead in promoting proxy 
wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain against its regional rival, Iran. The 
increased defence spending, in addition to the engagement in proxy wars, is worth paying 
attention to from an offensive realism perspective while analysing the kingdom’s foreign 
policy. As it is, Saudi Arabia’s identity and religious interpretation rest on the Islamic beliefs 
of Wahhabism, the heartland of Islam, and the importance of monarchy as governance. A 
threat towards this basis may provoke the Saudi regime to act against the perceived threat. 
This perspective is highly relevant from a constructivist perspective, with its focus on identity 
and ideology.  
 
Given that Saudi Arabia, prior to the upheavals, conducted a cautious foreign policy, it is, 
therefore, interesting to analyse Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy during a period that has been 
anything but stable. The Middle East has experienced enormous political changes from 2011 
onwards. Therefore, the word cautious may no longer be an accurate description of the 
kingdom’s foreign policy. In light of the revolutionary wave, with its demands for reforms 
and democracy, an analysis of whether Saudi Arabia does, in fact, serve as a 
counterrevolutionary force is useful for a greater understanding of the regional dynamic. The 
thesis applies an extensive theoretical framework and a variety of sources, including academic 
literature, along with primary and secondary sources. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
 
Extensive available sources related to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy 
exist. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (2005) have edited an informative book from varied 
contributors analysing Saudi Arabia in terms of ideology, political economy, regime and 
opposition, and external relations. Gerd Nonneman discusses the determinants and patterns of 
Saudi foreign policy, in which he elaborates on the main stakeholders within the royal family 
and the interest groups within the Kingdom. The book serves as one of the most detailed and 
complete studies related to the country’s foreign policy. Anthony H. Cordesman (1997) has 
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written a comprehensive book related to the Saudi defence capabilities, its economy, its 
growing internal security problems, the regime’s stability, and its reliability as an energy 
exporter. The former Saudi diplomat and political analyst, Abdulrhman A. Hussein (2012), 
discusses Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and the determinants of Saudi Arabia’s alliance 
behaviour. Madawi al-Rasheed (2010) provides an extensive research on the kingdom’s 
history, which is essential material in any attempt to understand Saudi Arabia. 
 
Mehran Kamrava (2012; 2013) is one of the several academics who argues that Saudi Arabia 
has pursued a counterrevolution in light of the Arab Spring. In this respect, his latest paper 
seeks to further explore the roles mediation and conflict resolution play in the formation of 
Saudi foreign policy. Frederick M. Wehrey (2014) investigates the roots of the sectarian 
tension between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in the Gulf, which increased after the US-invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 and has escalated throughout the Arab upheavals. There exists a variety of 
literature offering in-depth analysis of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the wake of the Arab 
upheavals, much of which was used in the thesis. Renè Rieger (2014) and Gregory F. Gause 
III (2011b; 2014) are critical of the labelling of Saudi Arabia as promoting 
counterrevolutionary politics. They both argue that Saudi Arabia does not serve as a 
counterrevolutionary force, but rather plays the ‘power of balance game’ against Iran. While 
Agha Hussein and Robert Malley (2011), Madawi al-Rasheed (2011), Ana Echagüe (2014), 
Andrew Hammond (2013), Bernard Haykel (2013), Crystal A. Ennis and Bessma Momani 
(2013), Guido Steinberg (2014), Marc Lynch et. al. (2011a: 2011b), Nawaf Obaid (2013), 
Toby C. Jones (2011a; 2011b), have all discussed the counterrevolutionary perspective. 
 
Gregory F. Gause III (2002; 2011a) has made detailed contributions in analysing both Saudi 
Arabia’s foreign policy and the regime’s stability. My thesis supervisor, Stig Stenslie (2011; 
2014a; 2014b), has extensively examined regime stability and the elite structure of the royal 
family. The structure of Saudi Arabia’s elite is highly important for understanding the driving 
forces behind the kingdom’s foreign policy decision-making.  
 
The study primarily rests on the theoretical frameworks of realism and constructivism. The 
Greek historian, Thucydides (ca. 430-406 BC) gave birth to realism and the principles of 
national interests and survival during the time of Ancient Greece. Realism later developed in 
different directions including classical, structural, and offensive/defensive realism. However, 
the theory of constructivism appeared within International Relations (IR) at the beginning of 
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the 1990s, as a result of the fact that the two leading theories, realism and liberalism could not 
explain or predict the end of the Cold War. John T. Mearsheimer (1995; 2014) is one of the 
leading figures within offensive neo-realism, and emphasises competition for security among 
great powers in an anarchical international system. Mearsheimer argues that power- 
maximisation drives states, and the principal goal is survival with the aim of achieving 
regional hegemony. This theory is important while trying to elaborate what has been the 
driving force(s) for Saudi Arabia’s more aggressive foreign policy in the time period 2011–
2014. Offensive realism provides causal explanations as to why states behave aggressively 
and what assumptions need to be present for aggressive behaviour to take place. When 
discussing Saudi Arabia’s instruments and capabilities, I seek to elaborate different power 
instruments from Christopher Hill (2003) who emphasises on the assumption that instruments 
are limited by a state’s resources through the lenses of foreign policy analysis (FPA). 
 
By contrast, Alexander Wendt (1992; 1999) is one of the main contributors to constructivism. 
In the first paper, he critiques both liberalism and realism and emphasises the notion of 
“anarchy is what states make of it”, (Wendt 1992: 395) and that national interests are subject 
to change. In his second work, Alexander Wendt (1999: 246) elaborates the term “cultures of 
anarchy”; described as how states view each other, based on a socially constructed Kantian, 
Lockean or Hobbesian role structures. Theories of constructivism are highly useful in the 
thesis, as realism do not appreciate the importance of identity, ideology and internal factors in 
explaining state behaviour. In this context, Lawrence Rubin (2014) has edited a book with an 
analysis that challenges the realist perspective of threats in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
Lawrence Rubin (2014) analysis how and why ideas or political ideologies may threaten 
states and presents an in-depth argument as to how and why states respond to these perceived 
ideational threats. 
 
In addition to these two approaches, the thesis applies FPA, which, to a large extent, focuses 
on how internal factors affect foreign policy behaviour. FPA developed as a common 
approach to IR after the Second World War. According to Valerie M. Hudson (2005: 3), “The 
single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical 
intersection between the primary determinants of state behaviour: material and ideational 
factors”. According to Hudson, the intersection is not the state, but rather the human decision-
makers. Scholars agree that there are three paradigmatic books with different views or themes 
on how to conduct FPA. According to Steve Smith et al. (2012: 4), the first theme within FPA 
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had a focus on foreign policy and policy making that developed in the 1950s and was inspired 
by the work of Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, and later Graham T. Allison. 
Morton H. Halperin further developed this theme in the 1960-1970s with a focus on 
bureaucratic and organisational politics. The second theme had a focus on the psychological 
dimension of foreign policy making, with contributors such as Kenneth Boulding, Harald and 
Margaret Spout in the 1950s, Alexander George and Michael Brecher in the 1960s, and Irving 
Janis in the 1970s. The third and final theme was an attempt to develop a theory of 
Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP), with contributors from Jim Rosenau in the 1960s.  
 
The research of Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002), Christopher Hill (2003), and Fred 
Halliday (2005) have been instrumental in the development of research towards the field of 
FPA. While Halliday, and Hinnebusch and Ehteshami also include the regional context of the 
Middle East, which is a relevant analytical approach for the present thesis. Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami (2002) have edited one of the most comprehensive studies of Middle Eastern 
foreign policies. They take FPA and the concerns from a realism perspective and document 
how the external context and internal factors shape foreign policy outcomes. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The study consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 serves as the introduction and presents the 
research questions, literature review and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 outlines the 
research method, sources, and ethical considerations used throughout the process. Chapter 3 
presents relevant IR theories, offering two different approaches within IR-theory: realism, 
constructivism, and the analytical framework provided through FPA. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to highlight the kingdom’s interests, identity, actors and foreign policy instruments, 
in addition to counterrevolutionary politics. Chapter 4 presents the Arab upheavals on a 
generalised basis, and, more specifically, how they affected the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Chapters 5 - 8 serve as the main portion of the thesis, being dedicated to the foreign policy 
behaviour within four case studies. The analysis in these chapters will, in accordance with the 
theory, discuss the Saudi bilateral relations towards the countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Syria/Iraq, 
and Yemen) used as case studies. Chapter 9 presents the conclusion, where I draw on the 
major findings in the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Method and Sources  
 
2.1 Method  
 
I will use an explanatory case study, complemented with theory triangulation on Saudi 
Arabia’s foreign policy within a limited and specific time period in order to answer the 
research questions. An extensive theory chapter and a variety of empirical data such as 
academic literature, primary and secondary sources are used for the analysis.  
 
2.1.1 Case study 
 
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005: 18) define a case study as; “[…] a well-
defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a 
historical event itself.” While, Schramm, W. (1971) according to Robert K. Yin (2014: 15) 
described the aim of the case study as; “The essence of a case study, the central tendency 
among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why 
they are taken, how they were implemented, and with what results.” As one of my research 
questions elaborates on what has been the driving force(s) for Saudi Arabia’s more aggressive 
foreign policy in the time period of 2011–2014, it therefore seeks to describe a set of foreign 
policy decisions, and why they were implemented. As I shows in chapters 5-8, change in 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is an ongoing event, it would, therefore, be difficult for me to 
reveal the results of the implemented paradigm shift in a long-term perspective. However, I 
will, as far as possible, discuss the results of the paradigm shift from a short-term perspective.    
 
It is necessary to set a specific limit for the thesis data collection, as it should be possible to 
conduct the study within the limits of this report. The Saudi responses to the Arab upheavals 
are considered as being revealed within the time period of 2011-2014, and I have chosen this 
as an end date for the analysis. The thesis’ historical epoch is, therefore, defined as the time 
period of 2011-2014, where I perceive the Arab Spring to be a catalyst for Saudi Arabia to 
undertake a change in foreign policy. I do not seek to analyse the Arab upheavals in depth, yet 
it is necessary to discuss the domestic impact of the Arab Spring and regime stability in Saudi 
Arabia, as there is a correlation between the kingdoms’ internal-external link to its foreign 
policy when the revolutions rolled across the Middle East. The great momentum of the Arab 
Spring has now weakened, however, there are still enormous regional and international 
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unsolved challenges, such as the future of the Iranian nuclear programme, the position of the 
terrorist group Dāʿesh, the increased sectarian violence, shifting alliances, and the emergence 
of regional failed states, all of which may influence Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in one 
direction or another. However, Robert K. Yin (2014: 12) states, “The case study is preferred 
when examining contemporary events […].” I would argue that there are strong indications of 
the paradigm shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards an ongoing process. The ongoing 
aggressive foreign policy behaviour is shown through discussion of the case studies, and is, 
therefore, suitable for a case study method. For this reason, Saudi foreign policy behaviour 
that contributes to highlighting the paradigm shift as being an ongoing event will be 
mentioned in the cases, even though the study focuses on the specific time period. 
Highlighting the current Saudi foreign policy behaviour is important, as it should be possible 
to offer some predictions regarding the future stance of Saudi foreign policy. 
 
2.1.2 Explanatory case study 
 
Robert K. Yin (2014: 9) suggests that, while undertaking a case study, one needs to assess 
whether the case study is explanatory, descriptive or exploratory. The reason for this is to 
avoid using the wrong method for thesis’ goals. An exploratory research method is widely 
used in the initial stage from a hypothetical and theoretical idea. The exploratory case study 
method is often an attempt to build a foundation for future research and studies related to a 
given subject. By expanding our understanding of a specific subject or field, the descriptive 
case method aims to describe and explain what is being observed and what is taking place. 
Moreover, it does so by contextualising previous events in order to create a broader and 
greater understanding of the factors bringing them into place. Several studies of Saudi Arabia 
and its foreign policy have been conducted, as my literature review shows. For this reason, it 
is not necessary to conduct an exploratory or descriptive case study, as the descriptive 
method, where scholars and researchers have described and explained the political 
development of the Middle East during, and after the Arab upheavals, has also been widely 
used. 
 
The third mentioned case study method, the explanatory research, predominately focus on 
explaining cause and effect, with the aim to explain how things interact. As there might be, 
according to my opinion, a correlation between the Arab Spring and the paradigm shift in 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, it is necessary to explain cause and effect. Based on this 
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argument, I have chosen an explanatory case study method, where the ‘cause’ – the Arab 
Spring, is presented in chapter 4, while the ‘effect’– the foreign policy, is discussed through 
case studies of foreign policy behaviour in chapter 5-8. However, I do not seek to provide a 
law-given explanation of cause and effect as the epistemology of positivism tends to do. 
Rather, the thesis highlights and focuses on real observable incidents that could provide 
answers for the research questions, which, to a greater extent, follow the epistemology of 
critical realism. Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg (2009: 41) elaborates on critical realism, 
stating, “The real is central to critical realism. There is a strong conviction regarding the real 
and the possibility of identifying it. Something is real if it has a causal effect, that is, if it 
affects behaviour and makes a difference. Reality does not just consist of material objects. 
Ideas and discourses are real and can have causal effects.” 
 
2.1.3 Theory triangulation 
 
According to Robert K. Yin (2014: 120), theory triangulation takes place when the researcher 
uses different perspectives on the same data. This means that the researcher uses more than 
one theoretical approach in the interpretations of a subject being studied. Alexander L. George 
and Andrew Bennett (2005: 115) states, “When theories are fairly well developed, researchers 
can use case studies for theory testing. The goal here is rarely to refute a theory decisively, but 
rather to identify whether and how scope conditions of competing theories should be 
expanded or narrowed.” The aim of using two theories is not, therefore, to refute a single 
theory, but rather to extend the theoretical framework and to test the theories in accordance 
with the scope conditions that are present. However, one can suffer a major pitfall while 
conducting theory triangulation. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005: 116) 
elaborates on this assertion, “While theories need to be developed into a testable form, a 
theory should not be forced into predictions beyond its scope; this leads to the creation of an 
easily discounted “straw man” version of the theory.” In order to avoid this problem, I have 
presented causal assumptions for states to engage aggressively from a realism perspective. 
Moreover, I have outlined the ‘role’ structures of relations between states through 
constructivism and identified the scope conditions for Saudi Arabia to engage in 
counterrevolutionary politics based on the discussion elaborated throughout chapter 1-3.  
 
In addition, there are challenges when conducting theory triangulation. Alexander L. George 
and Andrew Bennett (2005: 115-116) states, “[…] when a theory fails to fit the evidence in a 
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case, it is not obvious whether the theory fails to explain the particular case, fails to explain a 
whole class of cases, or does not explain any cases at all […]. An additional difficulty in 
theory testing is that tests are partly dependent on the causal assumptions of theories 
themselves.” Moreover, this means that the scope conditions need to be clearly 
contextualised, or one might experience the applied theories failing to explain the cases used.  
This is hopefully solved as I have chosen two leading theories within IR literature, 
complemented with FPA that have been prevalent in studies of the Middle East. However, 
there might be possibility that the theories will not explain the whole class of cases. Instead, 
the different cases might have different explanations in order to reveal the research questions, 
which implies that one of the theories might be a better explanation for the different cases.  
 
Some IR-theories have been more widely used than others in explaining the dynamics of the 
Middle East. Fred Halliday (2005: 13) notes, “One of the particular approaches of 
International Relations is the analysis of  how foreign policy is formed, and the combination 
of domestic, historical and external factors that shape foreign policy.” However, Fred 
Halliday (2005: 23-39) suggests that, from a historical perspective, there exist five broad 
categories of the IR literature for the Middle East that includes: 1. Historical analysis (history 
of a specific country’s foreign policy with a focus on diplomatic and state activity, within a 
stipulated period); 2. Realism (system and states with a focus on power); 3. Foreign policy 
analysis (focus on decision-makers); 4. Constructivism (focus on ideologies, perceptions and 
norms); and 5. Historical and international sociology. 
 
William C. Wohlforth (2012: 50) argues when he discusses realism and foreign policy, “[…] 
whether a theory applies to a given situation depends on the degree to which its scope 
conditions are actually present.” I would strongly argue that theory triangulation will be 
useful in order to explain the complex dynamics of the Middle East for two reasons.  First, as 
Simon Mabon (2013: 10) insists: “Many of the applications of IR theory to the Middle East 
apply realist approaches to the region, yet adopting a singular position belies the complexity 
of the region and fails to appreciate the importance of identity.” This argumentation strongly 
favours theories from constructivism, which emphasises the importance of identity and 
ideology. Secondly, Gregory F. Gause III (2014: 1) states that, “The best framework for 
understanding the regional politics of the Middle East is as a cold war in which Iran and Saudi 
Arabia play the leading roles.” The two arguments, however, contradict themselves regarding 
which scope conditions and theories that need to be focused upon. 
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The present conditions when analysing Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the Middle East 
during the time period of 2011-2014 are three-fold, including a ‘balance of power game’, the 
inter-state competition that followed the anarchy, and the essential notion of regime survival. 
All these conditions include both a realist military, in addition to an ideological threat 
perspective. The ‘cold war’ between Saudi Arabia and Iran usually favours the scope 
conditions as being a balance of power game from a realism perspective, whereby the rivalry 
has been described by analysts and observers of the region as the two states exploiting 
opportunities in order to increase their political influence. Yet, the Saudis have a closest 
‘paranoia’ of Iran, which could be explained by the Saudis constructing a social perception of 
Iran as trying to interfere in their political interests. This understanding needs to be explained 
from a constructivist viewpoint.  
 
The notion of survival and regime security is the most essential objective for the Saudi 
government, especially in the wake of the Arab upheavals. Regime survival traditionally 
favors theories from a realism perspective. John T. Mearsheimer (1995: 10) argues that 
survival is the primary motive in driving states. This perspective might coincide with several 
of the arguments presented in the introduction, where King Abdullah has worked to reverse 
the Arab upheavals and has tried to undermine Iranian influence. However, Lawrence Rubin 
(2014: 4) states, “First, ideology, or ideational power, triggers threat perception and affects 
state policy because it can undermine domestic political stability and regime survival in 
another state.” Ideational threats posed by actors (hereafter a state or non-state actor) in light 
of the upheavals, have been perceived as threats against the domestic legitimacy of the Saudi 
monarchy. Moreover, the ideational/ideological factor plays an important role in Saudi 
foreign policy, in which challenges the scope conditions of realism and the balance of power 
game. 
 
In addition, the foreign policy analysis is an important approach to the study, as it emphasises 
the link between internal and external in respect to foreign policy. The three systematic 
accounts detailed by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002) are used to reveal the why, who and 
how, in addition to what of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002: 
23) used the same variables in their case studies of foreign policies in the Middle East, and the 
accounts are as following: 
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 1. Foreign policy determinants – why, by looking at external threats, and its domestic politics 
by focusing on identity, regime legitimacy, state formation, and the economic needs and 
interdependencies.  
 
2. Foreign policymaking – who and how, the foreign policy concerns the effect of the elite’s 
goals, perceptions, ideologies, and historical role conceptions. State institutions and policy 
processes, and how the domestic power structure affects the capacity of bureaucratic actors, 
and how public opinion can affect policymaking, and looking at the leadership autonomy.  
 
3. Foreign policy behaviour – what, the foreign policy includes strategies and patterns of 
behaviour, or change in the foreign policy. 
 
Numbers 1 and 2 of these accounts are presented as empirical material in the theory chapter, 
and include both a realism and constructivism perspective, while account number 3 is 
presented in chapters 5-8. 
 
2.2 Sources and ethical considerations 
 
According to Robert K. Yin (2014: 12), “The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence – documents, interviews, and observations – beyond what 
might be available in a conventional historical study.” By undertaking a case study, it, 
therefore, allows the author to use a range of different sources in the research. Because Saudi 
Arabia is an authoritarian regime, and much information and free access to sources and 
interviews are not easily available, the thesis consequently relies on a variety of primary 
sources complementary to the secondary sources.  
 
2.2.1 Internship in Riyadh 
 
I had the opportunity to have an internship at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Riyadh, from 
June - December 2013 during my Master’s program at NMBU. Living in Saudi Arabia was a 
possibility for me that would be unavailable to most people. Therefore, it was an excellent 
opportunity to acquire first-handed information in a country where data collection is usually 
complicated. My daily work provided relevant information and data, both at the Embassy and 
through other channels in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, I met 
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several individuals that had worked in the diplomatic community in Riyadh for a long time, 
which contributed to expanding my knowledge about the kingdom and its foreign policy. I 
will, however, not explicitly refer to these sources in the thesis, as the conversations were not 
through formal interviews. In addition, I do not possess the information I acquired at the 
Norwegian Embassy, as this is restricted to individuals working in the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (NOR MoFA) only. However, I will, wherever possible, use my knowledge 
about the topics being addressed as a primary source.  
 
While living in Riyadh, the Saudi regime undertook several foreign policy actions that are 
significant to the thesis. The Saudi rejection of a temporary seat in the UN Security Council, 
the Saudis’ harsh rhetoric for a military intervention against the Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad, and the extended Saudi support for Syrian opposition groups are among these 
incidents. One of my task at the Embassy was political reporting to the (NOR MoFA) of the 
Saudi policies towards the Syrian civil war, which is one of the cases cited in the thesis. In 
addition, I participated in a seminar at King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies. The 
outline and strategies of Saudi foreign policy, its relationship to Iran, and its mutually 
dependent relationship to the United States were highlighted by the former Saudi Director of 
General Intelligence (GIP), Prince Turki bin Faisal, in addition to a US-diplomat. The seminar 
was only available to the diplomatic community, researchers, and other prominent individuals 
and was, hence, an excellent opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge from a former 
relevant Saudi decision-maker.  
 
2.2.2 Sources and data 
 
Some of the primary sources used in the thesis include official statements from the Saudi 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the 
UN, King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies, and the Saudi religious 
establishment. It is, however, important to note that King Faisal Center is not a governmental 
decision-making organisation. The chairman, Turki bin Faisal does, however, due to his 
former position in the Saudi state institution, possess valuable information related to Saudi 
foreign policies strategies. Moreover, bin Faisal has, on several occasions, held seminars and 
lectures about Saudi foreign policies. Data from all the courses mentioned above has been 
most valuable, as it addresses how the regime officially perceived the Arab upheavals and 
how they legitimised their foreign policy. I have reviewed the official website of the Saudi 
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(MoFA) for statements throughout the period 2011-2014 in order to find useful data, which 
has uncovered useful information on the objectives of the thesis. Reports from the Saudi 
(MoFA) official website include: ‘Leadership News and Statements’, ‘Government News’, 
‘The Ministry’s News’, ‘Official Speeches of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’, and 
‘Official Speeches of the Crown Prince’.  
 
I have reviewed the official website of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia to the UN, where statements are given in both English and Arabic. Doing this has 
uncovered speeches from UN sessions 65th to 69th that include statements from the time 
period of 2011-2014. I am, to some extent, able to read Arabic but have chosen to use the 
English sources in the thesis, as the reports include the same information in both languages. 
Statements from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the UN have been 
a valuable source, as they evidence how the Saudi regime handles its high-diplomacy within 
international relations. Data from the Saudi religious establishment has been provided through 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Portal of the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta`. 
However, the religious establishment plays a more debated role as decision-makers in the 
kingdom’s politics, as discussed in chapter 3.  
 
In many respects, the state media in Saudi Arabia serves as a representative of the regime and 
could, given how they usually report the official Saudi policy, be seen as a primary source. I 
have therefore examined several media archives from the period of 2011-2014, in both 
English and Arabic. The reliability of articles and statements from the state media and the 
religious establishment should, due to their link to the royal family and the extended use of 
censorship within Saudi Arabia, be considered to be infused with regime propaganda. The 
independent organisation Reporters Without Borders (2014) states, “The kingdom is relentless 
in its censorship of the Saudi media and the Internet, and jails netizens without compunction.” 
Moreover, the report suggests that criticism towards religion and the system of government 
have led the Saudi regime to react in many cases. This suggests that state media is highly 
likely to be subjected to state censorship and, therefore, implies to be ‘politically correct’ in 
accordance with the royal family’s political view.  
 
A variety of news agencies are in existence in Saudi Arabia, which include political analysis 
and politically charged opinions. The pro-Saudi and pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat (The life), 
is owned by Khalid bin Sultan, a prominent member of the Saud royal family. According to 
28 
 
Andrew England (2007, August 29) in Financial Times, has al-Hayat been in a previous 
conflict with the Saudi Information Ministry, leading to a publishing ban in August 2007 that 
lasted almost a week. The owner of the Saudi newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat (The Middle 
East) is Faisal bin Salman, a royal family member. Another member of the royal family, Turki 
bin Salman owns the Saudi newspaper Arab News. The Saudi news agency al-Arabiya (The 
Arabic one), was first broadcasted in 2003 as a rival to al-Jazeera and is represented in United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). The general manager of al-Arabiya is Adel Al Toraifi, who also 
ascended to the position of Minister of Information and Culture in Saudi Arabia on January 
29, 2015.  
 
Moreover, a broad range of news agencies are in evidence in the wider Gulf. For example, 
Gulf News, an English-language newspaper, which is based in the UAE, with the company, 
Al-Nisr Publishing as owners. While the Qatari news agency al-Jazeera (The Island) is a 
state-owned news agency. Any assessment of the reliability of the articles from these agencies 
is considered as their promoting the respective country’s political view, based on the close 
connection of the owners to the ruling elites in their countries. 
 
Another news agency used in the thesis is the online newspaper al-Monitor, founded in 2012, 
and based in Washington DC, USA. Al-Monitor received a Free Media Pioneer Award 
Winner prize in 2014 from International Press Institute (IPI). According to International Press 
Institute (2014, February 26), “The award is given annually to a media or press freedom 
organisation that distinguishes itself in the fight for free and independent news.” This implies 
that the reliability of articles in Al-Monitor may well give a more nuanced and accurate 
picture than the regional and Saudi-based news agencies. 
 
2.2.3 Ethical considerations 
 
According to Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune (2014: 61), the fundamental aspect of ethical 
considerations in social scientific research is the principle, do not harm. This principle is 
meant to ensure the protection of subjects taking part in the research. Moreover, Laurie A. 
Brand (2014: 9) discusses ethical principles when studying the Middle East and elaborates, 
“Fieldwork in the Middle East and North Africa region poses many ethical concerns. Most 
immediately and obviously, particularly given the authoritarian nature of the regimes in the 
region, are the need to respect privacy or even anonymity of sources […]”. During my 
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internship in Riyadh I met, as already mentioned, individuals working in the diplomatic 
community. However, as much of the information was revealed through informal 
conversations, I have chosen not to cite any of these sources. In addition, it is difficulties 
regarding verification of the validity of the sources. This consideration also accounts for 
information I acquired through my work at the Norwegian Embassy, which I cannot use due 
to restrictions set by the (NOR MoFA). However, I do appreciate the conversations with 
individuals that provided me with greater knowledge about the topic addressed in this thesis. 
In addition, all sources used in the thesis have their origins in published books, or are 
available as open sources online. My assessment in using these sources is considered not to 
create any harm to any individuals cited in this thesis.   
 
2.3 Validity, reliability and case selection 
 
This section considers the reliability of the method used, the internal and external validity of 
the study, and moreover, the section outlines the reason for selection of the four cases used in 
the study.  
 
2.3.1 Reliability 
 
According to Robert K. Yin (2014: 49), one of the goals of reliability is to minimise the errors 
and biases in a study. By conducting theoretical triangulation that relies on both realism, 
constructivism, combined with FPA, it may overcome the weakness of conducting a single-
theory study, given the present scope conditions mentioned above. There are similarities 
within realism and constructivism, but to a certain level, there exist epistemological tensions 
that might provide different answers for, at least, the first research question. In an attempt to 
overcome the biases in the research, the thesis relies on a broad and supplementary literature 
review, which contains different perceptions of the same phenomena, in addition to 
containing extended data from primary sources. 
 
2.3.2 Validity 
 
External validity can, according to Yin (2014: 46), be defined as, “Defining the domain to 
which a study’s findings can be generalized.” Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett 
(2005: 70) expand this by stating, “It is important to recognize that a single event can be 
relevant for research on a variety of theoretical topics.” They further highlight the case of the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis, which gave useful data for different theories, for instance crisis 
management, deterrence, coercive management, domestic influence on foreign policy, and 
personal involvement in decision-making. For testing contingent generalisations, Alexander 
L. George and Andrew, Bennett (2005: 119) observe, “[…] scholars must clearly specify the 
scope or domain of their generalizations. To what range of institutional settings, cultural 
contexts, time periods, geographic settings, and situational context to the findings apply?”  
 
In order to construct external validity for the study, there is a potential for the findings in this 
thesis being applicable to other domains than specifically Saudi Arabia. I have clearly 
identified the time period being studied, and the cultural and situational context as the Middle 
Eastern region in light of the Arab upheavals. In addition, the thesis highlights the foreign 
policy of an authoritarian regime during a period of regional upheaval. Moreover, the findings 
might contribute towards expanding theories within the field of state and counterrevolutionary 
politics, as I will discuss the counterrevolutionary politics by Saudi Arabia in some depth. 
Theories of the link between internal and external to foreign policy are also highlighted 
through the analytical framework provided by FPA. In addition, the thesis focuses on how a 
state perceives ideological threats towards its identity, through the lenses of constructivism.  
 
The four cases of the thesis do not cover all aspects of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policies within 
the defined time period. However, I would strongly argue that the results from the selection of 
cases would provide valuable information in answering the research questions. Internal 
validity is described as being the extent to which the results are valid for the selection and the 
phenomena that are being studied. In order to strengthen the internal validity, I have chosen 
cases that do not possess similar subject-related variables. The foreign policy instruments 
have, for instance, been different in several cases cited, and the driving force for undertaking 
aggressive and counterrevolutionary politics may have been diverse in the different cases. The 
thesis includes four cases of Saudi foreign policy behaviour in Bahrain, Egypt, Syria/Iraq, and 
Yemen, in which, moreover, all include Saudi aggressive behaviour to a different degree. 
 
2.3.3 Case selection 
 
The study includes, in addition to the regional balance of power game between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, cases where the Saudi regime has feared a violent spill-over effect from the regional 
instability, and a Saudi fear of political or ideological aspirations could question the regime’s 
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legitimacy. These lines are also supported by Ana Echagüe (2014: 13) where she states, “By 
2011 Riyadh was literally surrounded by instability with uprisings in Bahrain to the east, 
Yemen to the South, Syria to the west and ongoing instability in Iraq to the north contributing 
to Saudi fears of over-spill […].” Moreover, all cases include an internal-external dimension, 
while some of the cases show that Saudi aggressive foreign policy is an ongoing event. 
 
The GCC-led military intervention in Bahrain is the first case. It serves as a prime example of 
Saudi counterrevolutionary politics and the first signal for Saudi aggressive behaviour in the 
wake of the Arab upheavals. The Saudi role in supporting the counterrevolution in Egypt 
serves as the second case. This case seeks to demonstrate how King Abdullah worked to keep 
the authoritarian regime’s status quo and to counter threatening aspirations from political 
Islam such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and at the domestic level. The third case 
elaborates on the Saudi role in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars. I have included both countries 
in one case, based on the integration of the two conflicts during the Arab upheavals. The 
Saudis have actively tried to direct the civil war in Syria in favour of their regime and have 
used the civil war as a proxy-theatre for countering Iranian influence. Saudi forces engaged 
Dāʿesh-targets with military means in Iraq and Syria from the autumn of 2014, and has 
continued these operations in 2015, thus making it a contemporary event.  
 
The fourth case seeks to reveal Saudi politics towards Yemen, and how the regime has tried to 
influence its internal politics and perceives the neighboring country as a ‘dodgy’ domestic 
backyard. The case elaborates on how the Saudis have lost much of their former influence in 
Yemen, as they have focused on the events in Syria and Iraq. However, the Saudi-led military 
campaign in Yemen March 2015 indicates that the aggressive behaviour is an ongoing event. I 
will seek to engage with the different cases in a chronological order within each case, 
complemented by primary and secondary sources where they contribute to a greater 
understanding of the driving force(s) behind the Saudi foreign policy in the time period of 
2011-2014, and if the Saudi regime, in fact, lead a counterrevolution in light of the Arab 
Spring. 
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Chapter 3: Theory  
 
Overall, the theory chapter is a mixture of theoretical considerations provided by macro-
theories within IR, in addition to including empirical data in order to elaborate the analytical 
framework given by FPA, as presented in chapter 2. The first aim of the chapter is to present 
testable macro-theories on two issues: why states behave aggressively driven by certain causal 
interests, explained by offensive realism through John T. Mearsheimer, and seek to explain 
the Saudi national interests and role structures between states, with theoretical considerations 
from constructivism provided by Alexander Wendt.  
 
The second aim of the chapter is to highlight the Saudi foreign policy actors, its identity, and 
counterrevolutionary politics through micro-theories. There is, however, none testable 
theories within IR that explains how states engage in counterrevolutionary politics. I have, 
therefore, tried to present the scope conditions for Saudi Arabia to pursue 
counterrevolutionary politics. I will diverge from the uniform realism perspective that only 
considering the hard power capabilities, such as military and economic means when 
discussing Saudi Arabia’s instruments and capabilities. In addition, I will not present an in-
depth analysis of each capacity the Saudis possess, but rather seek to outline the major 
instruments and capabilities the Kingdom currently hold. This perspective is highlighted 
through micro-theories provided by FPA by Christopher Hill (2003). 
  
3.1 National interests  
 
A country’s national interests are essential to consider in exploring its foreign policy 
behaviour. Joseph, S. Nye Jr. (2004: 60) says, “All countries pursue their national interests in 
foreign policy, but there are choices to be made about how broadly or narrowly we define our 
national interests, as well as the means by which we pursue it.” As the thesis shows, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has one fundamental national interest: the essential principle of 
regime security. The Saudis are willing to take great risks in order to ensure their position. In 
addition, Saudi Arabia has shown an aspiration to expand its regional influence and become a 
regional hegemon. Moreover, the Saudi Islamic-based identity has an important role in the 
creation of their foreign policy, as I will discuss throughout this chapter.  
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3.1.1 Offensive realism and aggressive behaviour 
 
Realism adheres the idea of nation-states as being rational actors in the international system. 
Moreover, realism explains the anarchy and the states’ choices with assumptions such as self-
interest primarily driving political behavior. States, from this theoretical view, tend to focus 
on their security and struggle for power, according William C. Wohlforth (2012: 36). 
Offensive realism argues that all great powers aspire to become regional hegemons. John T. 
Mearsheimer (2014: 2) believes, “There are no status quo powers in the international system, 
save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential 
rivals.” Mearsheimer (2014: 3) further notes, “Thus, a great power will defend the balance of 
power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance 
when the direction of change is in its own favor.” Due to the rivalry between the two great 
regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the latter, as focused upon in the study, has perceived 
the Arab upheavals as both a risk for losing its influence and an opportunity to gain influence 
in the region to the longstanding rival. From this perspective, it provides Saudi Arabia strong 
incentives for defending its balance of power. This idea is in accordance with John T. 
Mearsheimer (2014: 29) where he states that, “Great powers, I argue, are always seeking for 
opportunities to gain power over its rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.” The argument 
is especially relevant when discussing the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the wake 
of the Arab upheavals. In addition, the Arab Spring was also an opportunity for other sub-
regional powers to increase their influence as well, as I will show in the case studies. 
 
In the last few decades, Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as one of the most influential 
countries in the Middle East. This role has been possible through its acquisition of both hard 
and soft power capabilities, and through its mutual dependent alliance with United States. 
Anthony H. Cordesman (1997: 20) notes several years ago that, “Saudi Arabia is continuing 
to seek prestige and influence throughout the Arab world, and to define its legitimacy as the 
Arab custodian of Mecca and Medina […].” Moreover, there is no indication of Saudi Arabia 
trying to downplay its regional aspirations. Alongside Saudi Arabia, there exist four great 
powers in the Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Turkey. In addition, Qatar has actively 
tried to position itself on the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the region by the use of its 
soft power capabilities and its ideology of political Islam, complemented with significant 
economic capabilities following its oil wealth.  
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Due to the anarchy following the Arab upheavals, stronger competition between some of the 
Middle Eastern great powers can be observed. Saudi Arabia has increased its ‘war’ of regional 
influence with Iran. As well as the conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia has been involved in 
several political conflicts with Qatar related to the latter country’s support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and who would serve as the sub-regional hegemon. Israel has not been actively 
involved in the great power politics among the regional players after 2011, except for 
diplomatic attempts to remove the possibility of Iran gaining nuclear capability. The Turkey 
regime has been tightening its position on the domestic level, and has been involved in the 
Syrian civil war with support to the Syrian opposition, in the attempt to remove the Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad.  
 
March Lynch (2010: 316) elaborates on the assertion of an anarchy in the Middle East, and 
notes, “The states of the Middle East compete with each other for power, security, and 
ideological influence in an environment that is formally anarchic but in fact thoroughly 
ordered by a shared public sphere and ideological concerns.” The term anarchy is especially 
relevant in light of the Arab upheavals, as the competition among regional states has 
increased. Both realism and constructivism accept the idea of anarchy in the international 
system. However, within these two theories, there are some great differences in the perception 
of how states act in an anarchic system.  
 
Anarchy, following a realism definition, is defined as, “When no authority which can enforce 
agreements exists – a condition theorist’s call anarchy – any state can resort to force to get 
what it wants. Even if a state can be fairly sure that no other state will take up arms today, 
there is no guarantee against the possibility that one might do so tomorrow. Because no state 
can rule out this prospect, states tend to arm themselves against this contingency”, according 
to William C. Wohlforth (2012: 38). The assertion of a regional anarchy following this 
definition is strengthened, as Saudi Arabia has armed itself more extensively in light of the 
Arab Spring, and, by 2014, became the world’s biggest arms importer. This can clearly be 
related to the wake of the Arab Spring, where several regimes fell apart, new threats by the 
emergence of terrorist groups such as Dāʿesh appeared, in addition to the civil wars in Syria, 
Libya, and Yemen. Following the notion that no higher authority can enforce agreements, I 
would strongly argue that several states in the Middle East viewed the situation in the Middle 
East from 2011 to be anarchy, as several countries in addition to Saudi Arabia have increased 
their defence spending.  
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Aggressive behaviour occurs when great powers aspire to maximise their relative power, 
serving as an optimal way to ensure its security, according to the offensive realism view on 
the international system. John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 21) states, “In other words, survival 
mandates aggressive behavior. Great powers behave aggressively not because they want to or 
because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power 
if they want to maximize their odds of survival.” John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 46) further 
argues that survival is the primary goal for great powers, alongside non-security goals such as 
economic prosperity, while they sometimes seek to promote a particular ideology abroad. The 
notion of promoting an ideology is especially relevant when analysing Saudi Arabia, due to its 
widespread exporting of the Wahhabi-tradition. The realist traditions recognise the non-
security goals but do not emphasise them.  
 
There are certain assumptions that need to take place for a great power to strive for hegemony 
and behave aggressively, according to John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 29-31). The first 
assumption is that the international system is anarchic. Second, a great power needs to possess 
offensive military capabilities. Third, a state can never be sure about another state’s 
intentions. Fourth, is based on the assumption that survival is the primary goal of great 
powers. John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 31) notes, “Specifically, states seek to maintain their 
territorial integrity and the autonomy of the domestic political order.” Fifth, that great powers 
are rational actors, and that states think strategically about how to survive. All of these five 
assumptions need to be present in order to explain why states behave aggressively. The 
argument suggests that, even though a state possesses offensive military capabilities, it will 
not mandate a situation where states behave aggressively. More importantly, when discussing 
an anarchic situation, John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 54) states, “In anarchy, however, the desire 
to survive encourages states to behave aggressively.” The latter argument does, however, 
presume that states may pursue aggressive behaviour in order to survive in an anarchy.  
 
There are, however, some limits to using realism as a uniform theory in explaining a country’s 
foreign policy. John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 10-11) suggest that offensive realism pays little 
attention to ideology, individuals or domestic political considerations. This is also supported 
by Fred Halliday (2005: 25), who suggests that realism largely gives less priority to the 
importance of identity, ideology, and internal factors. In addition, Mehran Kamrava (2013: 6) 
states that, “No state, of course, is a unitary entity, and the Saudi state, like its counterparts 
everywhere else, is fragmented. In the Saudi case, this fragmentation runs along institutional, 
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personal, and ideological lines.” I, therefore, sought to explain the complexity of a state’s 
foreign policy from a constructivist perspective, complemented with foreign policy analysis, 
due to the importance of identity, ideology and personal lines within the Saudi state.  
 
In contrast, constructivism fails to appreciate one important issue, namely the importance of 
material factors and capabilities. The perspective of offensive realism needs, therefore, to be 
included, as Saudi Arabia became the world’s largest arms importer in 2014. In addition, Fred 
Halliday (2005: 32-33) states, “[…] constructivism and its outriders run the risk of ignoring 
interests and material factors […]”. I have highlighted the lack of focus on material factors in 
constructivism. The critique of less focus on interests is, however, remarkable, as interests 
from the perspective of constructivism are explained by the notion of interaction between 
states, and that interests are subjectively changed according to the defined situation of the 
actor. 
 
3.1.2 Socially constructed interests and role structures between states 
 
Christopher Hill and William Wallace (1996) states according to Lisbeth Aggestam (1999: 1), 
“Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s 
place in the world’, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying 
assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as 
political leaders re-interpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.” This 
assertion rests on the notion of constructivism and is similar to Wendt’s perception of a state’s 
interests.  
 
National interests from the perspective of constructivism is elaborated by Alexander Wendt 
(1999: 233) who believes, “States are actors whose behaviour is motivated by a variety of 
interests rooted in corporate, type, role, and collective identities.” Wendt’s view on national 
interests differs from the realism perspective and assumes that the behaviour of an actor arises 
through how a state perceives itself and the role it possesses. Moreover, national interests are 
a social construction of what states want to achieve. Alexander Wendt (1992: 391-393) is 
critical of both liberalism and realism, and challenges the realism assumption of state’s 
behaviour in an anarchic international system. Alexander Wendt (1999: 246-247) defines 
anarchy as, “The absence of centralized authority.” This definition is quite similar to the 
realist definition, but does not take the idea of an arms race for granted as the results of an 
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anarchy by the realist definition. While Alexander Wendt (1992: 395) argues, “Anarchy is 
what states make of it”, and Wendt (1992: 395) further insists, “Anarchies may contain 
dynamics that lead to competitive power politics, but they also may not, and we can argue 
about when particular structures of identity and interests will emerge.” This view differs 
markedly from Mearsheimer’s perception of that anarchy encourages states to behave 
aggressively and always engages in a competitive power politics. Moreover, Wendt (1992: 
398) states, “Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests 
that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the 
process of defining the situation.” This view implies that an actor represents their interests 
according to how they define and perceive any given situation. More precisely, Alexander 
Wendt (1992: 406) argues that a state’s interests and identities are constituted through a 
process of intersubjectivity. It is a result of continuous adaption as states interact. Alexander 
Wendt (1999) argues that realists possess a pessimistic view on international relations and 
states, “All realists would probably agree, however, that states are inherently self-interested or 
egoistic,” according to Alexander Wendt (1999: 239). 
 
Instead, Alexander Wendt (1999: 251-299) speaks of three structures and roles under anarchy 
within the international system, whereby the Hobbesian culture serves as an enmity role 
structure, the Lockean as a rivalry role structure, and the Kantian as a friendly role structure. 
The logic of role structures is used in the case studies in order to explain the diplomatic 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the countries used as case studies. The reason for this is to 
reveal if there are any specific ‘role’ structures the Saudis have engaged in more aggressively 
in comparison to other role structures.  
 
The logic of a Hobbesian anarchy is centred on the notion of ‘war of all against all’, as the 
actors engage in the international system of the principles, kill or be killed. Alexander Wendt 
(1999: 265) considers on the Hobbesian anarchy as being something similar to the realist 
perception, where states tends to focus on power as a means to dominate. Alexander Wendt 
(1999: 284) elaborates on the Hobbesian anarchy, and states, “If states think that others 
recognize their sovereignty, however, then survival is not at stake if their relative power falls, 
and the pressure to maximize power is much less.” The Lockean culture follows another logic 
than the Hobbesian whereby the international system is based on the role structure of rivalry. 
In this form of anarchy, the actors respect each other’s sovereignty. It is important to note that 
the rivalry is based on a subjective perception of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, whereby a change 
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towards this perception might also change the structure of rivalry, enmity, or friendship. The 
last form of culture of anarchy is the Kantian role structure, based on friendship. The macro-
level logic of Kantian anarchy is based upon the notion of two guidelines, which are 
“pluralistic security communities” and “collective security”, according to Wendt (1999: 299). 
However, the realists see the Kantian friendship as utopian and idealistic, and that states act 
on the notion of being in a Lockean structure rather than a Hobbesian one, according to 
Alexander Wendt (1999: 298).  
 
I have already highlighted that states pursue their own national interests, but it is up to the 
decision-makers for how to define them. Christopher Hill (2003: 132) argues that if states 
have interests (I) and values (V), in which they want to preserve and protect, then they can be 
classified in the idea of core concerns (I+V=C). The core concerns, according to Hill, revolve 
around four issues: security, prosperity, identity, and prestige. In addition, Cristopher Hill 
(2003: 118) elaborates on foreign policy actors and states, “When pressed they usually take 
refuge in the old notion of the national interests, […]. They prefer to hide behind a screen of 
presumed unity and collective responsibility rather than dissect their own real goals, […].”  
 
Domestic regime security is the overriding objective and interest (I) of the Saudi royal family. 
Gerd Nonneman (2005: 338) expands on this, stating, “The Saudi foreign policy ‘role’, or 
‘roles’, must be seen as defined through the lens of Al Sa’ud perceptions about the security of 
their regime; about the opportunities and challenges presented by both their domestic and 
their external environments; and about the family’s own history and its place in Arabian, Arab 
and Muslim society and politics”. This theory is supported by Ana Echagüe (2014: 3), who 
compares all the Gulf States and states that, “[…] regime survival becomes the defining 
characteristic of Gulf states’ policies. State interests is conflated with regime security, and the 
focus of foreign policy is on the regime’s dynastic interests.” The Saudis are willing to take 
high risks in order to ensure its survival. Shireen T. Hunter (2015) elaborates on this assertion 
and states, “Prince Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz put it succinctly: “We got our power by the sword 
and will keep it by the sword”—even if the sword is wielded by the Pakistanis, Egyptians, IS, 
or others.” 
 
The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its foreign policy on its official website on 
September 20, 2011, intimating that pieces from both realism and identity factors are given 
considerable attention in their foreign policy focus, and assert, “The Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
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policy in the Arab Circle is based on major permanent basis and principles that are: Realism, 
which is represented in avoiding slogans and overacting, which negatively affect the security 
and stability of Arab World, and prevent the interference in Arab internal affairs […]. Islam 
has been always the most important factor affecting the determination of priorities of 
Kingdom’s foreign policy,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2011, September 20). The text strengthens my opinion that both realism and 
constructivism should be used as theories when conducting theory triangulation, as it 
foregrounds the notions of security and stability, and its focus on identity, which is, more 
precisely, Islam. 
 
Moreover, Saudi foreign policy has some fundamental goals, which according to Gregory F. 
Gause III (2002: 193) include, “[…] to protect the country from foreign domination and/or 
invasion and to safeguard the domestic stability of the Al Saud regime”. Gregory F. Gause III 
(2002: 208) further states that, “When foreign powers directly challenge the legitimacy of 
Saudi rule and pose direct military threats, the Saudis will take significant risks to oppose 
them and call upon the United States for support.” Stig Stenslie (2011: 12) explores the 
former US support for Saudi Arabia and states, “Likewise, the Americans have provided 
security in time of intervention of external forces. The House of Saud called for help in 1963 
and again in 1990.” Stenslie refers to the conflict between Egypt and Yemen, where Egyptian 
aircraft engaged targets close to the Saudi border in 1963, and the United States responded by 
sending military support as a preventive measure. In 1990, the United States provided military 
support against the aggressive Iraqi state. The United States has, in other words, proven a 
valuable ally for the kingdom. 
 
3.1.3 Identity and values 
 
Ole Wæver (1994) states according to Christopher Hill (2003: 98) that, “Indeed, the main aim 
of foreign policy analysis from this [constructivism] viewpoint is to probe ‘the deeper 
questions of the formation of identities and the structural forces at the domestic level.’” In this 
context, and in order to understand the importance of Islam, which serves as an important 
marker of identity in Saudi Arabia, it is necessary to consider the kingdom’s history and 
foundation. Madawi al-Rasheed (2010: 48) states, “The holy alliance between Ibn Sa’ud and 
the Najdi ritual specialists is important for understanding the origins of the Sa’udi polity in the 
twentieth century.” The idea of the Saudi state is built upon the Wahhabi partnership between 
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the imām, and the religious specialists, whereby the political leadership is enforcing the 
religious doctrine of the Wahhabi establishment. The alliance was established in 1902, as the 
Wahhabi establishment gave an oath of allegiance, bay’ah, to Ibn Saʿud in light of his capture 
of Riyadh, according to Madawi al-Rasheed (2010: 54). Moreover, Al-Azmeh (1993) notes 
according to Madawi al-Rasheed (2010: 49), “Wahhabi religious specialists accepted the 
doctrine that power is legitimate however it may have been seized, and that obedience to 
whoever wields this power is incumbent upon all his subjects.” The alliance between the 
religious establishment and the royal family provides the legitimation of the Saudi monarchy. 
Madawi al-Rasheed (2010: 49) suggests that, “In addition, they preached the importance of 
obedience to wali al-amr, leader of the Muslim community. Obedience should be manifested 
in readiness to pay him zakat and respond to his call for jihad.”  
 
Moreover, the Saudi regime perceives Saudi Arabia as the heartland of Islam. The Saudi 
perception of possessing the leading state within Islam is one of Saudi Arabia’s core values 
(V). In this context, Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 194/198) states that, “Their [Saudi Arabia] 
self-conscious assertion that they are the “most Islamic” of the Muslim countries has been an 
important element of their domestic legitimation and regional stance […]. Riyadh has been 
able to use its status as a leader of the Muslim world to advance its foreign policy goals”. He 
further elaborates on how the Saudi regime has used the narrative of Islam when they 
confronted Nasser and his Pan-Arabism in the 1960s. In these terms, Islam serves as one of 
the most important factors in promoting Saudi national interest. The Islam-based Saudi 
identity also affects their foreign policy. Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 202-203) suggests that 
Islam is one of the factors that defines the role of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. He reveals 
the central role Islam plays in the Saudi regime’s domestic legitimation formula, and how 
they consider themselves to have the leading political role among other Muslim states. This 
has been evidenced by the role of Saudi Arabia in the formation and cooperation among 
several Muslims countries in organizations such as OIC, WAMY, and MWL. However, 
Lisbeth Aggestam (1999: 5) states that, “It is however important to stress that socio-cultural 
sources of foreign policy are dynamic and may be subject to change, not least because the 
state itself contains a range of different social groups with varying interests and identities”. 
These assertions favour a constructivist perspective, which according to Wendt is subject to 
change. However, there are no indications that Saudi Arabia has reconsidered the importance 
of its socio-cultural sources from Sunni Islam play in its foreign policy. 
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Another view of the Saudi foreign policy through their Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
website, which states, “The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on 
geographical – historical – religious – economic – security – political everlasting principles 
and facts. It is shaped within major frameworks, among the most important of which are; 
good-neighbor policy, non interference in the internal affairs of other countries, strengthen 
relations with the Gulf States and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, strengthen relations 
with Arab and Islamic countries for the benefit of common interests of these countries, as well 
as advocate their issues, adopt nonalignment policy, establish cooperation relations with 
friendly countries, and play effective role in the international and regional organizations. This 
policy is activated through several circles such as Gulf, Arab, Islamic, and international 
circles”, according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, September 
20).   
 
The above statement reveals the Saudi foreign policy as being built upon the notion of a 
certain identity based upon its geography, history, religion, economy, security, and politics, as 
explicitly stated in the text. These are, as Renouvin and Duroselle (1968) according to 
Christopher Hill (2003: 136) calls it, resources. The resources are elements that derive from 
the history and geography and are the primary forces of foreign policy, which contributes to 
suggest the limits of a country’s impact on the world – and its ambitions. It is clear that the 
text foregrounds a presumed unity and collective responsibility, rather than attempting to 
directly dissect its own goals. This might imply that the kingdom’s decision-makers are under 
some pressure, based upon Hill’s argument that when the decision-makers are pressed, they 
usually take refuge in the old notion of national interest. 
 
In addition, the Saudi identity, based upon the belief of Wahhabism contributes to 
contradiction towards other interpretations of Islam. The notion of rationality in foreign policy 
is further explored by Christopher Hill (2003: 111) who states, “Decision-makers cannot 
avoid having images of others which will be as affected by their own cultural and political 
baggage as much as by the objective evidence.” Moreover, Christopher Hill (2003: 112) 
notes, “But if the politics of a country is built on “othering”, or finding its own identity in 
contradistinction to a feared and hated outsider(s), then stereotypes will persist and compound 
the existing problems.” The Saudi state and its royal family carry its cultural and political 
baggage, which have existed since the creation of the state in 1932. However, as Alexander 
Wendt (1999: 246) says, “Within domestic politics states are socially constructed […]”. In the 
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case of Saudi Arabia, this cultural and political baggage is constructed on the notion of 
‘othering’ others that do not fit into the self-imposed identity. This is particularly noticeable in 
the strong character of Wahhabism. Moreover, Peter Mandaville (2007: 247) highlights the 
notion of ‘othering’ in the Wahhabi doctrine, and states, “The social structure of Arabia, for 
example, led Wahhabi scholars to lay great emphasis on differentiating true believers from 
infidels in the name of justifying political expansion and the use of violence against other 
Muslims.” This notion is also highlighted by Laurence Louër (2014: 118) who states, “It 
[Saudi Arabia] is the only Gulf monarchy where the identity of the state, based on a specific 
reading of Sunni religious orthodoxy, has led to a widespread state-sponsored policy of 
sectarian discrimination.” While the Saudi state’s cornerstones are built upon ‘othering’, it 
does, according to this view, contribute to exacerbating the existing problems towards other 
ideologies and religious interpretations within Islam.  
 
3.1.4 Internal-external link to foreign policy 
 
Regime security is the most significant national interest for the Saudi regime, as highlighted 
above. In order to ensure the security of the monarchy from external threats, and conduct an 
effective foreign policy, the royal family is, therefore, dependent on domestic stability and 
internal politics. Alexander Wendt (1999: 2) believes, “[…] foreign policy behaviour is often 
determined primarily by domestic politics […].” In the case of Saudi Arabia, Crystal A. Ennis 
and Bessma Momani (2013: 1130-1131) notes, “A concern with domestic security has long 
structured how external security is approached, […].” Moreover, the Saudi regime has 
accused other states, and especially Iran, of trying to expand their influence in the Gulf and 
inside the kingdom itself, both prior to and after the Arab upheavals. The concept of 
Homeostasis becomes relevant in this context. Ideas of social and domestic peace against 
external threats are explored by Christopher Hill (2003: 44), where he notes, “Homeostasis, or 
the maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against external threats. Challenges 
which come from inside, such as demands for regional autonomy, are not the proper business 
of foreign policy until they become connected to the outside pressures, when decision-makers 
have to be careful not to be drawn into confusing “enemies” within and without.”  
 
There are several examples of the internal – external link to the foreign policy in Saudi 
Arabia. During the Cold War period of 1979-1988, Saudi Arabia, and its most valuable ally, 
the United States tried to counter and destroy the Soviet and Communist influence in 
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Afghanistan. One of the means used was soft power, and, more importantly, the Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam, which predominates in Saudi Arabia. The United States, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan promoted religious training, economic, and arms support to Afghan and 
Pakistani rebels in their fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In addition, a high 
number of Arabs fought, with Saudi and US support, against the Communists. Years later, 
this foreign policy strategy, support of Afghans, Pakistani, and Arab Jihad fighters had a 
severe impact on a domestic level in Saudi Arabia. The military and religious trained Saudis 
who fought in Afghanistan subsequently went back to Saudi Arabia, and then threatened the 
security within the kingdom, and the House of Al Saʿud. Some of the prominent figures in the 
creation of al-Qaida were Saudis. In addition, there are several examples of Saudis who have 
been a part of terrorist organisations such as al-Qaida on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and 
Dāʿesh. 
 
The Gulf War of 1990-91 and the following events provide another example of the internal 
link to foreign policy. Saudi Arabia feared that Iraq and Saddam Hussein planned to attack 
Saudi Arabia following its invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia possesses the economic 
capabilities to pay for US-led military operations, but did not possess the military capabilities 
to protect the kingdom itself. Saudi Arabia, therefore, allowed foreign, and particularly US 
troops, to be stationed in the kingdom in order to liberate Kuwait. The decision to let foreign 
(non-Islamic) troops on Saudi soil was among Saudis considered highly controversial. This 
was particularly true among the religious establishment, which demanded that non-Islamic 
troops should not be stationed in the heartland of Islam. The decision to allow foreign troops 
to be stationed within the Kingdom created space for radical Islamists to propagate their 
beliefs of a ‘corrupt’ monarchy, and urged for their removal through violent means. Anthony 
H. Cordesman (1997: 27) asserts that, “The complex mix of social and economic pressures 
that arose during the Gulf War led King Fahd to reorganize his cabinet on August 5, 1990, 
and announce a series of reforms on March 17, 1991.” Example on these included the creation 
of Majlis al-Shura, or a Council of Saudis, introduction of a basic body of governing laws, 
and a higher degree of autonomy for the provinces. The announcement of the reforms was 
supported by prominent religious clerics such as Sheik Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz. In 1992, there 
were, according to Anthony H. Cordesman (1997: 38) “[…] 107 leading religious clerics 
signed a petition – or “Memorandum of Advice” – which called for the stricter enforcement of 
Islamic law, severing relations with all non-Islamic countries and the West […].” The 
implementation of reforms within the kingdom was a result of a series of events. It started 
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with the external threat from Iraq, which in return created domestic pressure to the royal 
family as foreign troops were stationed in the kingdom, and later produced more domestic 
threats, which ultimately became radical groups such as al-Qaida. 
 
3.2 Actors and Instruments 
 
The Saudi Kingdom is a nation-state recognised by the international community, and, in 
accordance with the realist perception of the international system, thereby an actor. However, 
the underlying dynamics of the kingdom, predominately ignored by realists, need to be 
explained in order to understand the internal-external link to foreign policy. Tim Dunne and 
Brian C. Schmidt (2011: 87) highlight one core element in realism named statism, where they 
refer to the idea of the state as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the 
people. The notion of statism assumes that states are considered to be the only actors in the 
international system. However, the challenge in assuming that a one-dimensional unit makes 
the foreign policy, fails to appreciate the variety of stakeholder that may influence it. To 
follow the methodology outlined in FPA, Christopher Hill (2003: 51) stresses that, “Decision-
makers must be the starting-point if we wish to understand the dilemmas of acting in the 
international system.” 
 
3.2.1 The royal family  
 
The royal family in Saudi Arabia consists of an extended and influential group of 
approximately 5.000 descendants of the country’s founder, Ibn Saʿud. The exact numbers of 
the House of Saʿud are, however, debated. The descendants are divided into various 
generations, branches of kinship, and matrimonial descent that determines a prince’s position 
in the family. The royal family has a hierarchical structure whereby the king’s closest family 
would be given the most prominent positions in the state apparatus and government structure. 
An example of this is when King Salman ascended the throne in January 2015. In order to 
consolidate his power, he placed his son Muhammed bin Salman in prominent positions such 
as Minister of Defence and Chief of the Royal Court, while he was given the prominent title 
as deputy Crown Prince in April 2015. Gerd Nonneman (2006) and Abdulrhman A. Hussein 
(2012) argue that there are several stakeholders within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but 
presumes that the royal family and the King determine the country’s foreign policy. In 
addition, the strong influence of monarchy is also highlighted through the Saudi Basic Law of 
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Government. Article 5 (A) in the Basic Law states, “Monarchy is the system of rule in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws 
and Regulations > The Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 2 (1992, March 1). Stig Stenslie 
(2014 a: 1) elaborates on the Basic Law as, “[…] a constitution-like document adopted by 
royal decree by the then-King Fahd in 1992.” The Saudi Basic Law of Government came a 
year after the second Gulf War and is ruled in accordance with the principles of Sharīʿa. 
 
Given that Saudi is governed as an absolute monarchy, the role of the Saudi monarchy as an 
important stakeholder in the decision-making of the Saudi foreign policy, should not come as 
a surprise. Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 204) states, explicitly, that, “The key decision-making 
body on foreign policy in Saudi Arabia is that group of senior members of the Al Saʿud 
family who, by reason of their official positions or their standing within the family, decide all 
major issues of policy.” Gregory F. Gause III (2002) accepts that people outside the royal 
family have important roles as advisors, but the key decisions are nonetheless made within the 
family. The King’s role in the decision-making process should, however, not be 
underestimated, even though there are several senior members of the royal family that 
possesses important decision-making positions.  
 
3.2.2 State institutions 
 
When discussing this section, it is important to note that several prominent members of the 
royal family possess influential positions in the different state institutions. Alongside the 
members of the royal family, the Wahhabi establishment have enjoyed a close link to the state 
and the royal family due to the political structure of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Saʿud al-Faisal is one of the longest-serving foreign 
ministers in the world as he became the head of the Ministry in 1975. Saʿud al-Faisal was, 
however, replaced by Adel al-Jubeir on April 29, 2015. Christopher Hill (2003: 62) states, 
“Foreign ministers are vulnerable for removal in the early phases of their tenure, […], but the 
longer they survive the more vital their experience and contacts become.” The kingdom 
consolidated its important international position after the oil embargo towards Western 
interests in 1973, implying that Saʿud al-Faisal had been the head of the Ministry throughout 
the whole period. The Saudi Foreign Minister has experienced the dynamics of the region, 
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and international affairs for the last forty years, thus providing him a significant position in 
Saudi foreign politics and relations with other states.  
 
King Abdullah created the National Security Council (SNC) as an organisational mechanism 
in 2005 to handle security related issues. The NSC was, however, dissolved on January 29, 
2015, when King Salman ascended the throne. Instead, Salman implemented a similar 
mechanism - Council for Political and Security Affairs. The NSC importance as a decision-
making organisation is, therefore, only relevant for the thesis defined period of 2011-2014. 
Sager Abdulaziz (2005, November 11) in Arab News states, “Although the executive 
leadership makes the final decisions that determine state policy, this only takes place 
following consultation with appropriate institutions. By providing options and solutions to the 
executive leadership in order to enable them to adopt the best option, these institutions 
participate in the decision-making process. In this respect, the work of the National Security 
Council secretariat is considered vital.” Abdulrhman A. Hussein (2012: 51) argues the council 
was created in response to major geopolitical developments, while Sager Abdulaziz (2005) 
suggests that the creation took place in the wake of domestic developments as well. 
 
The council had responsibility for the creation of Saudi Arabia’s national security, 
intelligence, and foreign policy strategies. In addition, the council had the power to declare 
war and investigate the country’s security agencies. However, the council’s power was, 
however, limited by the King, as Article 62 of the Basic Law states, “If an imminent danger is 
threatening the safety of the Kingdom, the integrity of its territories or the security and 
interests of its people, or is impeding the functions of official organizations, the King may 
take urgent measures to deal with such a danger. When he considers that these measures 
should continue, necessary arrangements shall be made in accordance with the Law,” 
according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws and Regulations > The 
Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 6 (1992, March 1). Stratfor Global Intelligence (2005) 
states, “Saudi Arabia has created an enhanced National Security Council that will enjoy wide-
ranging powers related to domestic and foreign policy.” Furthermore, Stratfor Global 
Intelligence (2005) observes that what makes NSC interesting is the council’s composition. In 
2005, the NSC consisted of King Abdullah as Chairman, Crown Prince Sultan as deputy 
chairman, and the former Saudi Ambassador to the United State Prince Bandar bin Sultan as 
the secretary-general of NSC. In addition, other members of the council included Saudi 
National Guard Deputy Commander Badr bin Abdel Aziz, Interior Minister Nayef, Foreign 
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Affairs Minister Saʿud al-Faisal and the Chief of the General Intelligence Department Nawaf 
bin Abdel-Aziz.  
 
The composition of the NSC in September 2014 included King Abdullah as Chairman, Crown 
Prince Salman as Deputy Chairman of the Council, Saʿud bin Faisal, Bandar bin Sultan, who 
served as the Secretary General, Khalid bin Sultan, who serves as the General Intelligence 
President, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, who serves as the National Guard Minister, and 
Mohammed bin Nayef, who served as the Minister of Interior. Given the prominent royal 
family members included, the NSC is considered to have been an important stakeholder in the 
decision-making process of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. This assumption is also supported 
by Stratfor Global Intelligence (2005) who noted that the council consist of figures in the top 
layer of the royal family, which, in return, suggests the royal family as being in charge of the 
major foreign policy decisions.  
 
Anthony H. Cordesman (1997: 21) states that, “The monarchy remains the key source of 
power in the Saudi Arabian government.” Moreover, Cordesman (1997) suggests that there is 
a lack of a formal constitution and that elections and political parties are, however, prohibited 
in the Kingdom. The Saudi Basic Law of Government was established in 1992, but, as 
Cordesman asserts, that the King’s power is, however, limited by the need for support by the 
religious leaders. The support from the religious establishment may be explained by the 
strong Islamic narratives that took place when Saudi Arabia was founded, in addition to the 
mutually dependent political alliance between the Wahhabi establishment and the King that 
still exists. In order to ensure the governance as an absolute monarchy, the Saudi religious 
establishment has issued a fatwā, prohibiting political parties. The fatwā states, “It is not 
permissible for Muslims to divide into separate religious groups and parties, with members 
cursing and fighting each other. Allah not only forbids such factionalism, but censures those 
who introduce or follow them and threatens them with grievous punishment. Both Allah and 
His Messenger (peace be upon him) renounced this practice,” according to Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Portal of the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta`(n.d). 
 
The role of the Wahhabi establishment in the decision-making process is, however, debated. 
Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 205) suggests that there exists an ongoing discourse among 
observers of Saudi foreign policy in relation to the role of the religious establishment in the 
decision-making process. He argues that some observers suggest that the religious 
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establishment has considerable power to claim veto in cases, while others perceive its power 
is greatly attenuated from previous times. Gause himself believes that the religious 
establishment has restricted power in foreign policy decision-making. The religious 
establishment has often been used as a tool for the royal family, whereby senior clerics 
usually issue fatwās following the King’s political stance. There are several examples where 
the royal family uses the religious establishment and prominent clerics to validate and 
approve decisions on both domestic and foreign policy, as the case studies will show. A prime 
historical example of how the royal family has used the religious establishment for political 
validation, is as Gregory F. Gause III (2002: 205) observes, when King Fahd ordered the 
Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz to justify the request for US troops to assist the 
kingdom in 1991, and of the hostilities against Iraq the same year.   
 
In contrast, Mai Yamani (2008: 146) states that, “Meanwhile, the Wahhabi clerics are 
continually indulged as the kingdom’s de facto rulers.” Mai Yamani (2008: 146) further says, 
“The Wahhabi establishment controls not just the juridical system, but also the Council of 
Senior Ulama; the General Committee for Issuing Fatwas, Da’wa, and Irshad; the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs; the Supreme Headquarters for the Council for International Supervision of 
Mosques; and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice.” 
Several of these agencies have an international orientation and provides the religious 
establishment an important function, as the Saudi legitimate much of its foreign policy 
through Islamic terms. Moreover, the Wahhabi establishment controls all religious education, 
the Ministry of Hajj, and endorses great influence in the Ministry of Finance through the 
control of Zakat. In addition, Article 8 in the Basic Law states, “Government in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic 
Sharia,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws and 
Regulations > The Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 2 (1992, March 1). Article 8 in the 
Basic Law of Gowenment suggests that the religious establishment enjoys considerable power 
at the domestic level, but I will argue that the Wahhabi clerics also have a direct impact on the 
external sphere as well. The case of the foreign troops stationed in the kingdom during the 
second Gulf War suggests that the royal family needs to gain political validation. 
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3.2.3 Instruments and capabilities 
 
Realism tends to focus on military power and capabilities, and assumes that nations use their 
military capabilities in order to gain more power. John T. Mearsheimer (2014: 55) explores 
the importance of military capabilities, stating, “In international politics, however, a state’s 
effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the 
military forces of rival states”. Moreover, the use of military instruments are often a 
controversial strategy, due to the risk it involves, according to (Mearsheimer 2014: 147).  
 
I do not dismiss the importance of hard power as focused upon in realism. Hard power 
capabilities need to be given attention if the critique of constructivism is taken into account. 
However, I do believe that the national attributes and self-imposed identity markers that Saudi 
Arabia possesses through soft power capabilities are of crucial importance when assessing its 
foreign policy. I have highlighted that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is complicated by the 
importance of transnational political ideologies within the region, in addition to the present 
balance of power game. These conditions complicate Saudi calculations in terms of power 
and threats, and the use of instruments. The Saudi regime not only needs to be aware of 
military shifts in the region, but also to political and ideological threats, which could question 
their domestic legitimacy, and thereby the essential national interest of regime security.  
 
Saudi Arabia has conducted an aggressive foreign policy through its, admittedly, rare use of 
its military capabilities abroad, as in the US-led coalition against Dāʿesh from September 
2014. Thus, a significant problem occurs when explaining this behaviour in terms of realism 
in IR-theory, as Dāʿesh is not recognised as a legitimate state among other nations in the 
international system. To handle non-state, or transnational actors, Christopher Hill (2003: 
195) suggest a basis for categorisation of actors, which are not recognised as states. 1. 
Territorial, a group or organization either use or seek some territorial base. 2. 
Ideological/cultural, whether they may try to promote certain ideas or ways of thinking across 
national frontiers. 3. Economic, their primary focus on wealth creation. This categorisation of 
transnational actors is used throughout the thesis, in an attempt to distinguish states from 
transnational actors. 
 
To differentiate the foreign policy instruments, there are, as Christopher Hill (2003: 128-129) 
argues, limited possible instruments that can be used in foreign policy – that can be classified 
as diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural. These instruments are rarely used in isolation 
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and are mostly used in conjunction to strengthen the desired impact. Military force can be 
used as coercion, deterrence or protection of sovereignty as foreign policy instruments 
towards other states, though military force can also be used as a repressive tool against a 
state’s own population. Economic power as an instrument can be used in promoting interests 
abroad, as economic aid, or economic sanctions, though it can be used to co-opt the 
population on the domestic level. In order to distinguish the different instruments and 
capabilities, I have included a figure that presents the possible instruments, capabilities, and 
resources a state may possess.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Resources, capabilities and instruments.1 
                                                 
1 The figure is taken from Hill, Christopher (2003: 137) with some modifications in order to distinguish hard and 
soft power capabilities.  
Resources 
(History and geography) 
Capabilities 
(Operational resources) 
Power and (to) influence 
Territory, natural resources, population, expertise, industry 
 
 
Hard power capabilities 
Weapons, GNP, trade/industry 
 
Soft power capabilities 
Technology, diplomacy, intelligence, media 
Force (the 
stick) 
 
Deterrence (threat of 
force) 
 
Persuasion (the carrot) 
 
Deference (latent 
influence) 
 
Military, diplomacy, economic sanctions, manipulation, diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, propaganda, inducements 
 
X`s ability to compel Y 
 
X`s ability to sway Y`s decision 
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Saudi Arabia possesses the whole spectrum of both soft and hard power capabilities, but has 
more effective economic and soft power capabilities, rather than offensive military 
capabilities. The term soft power, in contrast to hard power, has been debated. Christopher 
Hill (2003: 135) states, “Hard power is that which is targeted, coercive, often immediate and 
physical. Soft power is that which is indirect, long-term and works more through persuasion 
than force […]. Whereas hard power focuses on the target itself, soft power seeks primarily to 
change the target’s environment.” These arguments suggest that both hard and soft power aim 
to change the behaviour of another state or non-state actor, but involve different time 
perspectives for the desired effect to impact and the means used.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s hard power capabilities rest on its economy and military assets. The kingdom 
has, in recent years, increased its defence budget drastically, and imported advanced military 
equipment and capabilities. The Military Balance Press Statement (2014: 2) states, “Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have bought, or are buying, Western missile- and air-defence and 
strike systems, including stand-off air-launched munitions.” According to the report, these 
capabilities are imported as a preventive measure for deterring Iran’s missile arsenal. 
Therefore, the significant proportion of the imported Saudi military capabilities to a greater 
extent are defensive military capabilities, rather than offensive ones. However, Christopher 
Hill (2003: 147-148) states, “Even the build-up of apparently defensive arms in peacetime can 
be seen as an act of aggression and lead at best to unstable arms races and at worst to pre-
emptive strikes.” Despite this, the kingdom has, over the last few years, imported a large 
number of fighter aircraft and other offensive military capabilities.  
 
In addition to an increased defence budget, the Saudis possess great economic capabilities, as 
instruments that can be used to shape the international environment in their favour. 
Christopher Hill (2003: 188) elaborates on economic capabilities, “Foreign economic policy 
will be foreign policy when it seeks to shape the international environment and/or projects the 
fundamental concerns of the society from which it derives.” More relevant to the time period 
in light of the Arab Spring, Bernard Haykel (2013: 1) states, “Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
seek to use their wealth as an instrument of their foreign policy, shaping the external 
environment in order to secure their internal one.” The kingdom possessed 15.9 % of all 
global proven oil reserves in 2013, and contributed 13.1 % of the world’s oil production, 
according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2014: 6-15). The huge levels of Saudi 
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economic capabilities offer the Saudi regime with an extended package of options in 
promoting their interests abroad and on the domestic level. 
 
In order to analyse the politically economic perspective for Saudi Arabia through the prism of 
IR-theories, I would argue the need to explain it through the mercantilist tradition. This 
assertion is supported by the explanation of the mercantilist perspective on international 
political economy by Ngaire Woods Ngaire Woods (2011: 253) where he notes that, “For this 
reason, the aim of every state must be to maximize its wealth and independence. States will 
seek to do this by ensuring their self-sufficiency in key strategic industries and 
commodities,[…] Obviously, within this system some states have more power and capability 
than others. The most powerful states define the rules and limits of the system: through 
hegemony, alliances, and balances of power”. Saudi Arabia was one of the promoters of 
founding OPEC in 1960, and the organisation is characterised as an alliance or hegemon 
within the international oil market. Moreover, I would argue that Saudi Arabia to a large 
extent, is economic self-sufficient and independent, even though they are vulnerable to for 
instance decline in oil prices. This argument is based on the size of the kingdom’s oil 
reserves, the oil production volume, and its ability to adjust the levels of production. All these 
factors indicate Saudi Arabia as being an important player in the global economy. 
 
The kingdom’s soft power capabilities primarily rest upon its diplomacy, culture, intelligence 
services, media, and the religious establishment. Christopher Hill (2003: 141) states, 
“Diplomacy in multilateral institutions is an important part of any foreign policy.” In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, a country who holds membership of a wide range of powerful multilateral 
institutions, can promote its interests through a variety of channels. These institutions range 
from among the UN, G20, OPEC, The Arab League, and other Islamic organisations. 
Diplomacy through Islamic organisations falls under cultural diplomacy, whereas the UN and 
Arab League remains primarily under political institutions, and the G20 and OPEC are 
economic/political institutions. Christopher Hill (2003: 152) distinguishes between 
propaganda and culture, where the latter is a soft power tool and the use of propaganda is a 
coercive instrument. Nevertheless, he argues that both culture and propaganda aim to reach 
peoples more than the decision-makers of a state. Christopher Hill (2003: 152) elaborates on 
the argument and states, “By changing the domestic environment of other states that they are 
intended to undermine hostile regime and/or to spread the values of those seeking to act”. I 
would argue that culture used as a soft power foreign policy instruments can be promoted 
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through state institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, media 
and religious institutions, all of which they propagate certain values, beliefs or political 
stances. The cultural and political values Saudi Arabia possesses primarily rest upon the 
notion of its identity through Wahhabism and the importance of the monarchy.  
 
The sectarian instrument has been highlighted as one of the means Saudi Arabia uses to 
promote its interests. The use of sectarianism as an instrument is a soft power tool, whereby 
the desired impact is to attract others to its cultural and political values over time. The Saudi 
religious establishment, the Saudi media, and the Saudi intelligence services have all played 
an active role in promoting the Saudi sectarian narrative throughout the Middle East. The 
sectarian tension between Sunni and Shiite Muslims has escalated across the Middle East in 
past years, and especially in light of the Arab upheavals. The religious establishment and the 
state media have proclaimed anti-Shiite attitudes in television, preaches, and through the 
publication of fatwās. It is difficult to determine whether the anti-Shiite proclamation has 
taken place through the religious establishment’s own initiative or been approved by Saudi 
decision-makers. However, the Saudi religious establishment and the state media serves, in 
many ways, as an efficient and powerful actor in the promotion of Saudi culture and political 
values. 
 
The last soft power capability discussed in the thesis regards the use of intelligence services. 
Intelligence material and data are important elements in foreign policy-making for all states. 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have, according to Austin Long (2015), expanded both the 
use and capacity of their intelligence services. Austin Long (2015) highlights three reasons for 
this expansion. First, the growth of terrorist organisations on the Arabian Peninsula from the 
early 2000s precipitated the need for counter tactics. Second, the Arab Spring created new 
challenges and opportunities. Third, Iran as a perceived threat towards regional stability. 
General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) is Saudi Arabia’s primary intelligence agency and has 
been previously led by high-ranking figures within the royal family. Khalid bin Bandar held 
the position from June 30, 2014 until February 2015. The agency was previously led by the 
experienced diplomat and former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Bandar bin Sultan, 
in the time period from July 19, 2012 - April 14, 2014. The Saudi intelligence services do not, 
however, play an independent role vis-à-vis the King, but is an important state institution in 
promoting Saudi interests abroad. 
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3.3 Counterrevolutionary politics 
 
 
One of the thesis research questions addresses whether Saudi Arabia, did, in fact, lead a 
counterrevolutionary foreign policy in the Middle East during the period of 2011-2014. It is, 
therefore, necessary to clearly define how I understand the term counterrevolutionary and 
suggest factors that may motivate Saudi Arabia to engage in counterrevolutionary politics, 
based on the scope conditions elaborated through chapter 1-3. 
 
3.3.1 Definition and the normative aspect of the term 
 
The term counterrevolutionary should in the context of this thesis be understood as a nation 
that seeks to overturn or reverse a revolution in order to restore the state of affairs, which 
were in effect before the pre-revolutionary period, by using the available resources, 
capabilities, and instruments the state possesses. Counterrevolutionary politics also includes 
countering any other ideological, religious, or political aspirations that are not consistent with 
the worldview of an actor (here a state) which were in effect before the pre-revolutionary 
period.  
 
The term counterrevolutionary contains a normative aspect. Fred Halliday (1990: 210) 
discusses the term revolution, and states, “As with all other concepts in social science, the 
concept ‘revolution’ has evolved over time, and contains variant meanings.” Moreover, the 
concept of counterrevolutionary politics has perhaps been even more debated and subject to 
change. The term counterrevolutionary has been used towards both revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary movements, and vice versa. Who to engage in counterrevolutionary 
politics is often defined and dependent on who to label the actor - (the participants or the 
observers) to a given group, movement, or others that take part in these activities. The 
participants in the Hungary uprisings in 1956 were labelled as counterrevolutionary by the 
ruling parties, while the participants of the uprising labelled themselves as revolutionary. The 
term counterrevolutionary has been widely used in China, but contains another aspect than in 
the first example. Following victory in the civil war in China after the Second World War, the 
Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The Communist Party 
has repressed all political opposition and labelled opposition activities as 
counterrevolutionary. Article 28 of the CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA (1982) states, “The state maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and 
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other counter- revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that endanger public security and 
disrupt the socialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and reforms 
criminals.” The constitution of China thereby labels all opposition activities as 
counterrevolutionary. The difficulties related to the normative aspect of the term 
counterrevolutionary is however solved, as I have clearly defined the concept before engaging 
the cases, and discuss whether Saudi Arabia has, in fact, lead a counterrevolutionary foreign 
policy in the wake of the Arab upheavals. 
 
There are few studies of revolutions within IR, and the lack of focus upon this concept, by 
inference, means less focus on counterrevolutionary politics as well. Fred Halliday (1990: 
207) states, “Study of war, in its historical, strategic and ethical dimensions, as well as in 
policy terms, is central to the academic study of IR. Revolutions, by contrast, enjoy a 
marginal existence. Standard textbooks and theoretical explorations devote little space to 
them.” However, in order to explain how revolutions affects the international system from a 
realism perspective, Fred Halliday (1990: 211) states, “For Realists, revolutions tend to be 
seen in terms of the changing foreign policy styles and priorities of states, such that these now 
constitute a 'revisionist', 'dissatisfied' or unbalancing factor in the international system and 
must be suitable tamed: revolutions are a breakdown in an otherwise orderly world.” The 
regional revolutionary wave, could, from this perspective, have been seen as an unbalancing 
factor that needed to be suitably tamed for status quo powers. In addition, the realist 
perspective towards revolution strengthens my argument that the Arab upheavals served as a 
catalyst for Saudi Arabia to change their foreign policy, as states change their foreign policy 
styles and priorities in light of revolutions. 
 
3.3.2 Historical examples and Instruments 
 
There are several notable historical examples of states, or groups within a country engaging in 
counterrevolutionary politics. The word counterrevolutionary primarily originates from the 
1789 French Revolution, where French royalists started a counterrevolution to reinstate the 
monarchical system. The struggle resulted in a violent and bloody denouement, as the 
Royalists and Catholics armed themselves against the supporters of the Republican state. The 
revolution lasted for eleven years and changed the social, economic, and political structure of 
France, which affected Europe to this day. Thoughts of liberalism, nationalism, and 
democracy gained momentum as a direct consequence of the French Revolution. However, as 
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these ideas spread across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution, they threatened other 
European monarchies. The four great powers of Europe in this period consisted of the Russian 
Empire, the United Kingdom, Austria, and Prussia, who all found themselves under a 
threatening situation. One of the leading figures and known diplomats from this period was 
the Austrian Prince Klemens Von Metternich. He became known for trying to conserve the 
status quo of the monarchical systems, and aspired to reshape Europe as it existed prior to the 
French Revolution. 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 is another example of confrontation between revolutionary 
and counterrevolutionary forces. The Bolsheviks undertook a revolution against the rule of the 
former Tsar. However, not all Russians were supportive of the revolution, and the Bolsheviks 
met opposition from the ‘White movement’, which favoured a monarchical and conservative 
governance of Russia. The civil war and the fighting between these two parties lasted for four 
years, ending in 1921 with a Bolshevik victory. Counterrevolutionary politics in both the case 
of the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution lead to further civil war. 
 
It has proved difficult to outline specific instruments used in states that engage in 
counterrevolutionary politics. However, Kermit J. Johnson (1998: 34) has explored the ethics 
and counterrevolution through focusing on American involvement in internal wars, and states, 
“Revolution/counterrevolution is a protracted political-military struggle to determine who and 
what system will rule a country.” This argument suggests that both military and political 
instruments can be used to promote counterrevolutionary politics. Moreover, he highlights the 
political nature of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare. Kermit J. Johnson (1998: 
11) notes, “Nonconventional warfare describes only the military aspect of revolution and 
counterrevolution. This type of warfare encompasses struggle and war in all areas of society: 
political, economic, communications, social, cultural, psychological and religious.” Kermit J. 
Johnson (1998: 11) specifically outlines that revolutionary or counterrevolutionary warfare is 
a nonconventional form of warfare. The instruments used in revolutionary or 
counterrevolutionary wars embrace, from his perspective, all the instruments outlined in 
chapter 3.2.3 
 
Moreover, for a state to remain secure in times of revolutions, Fred Halliday (1990: 219) 
speaks of security between states and security within states, concluding that, “Security 
requires stability and counter-revolution.” This argument contributes towards legitimising 
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counterrevolutionary politics, as a necessity for a state to remain secure, from a realism 
perspective in times of a revolution. However, revolutions and counterrevolutionary politics 
challenge the realist perspective on international politics, as Fred Halliday (1990: 216) argues 
in respect to the relationship between the international system and domestic politics. The 
internal dimension is, as argued, less prioritised within the realist view towards the 
international system, and it, therefore, complicates the realist focus on revolutions or 
counterrevolutions as these (more or less) always come from within a state. 
 
Fred Halliday (1990: 215) discusses who provokes whom, the revolution or the 
counterrevolution, and observes, “[…] both processes begin, for internal and systemic 
reasons, and feeding on each other lead to confrontation. If revolutionary internationalism is 
an almost universal result of revolutions, so is its opposite, counter-revolutionary 
internationalism, the attempt by status quo powers to prevent the spread of revolutions and 
reform and, where possible, overthrow revolutions.” This logic is in accordance with the 
definition of counterrevolutionary politics used in this thesis, as a nation that seeks to overturn 
or reverse a revolution in order to restore the state of affairs, which were in effect before the 
pre-revolutionary period. 
 
In an attempt to distinguish the two concepts of conducting revolutionary politics and 
counterrevolutionary politics, I have chosen Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional examples. Iran, 
as it is today, evolved after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in opposition to the monarchical 
governance. Iran has been labelled as a revolutionary force by promoting its revolutionary 
Shiite-doctrine, vilayet-i faqih, which includes an ideational factor. Iran has sought to export 
its revolution with the aim of increasing its political influence throughout the Middle East. 
The propagation of the revolutionary doctrine has achieved success among the Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, and other branches of Hezbollah throughout the region, and more recently, to the al-
Houthi’s in Yemen. However, the Iranian revolutionary doctrine was perceived as a threat 
towards the Saudi state, legitimised, as it is, through Sunni Islam. For this reason, Saudi 
Arabia has sought to counter Iranian influence by supporting other Sunni groups with the aim 
of mitigating Iranian influence. Saudi Arabia has therefore been labelled 
counterrevolutionary, as the kingdom has actively tried to counter the Shiite doctrine that 
threatened the Saudi regime.  
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In reference to Halliday regarding the concept of who provokes whom, the revolutionary or 
the counterrevolutionary, in this particular example, Iran (the revolutionary), provoked Saudi 
Arabia (the counterrevolutionary), and the regional rivalry between the two states started. 
However, it would be far simple to label Iran as being revolutionary based on these 
circumstances. The role of ideology and interference is highlighted by Fred Halliday (1990: 
214) who states, “But this ideological challenge to the norms of international behaviour is, at 
most, a secondary issue: ideology and interference also play a part in the foreign policies of 
status quo powers, and revolutionary states have distinctive foreign policies above all because 
of the different goals they pursue, rather than just the methods they use.” Saudi Arabia has 
been highly active in promoting their interpretation of Islam and ideology by supporting a 
variety of Salafi and Wahhabi movements and mosques across the world. It is, therefore, 
necessary to look at the definition presented above. It is, therefore, not counterrevolutionary 
politics per definition to support different religious or ideological movements. However, it 
would be counterrevolutionary to engage in politics that aims to reverse or overturn a 
revolution in order to restore the state of affairs with the available capabilities and 
instruments.  
 
3.3.3 Scope conditions for Saudi Arabia to pursue counterrevolutionary politics 
   
Due to the lack of testable and well-employed IR-theories of counterrevolutionary politics, 
and in reference to the normative aspect of the term counterrevolutionary, I have sought to 
outline three potential factors for Saudi Arabia engaging in counterrevolutionary politics. 
These factors are based on the scope conditions I have presented through chapters 1-3, and 
will follow the definition given in section 3.3.1 when I discuss the different case studies. 
More precisely, the scope conditions include the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, the Saudi desire to 
retain regional stability, and that ideational threats can be perceived as undermining factors 
for the Saudi regime. The three core motivations for Saudi Arabia to engage in 
counterrevolutionary politics are as following:  
 
First, the overall and most important Saudi objective is regime security. In times of regional 
upheaval, there is a reason to believe that the Saudi regime’s greatest fear is to be deposed by 
a domestic revolution, thus losing their legitimacy. In order to prevent this from happening, 
the royal family needs to maintain the political alliance with the Wahhabi establishment and 
receive the support needed for political legitimacy. In order to sustain this position, it requires 
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the countering of competing ideologies or political systems that may undermine its position 
both on the internal and external level. Internal and external challenges to the political and 
religious legitimacy of its royal family may include democratic uprisings, and other ideologies 
within political Islam, which affect the domestic security of the Saudi regime.  
 
Threats against the Wahhabi-monarchical basis serve as an ideational threat. Threatening 
ideologies may derive from both an internal and an external level. The royal family have most 
likely defined the Arab upheavals as a threat towards the institution’s survival, in reference to 
Wendt (1992) and his beliefs that identities are the basis of interests and that an actor defines 
their interests in the process of defining the situation. A revolutionary situation gives the 
Saudi regime a high incentive for countering all threatening ideological, political, and 
religious aspirations that they perceive as threatening. In the context of countering ideological 
threats, Lawrence Rubin (2014: 37) suggests different ways to accomplish this, asserting that, 
“Counterframing involves four tactics: denial, defense, counterattack, and neutralization.” 
Rubin (2014: 37-38), elaborates on these tactics as, “Denial is a countermeasure to minimize 
the spread of the message and subversive ideas. There are two options for (authoritarian) 
states that control the media: cut of the communication entirely or not allow discussion of the 
issue […]. Defense is a rhetorical rebuttal to charge that involve positive statements or 
justifications of policies that are consistent with core and commonly held beliefs about 
normative values […]. Counterattack aims to undermine the source of the threat and thus deny 
the claim’s validity […]. Neutralization tries to recast the issue and change the environment to 
affect the resonance of a subversive idea.” 
 
Second, Saudi Arabia has another objective, which include keeping regional stability. The 
Saudi regime may be motivated for countering any unstable political systems to maintain 
regional stability, which would entail maintaining the status quo regarding the governance of 
other states. Regional instability is perceived as a significant risk to Saudi security. Saudi 
Arabia has traditionally conducted a consensual and cautious foreign policy, which may 
imply, from a defensive realism perspective, that it is unwilling to risk its security to gain 
more power. An aggressive foreign policy has higher risks and might, in contrast, be 
applicable to an offensive realism perspective. The Arab upheavals have greatly reduced 
regional stability. The civil wars, and the growing number of failed states close to Saudi 
borders, have produced increasing numbers of non-conventional actors that may threaten 
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Saudi Arabia from a security perspective. To Fred Halliday (1990), this situation suggests that 
security requires stability and counter-revolution. 
 
Third, Saudi Arabia aspires to become a regional hegemon. The Middle Eastern ‘cold war’ 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a conflict for hegemonic dominance. From this perspective, 
the Saudi regime needs to undermine the position and influence of the other regional great 
powers. The regional aspiration for hegemony gives Saudi Arabia a high motivation for 
countering Iranian influence in the region. This counter framing has two aspects: to reduce 
Iranian influence where it already has extensive control, or to reduce the possibility for Iran to 
gain power in areas where there is a political vacuum. It provides Saudi Arabia a tremendous 
motivation for downplaying Iranian influence throughout the region; taking the account of 
offensive realism perspective. The ultimate goal for states is to obtain a hegemonic position in 
the international system, and that states are willing to risk their security to gain more power 
for achieving hegemony. Foreign policy behaviour that reduces Iranian influence might take 
place at all levels, whether domestic, sub-regional, regional or international.  
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Chapter 4: A region in chaos  
 
The following two sections elaborates on the Arab Spring on a general basis, and, more 
specifically, how it affected the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the end of this chapter I will 
seek to nuance the analogy of King Abdullah as a reborn Saudi Prince Metternich.  
 
4.1 The Arab upheavals 
 
The Arab upheavals with all their hopes for democracy and reforms have led to violent 
conflicts, enormous refugee movements and more countries defined as failed states in the 
region. Moreover, the revolutionary wave represented as Haykel (2013: 1) puts it, “The Arab 
Spring represents a set of challenges the likes of which have not been seen in the Arab world 
for a half century or more.” The Arab upheavals and the ongoing chaos have led to battles on 
different levels. The first involves a fight between the regimes and protesters, the second 
conflict among different political groups, and the third is a regional and international 
competition for influence, according to Hussein Agha and Robert Malley (2011: 2).  
 
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia when a young man called Mohamed Bouazizi set himself 
on fire late December 2010. Mohamed Bouazizi’s reaction was an impulsive action in 
response to a Tunisian society with a high degree of corruption, governmental repression, and 
low political freedom. His action received great sympathy from Tunisian society, and protests 
quickly spread to other cities inside the country. Within a short time, it became clear that the 
demonstrations were not only isolated to Tunisia. People took to the streets in several cities 
across the Middle East, and the regional revolutionary outbreak became a reality from January 
to March 2011. The majority of the regimes within the region had no great plans to comply 
with the demands of the public demonstrations. Moreover, it became clear that the region’s 
leaders had no moral qualms in ruthlessly repressing the public uprisings. Social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, rather than arms were perhaps the most effective 
weapons during the Arab upheavals. The use of social media had two important purposes: it 
was used for mobilisation of demonstrations and protests, and served as a platform where the 
public could openly express their political opinions.  
 
Most states within the Middle East have been described as authoritarian, though politically 
stable for decades. A region in chaos, therefore, challenged the status quo for the political 
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leaders in terms of their position and the newly emergent threats. However, the majority of the 
countries in the region did not end up at war, civil-wars or otherwise. Nevertheless, there have 
been some dramatic and catastrophic consequences for some nations of the region, countries 
such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq have experienced the most violent outcomes as a result 
of the revolutionary fervour. The conflict in Iraq had already started prior to the Arab 
upheavals, though it was affected by the regional instability caused by the Arab Spring. The 
conflicts situated in these countries may have the potential to make the region 
disproportionately unstable. There is no higher authority, either at national, regional or 
international levels that provide security, and the situation is, therefore, described as anarchy 
in both the realist and constructivist perspectives. The civil wars in Syria and Iraq involve a 
high number of actors, including regional and international actors, which includes nation-
states and non-state actors. The conflicts in Libya and Yemen affect security in the 
neighbouring areas and allows terrorist groups to operate freely.  
 
In addition to severe regional challenges, the Middle Eastern powers saw opportunities for 
increasing their influence as the region became political unstable and sunk into anarchy. 
Gregory F. Gause III (2014: 25) notes that, “If one of them seems to be emerging as a 
dominant force, the others will naturally work to balance against it and limit the growth of its 
power.” The Arab upheavals were, therefore, the catalyst for regional states to engage in a 
more aggressive foreign policy, as it served as an opportunity to gain influence. Aggressive 
behaviour was evident, especially among Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar as they sought to 
promote and strengthen their areas of influence. This kind of foreign policy revealed itself 
through the extensive involvement in proxy wars throughout conflict areas in the region. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran have pursued conflicting interests in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, 
the politically unstable Yemen, and the uprising in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have both 
tried to strengthen their position in the Arabian Peninsula, and they have had different views 
on the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egypt and the wider region. Qatar has supported the 
Brotherhood and its sister organisation Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while Saudi Arabia has 
actively tried to undermine the Brotherhood’s influence inside the kingdom and throughout 
the region. 
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4.2 Regime stability and the Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Regime stability in Saudi Arabia, and how the kingdom handled the domestic uprisings, 
becomes interesting when discussing the kingdom’s external policies in reference to the 
theory chapter, and Alexander Wendt (1999) where he suggests that foreign policy behaviour 
is affected by domestic politics. Analysts and diplomats have, for a long time, predicted the 
end of the Saudi regime. However, the House of Al Saʿud has proved itself to be one of the 
most stable regimes in the Middle East. The royal family’s internal stability can in many ways 
explain the overall stability of the kingdom. It has been critical for the royal family to remain 
united in order to handle the serious threats from both within and abroad during times of 
regional political instability. Saudi Arabia’s main external threats to its security do primarily 
stem from the instable adjacent countries. The non-state actor, Dāʿesh, and the chaotic 
situation in Yemen may have a tremendous impact on the Saudi security if not dealt with. 
However, the royal family also faces internal challenges, such as maintaining the political and 
religious legitimacy of the al-Saʿud’s regime. Stig Stenslie (2014 a: 3) elaborates on what 
potentially can undermine the internal stability within the royal family, stating, “Ultimately, 
the absence of unity among the top echelons of the family could cause weaker leadership. 
This would undermine the House of Saʿud’s ability to effectively address the series of grave 
threats that it is facing, including rapidly growing unemployment, tremendous economic 
disparities among the people, sectarian divides, extremism, oil dependency, regional rivalry 
with Iran, and signs of a rift with the U.S.” The royal family has, however, been able to 
maintain stability within the family in times of both internal and external threats towards its 
position. 
 
Gregory F. Gause III (2011 a: 5-8) discusses how the regime has retained stability in Saudi 
Arabia in the wake of the Arab Spring and highlights the kingdom’s capacity to co-opt the 
loyalty of its citizens, by deploying loyal and well-trained security forces, and by mobilising 
its patronage network. This line of thought is also followed by Guido Steinberg (2014: 5) who 
believes that the kingdom has conducted a carrot-and-stick strategy at the domestic level. This 
approach includes both giving enormous economic support to its population, and increasing 
the presence of its security forces to utterly repress any form of protest or demonstration. 
According to Gregory F. Gause III (2011 a: 6) the police, security forces, and the Special 
Forces all come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior and the National Guard, of 
which are controlled by individuals close to the king. Some of the armed institutions are built 
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on and controlled by the specific tribal coalition or religious sects. Gregory F. Gause III (2011 
a: 6) suggests that the forces belonging to the Ministry of Interior and the National Guard are 
exclusively recruited among tribes in areas the regime considers loyal. In the initial phase of 
the Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia, these forces were particularly deployed in the Eastern 
provinces of the country, where the Shiite population is located. The extensive use of the 
Saudi economic capabilities and networks in co-opting the opposition has been used for 
decades to keep the regime stable. However, the royal family has, in several instances, 
showed its will and capacity to use security forces more actively against any opposition in 
light of the Arab upheavals.  
 
There is no doubt to the extent that the wealth stemming from the oil has contributed to 
maintaining internal stability in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is undoubtedly one of the 
wealthiest countries in the Middle East, and had significant advantages, well above the 
regional medium or non-exporting oil-countries for co-opting their populations. However, it is 
somewhat unclear how long the royal family can pursue the strategy of co-opting the Saudi 
population’s loyalty and passivity, even though the economic capabilities have been an 
effective instrument in handling domestic upheavals in order to keep regime stability. 
According to Mehran Kamrava (2012: 98), the Saudi state had already started to prepare 
itself, and had taken preventive measures to handle eventual demands for reforms, or change 
from the civil society in February 2011. The Saudi state spent $130 billion to raise public 
service salaries, promising to build 500, 000 additional units of low-income housing, and 
increase the financial support for religious organisations.  
 
Protests and demonstrations were, however, planned on March 11, 2011, on a day named the 
day of wrath (yawm al-ghaḍab). Approximately 30, 000 people had joined a Facebook-group 
and planned to participate in protests against the Saudi regime. There were, according to 
Madawi al-Rasheed, (2011: 517) only two Sunni opposition groups that supported the 
planned protests on March 11: the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), and the 
newly established Sunni Umma Party. In addition to the fear of uprisings and demands for 
reforms by the Sunni majority, perhaps the greatest concerns regarding domestic uprising was 
caused by those located in the eastern part of the country; the Shiite minority population. 
During my period stationed in Riyadh, I twice travelled to the Saudi Eastern cities of al-
Dammam, and al-Jubail both of which are heavily inhabited by the Saudi Shiite minority 
population. The Saudi security forces had a greater presence in this part of the country in 
65 
 
comparison to Riyadh, where I spent most of my stay. There are several reports including al-
Rasheed (2011) and Rieger (2014), which support my observation of a high number of Saudi 
security forces present in the Eastern province. These forces have actively quashed any 
attempts of public uprisings in light of the Arab upheavals.  
 
The initial protests in Saudi Arabia were concentrated in the Eastern part of the country and 
led by the Shiite minority. These cities are in close proximity to Bahrain and further validate 
the idea of the Saudi fears of a spill-over, as demonstrations in Bahrain had taken place 
already on February 19, 2011. In the case of demonstrations in the Eastern provinces, 
Stéphane Lacroix (2011: 52) argues that Facebook pages urged for demonstrations already in 
February 2011. Some of these pages focused primarily on the defence of Shiite rights; others 
supported a project by implementing a constitutional monarchy. Stéphane Lacroix (2011: 52) 
states, “The activists had two main causes to promote. First, they demanded the release of the 
“forgotten prisoners” who had been detained without trail since the 1996 Khobar Towers 
bombing […]. Second, they proclaimed solidarity with the protests that had erupted in 
Bahrain on February 14.”  
 
Demonstrations are, however, forbidden by law according to the Saudi Arabian constitution, 
legitimised through the Saudi Basic Law. The Saudi Basic Law of Government states in 
Article 6 that, “In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger(PBUH), 
citizens shall give the pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to the King, professing loyalty in times of 
hardship and ease”, according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia The Shura Council. Laws and 
Regulations > The Basic Law Of Government > Chapter 2 (1992, March 1). The Saudi 
constitution propagates, through Article 6, the tenet of allegiance to the King, and that it 
should be respected at all times. Moreover, Abdallah received support from the Wahhabi 
establishment in order to reduce the impact of the upheavals. According to the Islamopedia 
Online (2011), the Council of Senior Scholar’s issued a fatwā on March 11, 2011 stating, 
“Since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on the Qur'an, Sunnah, the pledge of allegiance, 
and the necessity of unity and loyalty, then reform should not be by demonstrations and other 
means and methods that give rise to unrest and divide the community. The Council affirms 
prohibition of the demonstrations in this country and the legal method which realizes the 
welfare without causing destruction rests on the mutual advice.” The Senior Scholars stressed 
the pledge of Bayʿa or allegiance, and, through their fatwā. According to Asma al-Sharif 
(2011, March 29), in Reuters did the leader of the council, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-
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Sheikh, requested 1.5 million copies of the fatwa to be published in in March 2011 for further 
distribution. 
 
Furthermore, approximately a year after the Arab upheavals took place, in January 2012, 
Abdullah promoted Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh to be the head of the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the ‘religious police’. Louise Lief (2013) 
states, “Since taking office, Sheikh Abdul Latif has identified five areas the religious 
police should focus on: preserving Islam, preventing blackmail, combating sorcery, fighting 
human trafficking, and ensuring that no one disobeys the country’s rulers.” The last identified 
area of focus becomes relevant in the context of a revolutionary wave rolling across the 
region. Moreover, Abdul Latif Abdul al-Sheikh warned the Saudi population against using 
Twitter through a statement. According to an article in BBC (2013, May 15), al-Sheikh 
announced that Twitter was a threat to national unity. Saudi Arabia is, however, one of the 
most active Twitter users per capita in the Arab countries, according to Arab Social Media 
Report (2014). The strategy of al-Sheikh was a counter-framing measure of denial, where it 
aimed to minimise the spread of ideas by cutting off the social media platform Twitter. The 
combination of Abdallah’s appointment of al-Sheikh as head of the government agency, and 
al-Sheik’s strategy of minimising the use of Twitter by the Saudis, serves as a clear example 
of how the royal family uses Islam to promote and preserve its national interest of regime 
security. However, there are some notable contradictions in al-Sheik’s statement against the 
use of Twitter. Several members of the religious establishment, and the Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, are themselves active users of Twitter for 
promoting their opinions.   
 
In addition, the Saudis launched the state propaganda machinery through its Foreign Ministry. 
During a press conference, the Saudi Foreign Minister Saʿud al-Faisal elaborates on how the 
Saudis would react in cases of foreign influence during a press conference in March 2011.  
 
“Prince Saud also emphasized the Kingdom's absolute refusal of any infringement on the 
Islamic principles and values on which the Kingdom's laws and regulations are based, 
including the regulations that establish the principles of civil society and aim at protecting the 
society and maintaining its security, stability and integrity against sedition. Such issues are 
provided for by the teachings of Islamic Law (Sharia) and confirmed by the statements issued 
by the Senior Scholars Commission and the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom[…] 'We will cut off 
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any finger comes to the Kingdom. We won't accept at all any interference in the internal 
affairs of the kingdom, as we do not interfere in the internal affairs of others. We are a State 
based on Shari' a (Islamic law) and will not accept to be blamed by whoever sees in this 
system something he doesn't want'[…] 'Change comes by the citizens of this country and not 
by the theory of foreign fingers[…]'As for Iran, we hope it deals only with the demonstrations 
in its country. We do not have demonstrations like those in Iran, and I repeat what I have 
mentioned before that we will not tolerate with any interference in our internal affairs by any 
party whoever and we will continue this policy, and we confirm that had the Kingdom spotted 
any interference cases, we will deal with them decisively',” according to Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, March 9).   
 
The statement from Saʿud al-Faisal suggests that the Saudi regime warned the Iranians for 
trying to influence its domestic sphere. Saʿud al-Faisal makes it explicitly clear that the Saudi 
government does not tolerate any interference, and will deal with the interference decisively. 
The Saudi perception of foreign influence connected to the upheavals, and, moreover, the 
harsh rhetoric from Saʿud Al-Faisal, coincide with the argument that the Saudis are willing to 
take huge risks in safeguarding its position against any foreign powers that directly challenge 
the legitimacy of Saudi rule. Madawi al-Rasheed (2011: 520) describes the speech, and states, 
“The state propaganda machine described calls for protests as a foreign attempt to cause 
chaos, divide the country, and undermine its security.” The notion of Homeostasis now 
becomes relevant, Christopher Hill (2003) argues that demands for regional autonomy are not 
the proper business of foreign policy until they become connected to outside pressures, as 
referred to in chapter 3. Madawi al-Rasheed (2011: 520) argues that this Saudi strategy had 
two purposes. First, it legitimized the deployment of security forces to the Eastern part of the 
country as the regime described it a ‘Shiite revolt’. Second, the Saudi regime tried to unite the 
Sunnis as support for the regime. 
 
4.3 Prince Metternich in Riyadh   
 
I have argued that the common perception of Saudi Arabia is that of serving as a 
counterrevolutionary force within the Middle East in light of the Arab upheavals. However, 
Gregory F. Gause III (2011 b: 9) strongly disagrees with this characterisation, believing, 
“Saudi Arabia is against regime change in allied states. It supports its fellow monarchs both 
out of concern for its own domestic regime security, ideological solidarity, and balance of 
68 
 
power politics.[…] Let’s understand Saudi regional policy for what it is, and let Prince 
Metternich rest in peace.” His argument originates from 2011, prior to Saudi Arabia having 
involved itself actively in the internal affairs of Egypt with its support to Egyptian parties 
promoting the counterrevolution. The arguments of Saudi support for fellow monarchs and 
ideological solidarity do, however, not correspond to the Saudi behaviour toward Egypt, as 
the country is not governed as a monarchy and promotes a different ideology to Saudi Arabia. 
Despite this, Egypt has for years been a close and valuable ally for the Kingdom. I, therefore, 
concur with Gause III that Abdullah has not promoted an overall and unambiguously 
counterrevolutionary politics in all cases of Saudi foreign policy, as was the case with Prince 
Metternich. There are cases of Saudi foreign policy behaviour, where Abdullah has done the 
opposite, and even contributed or attempt for regime changes, as I will demonstrate in the 
next chapters. 
 
More recently, René Rieger (2014: 1) following the lines of Gause III, and states, “However, 
this [counterrevolutionary] characterization of Saudi policy is an incorrect generalization. It is 
true that Riyadh has been making significant efforts to safeguard the political status quo in the 
Kingdom and the remaining Arab monarchies, including in the Gulf.” Again, this argument 
fails to consider the Saudi role in Egypt. Moreover, Renè Rieger (2014: 1) states, “This 
ostensibly contradictory policy is the result of a pragmatic strategy that aims at safeguarding 
Saudi Arabia’s main policy interests, namely regime security and regional stability.” The 
argument suggests that King Abdullah has orientated the country’s foreign policy towards 
defending its core interests (I), in addition to preserving regional stability, rather than taking 
the counterrevolutionary lead in the overall foreign policy behaviour.  
 
Both Gregory F. Gause III (2011 a: 15) and Renè Rieger (2014: 1) argue that Saudi Arabia 
has only became militarily involved in Bahrain in order to crack down on demonstrations. 
Moreover, they argue that Saudi Arabia has actually contributed to regime change (or 
attempts at regime change) in many other Middle Eastern countries. The Saudi government, in 
addition to GCC, created a transition plan for the former Yemeni President. Saudi Arabia did 
more or less support the NATO bombing of Libya, and gave support for Libyan rebels against 
the former President. In addition, the Saudi regime has supported opposition groups against 
Syrian President al-Assad in the wake of the Arab upheavals. 
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As highlighted in chapter 1 and throughout this chapter, different perceptions of whether 
Saudi Arabia lead a counterrevolution in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab upheavals 
exist. I will now change direction somewhat and analyse Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy 
through the four cases, including strategies and patterns of behaviour, and will elaborate the 
underlying driving force(s) for a more aggressive policy within each case and discuss the 
counterrevolutionary aspect of its foreign policy behaviour.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Chapter 5: The military intervention in Bahrain  
 
The GCC-led military intervention in Bahrain serves as a prime example of King Abdullah’s 
counterrevolutionary politics. Along with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia was one of 
the leading countries within GCC that crushed the initial demonstrations in the neighboring 
country under the flag of the Peninsula Shield Force. The intervention took place on March 
14, 2011, when approximately 1500 troops and vehicles rolled across the King Fahd 
causeway into Bahrain in order to stop the democratic uprisings, and, therefore, follows the 
definition outlined in section 3.3.3. Saudi Arabia’s behaviour in Bahrain can be perceived as 
the kingdom’s first intimation of a more aggressive foreign policy, and a symbolic policy of 
tightening control over its area of influence. There are three possible factors for the Saudis 
engaging in counterrevolutionary politics, and these are based upon the arguments presented 
in chapter 3.3. First, to counter threatening ideologies and political systems that pose a threat 
to the legitimacy of the political alliance with the Wahhabi religious establishment and the 
royal family. Second, Saudi Arabia might be motivated to counter any unstable political 
systems to retain regional stability, which involves maintaining the status quo in other Middle 
Eastern states. Third, Saudi Arabia possesses a high incentive to counter Iranian influence 
across the region. The following chapter will show that all three factors were needed in order 
to explain the counterrevolutionary politics in the case of the Saudi military intervention in 
Bahrain.   
 
In addition, the five causal assumptions to explain aggressive behaviour from an offensive 
realism perspective all need to be present in order to assess the foreign policy from this 
viewpoint. In the case of the Saudi intervention in Bahrain, I would strongly argue that all five 
of Mearsheimer’s assumptions were present. First, the international system was anarchic, 
according to both the realist and constructivism definition. Second, Saudi Arabia possessed 
the military capabilities needed to intervene. Third, Saudi Arabia was unsure about Iranian 
intentions in Bahrain. Fourth, Saudi Arabia strived to maintain territorial integrity and the 
autonomy of the domestic political order, as presented in chapter 4. Fifth, the Saudi 
intervention was a rational and strategic action in order to ensure its survival.      
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5.1 Crushing the democratic uprising   
 
Saudi Arabia has probably seen its relationship with the Al Khalifa monarchy in the 
neighbouring country Bahrain as a form of a Kantian role structure, according to Wendt’s 
exploration of role structures between states. Whereby the two regimes perceive each other as 
being in a socially constructed friendship, based on an equal structure of governance as Sunni 
Muslim-ruled monarchies, in close bilateral cooperation and within GCC. However, a 
neighbouring democratic uprising in the Saudi near backyard served as a major threat to the 
Saudi regime legitimacy, and, therefore, to its relative domestic stability. Toby C. Jones 
(2011a: 4) asserts that the Saudis had several reasons for not wishing the ruling Al Khalifa to 
be toppled from its position. The Saudi’s greatest fears were focused on the possibility of a 
Shiite government being established through democratic reform. In addition, Lawrence G. 
Potter (2014: 20) states that, “The possibility that the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain could be 
thrown by its Shiʿi majority was a red line for the Saudis, who feared that their own Shiʿi 
community would be encouraged to revolt should the Al Khalifa fall.” In this respect, the 
Saudi regime did take preventive measures on the domestic level in order to counter the 
uprising at home as shown in chapter 4.  
Moreover, the Saudis believed they had every right to take precautionary measures abroad as 
well, according to a statement from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011, who states, 
 “The security and stability of the region is the responsibility of the states of the region […]. 
The Gulf States have the right to defend their security and maintain their independence 
according to their own discretion and as guaranteed by the international law to confront any 
internal or international challenges,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2011, September 20). This statement was published on September 20, 2011, 
through the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website. The statement 
suggests that Saudi Arabia perceived itself as having the right to defend the stability in the 
region in order to confront any internal or international challenges. As the statement was 
published six months after the Saudis acted against the uprisings in Bahrain, the Saudis may 
have needed to legitimise its action for keeping regional stability by referring to the 
international law. There is, however, an inherent contradiction in this statement. The Saudi 
regime has, both through Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, March 
9), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, September 20) and HRH 
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Prince Turki Al Faisal (2013), all of which state that Saudi foreign policy is built upon the 
notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.  
Saudi rhetoric was based on the premise that the Al Khalifa regime urged the GCC for help in 
order to handle the uprisings, such as legitimising the military intervention. HRH Prince Turki 
Al Faisal (2013: 6), states that, “The deployment of GCC troops at the request of a member 
country of the GCC to protect its strategic infrastructure like the oil refinery, the airport, the 
seaport, and economic installations is a duty that the Kingdom was and remains happy to 
provide.” However, Bill Law (2011, December 14) in BBC states that, “A source close to 
Prince Nayef told me two weeks before the troops arrived that the Bahrainis were on notice 
that if they did not deal with the demonstrations, the Saudis would do it for them.” It is 
difficult, however, to validate this statement without further sources. Bernard Haykel (2013: 
4-5) appears to corroborate this by arguing that the Saudi leadership handles Yemen and 
Bahrain as they were Saudi domestic territory, with the Ministry of Interior as the responsible 
Ministry in charge of Saudi policies with both Yemen and Bahrain. The Saudi Minister of 
Interior, Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud served as Minister of Interior prior to the Saudi 
intervention, suggesting that Bahrain was, according to Haykel, under Nayef’s responsibility. 
Moreover, this also relates to an assertion by Bernard Haykel (2013: 4), who states, “On 
February 14, 2011, the Saudi leadership sent a message to the Sunni minority regime in 
Manama that no political concessions were to be made to the majority Shi’ites.” This is also 
supported by Toby C. Jones (2011a: 3), who considers that Saudi domestic anxieties 
contributed to the decision to crack down upon the revolution in Bahrain. Regime security is 
highlighted as being the most crucial aspect of Saudi national interests, might therefore 
strengthen the Saudi motivation in terms of protecting itself, and the Saudi monarchy, against 
threatening ideologies or political systems as Shiite governance and democracy. 
 
In order to ensure the security of the Bahraini regime, both military and economic instruments 
were used to prevent an effective revolution, before the Saudis led the upheavals to a sectarian 
dimension against the Shiites population, and for preventing Iranian influence. The use of 
military instruments had only temporary effects in Bahrain, as the uprisings still function as 
an ongoing ‘silent’ revolution. Saudi Arabia has, in light of the intervention, backed the Al 
Khalifa monarchy, offering extended economic support as a preventive measure to maintain 
the status quo for the Bahraini regime. HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal (2013: 6) states, “The 
GCC has extended a ten-year economic package of $10 billion dollars, mostly from the 
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Kingdom.” Moreover, the Saudi actions in Bahrain created another proxy theatre between the 
Saudis and the Iranians, as the Iranian support for the Shiite uprisings increased. Eduardo Z. 
Albrecht (2013) highlights that the Iranian politician, Ayatollah Ahmed Jannati stated, “All 
Islamic intellectuals are now called upon to act. All Islamic countries, as long as they`re not 
themselves involved in the crime, bear responsibility to support the Bahrainis in their fight.” 
The Bahraini Shiite population has suffered a wide range of socioeconomic, political and 
religious discrimination for years. Iran had, therefore, the possibility to provide the 
discriminated Shiite the support it needed against the suppression by the Al Khalifa regime. 
 
5.2 Preventing Iranian influence 
 
The Saudi intervention had another crucial objective, which was to limit and/or prevent 
further Iranian influence in Bahrain, with its close geographical proximity to Saudi Arabia. I 
have highlighted that the Saudi perception of the uprisings had foreign and Iranian influence, 
as shown in chapter 4. It is difficult to validate if this was a Saudi socially constructed 
perception, or if the uprisings actually had foreign influence. However, if the Shiite majority 
population potentially obtained real political power in Bahrain, the Saudi regime would, in all 
probability, have perceived this structure of governance as a threat, as it is with Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, the al-Houthi’s in Yemen, and the al-Assad regime in Syria, where Iran has 
extensive political influence.  
 
Since the Islamic revolution in Iran 1979, in which proclaimed the Shiite-doctrine of the 
vilayet-i faqih, Saudi Arabia has perceived Iran as an ideological, religious, and political 
threat to its legitimacy. Moreover, the Islamic Revolution through Khomeini challenged the 
Saudi perception of being the leading state within Islam, as both regimes use religion for 
legitimacy. The rivalry developed into an ideological and political battle for influence in the 
Middle East, and this has led both states to attack the other’s religious legitimacy and its 
character. The Iranian threat has, from a Saudi perspective, seemed to have escalated when 
the Iraqi Shiite majority have gained greater political power from 2003 and onwards. It has 
therefore been critical to reduce the influence of Iran and other Shiite-movements from a 
Saudi perspective. Guido Steinberg (2014: 6) notes that, “[…] Riyadh countered Iranian 
hegemonic strivings more vigorously than before.” He highlights the Saudi-led military 
intervention in Bahrain 2011, and the Saudi support for opposition groups in Syria, with the 
aim to crush the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad, a close Iranian ally. Guido Steinberg 
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(2014: 6) further argues that Saudi Arabia’s regional policy, driven by a fear that Iran could or 
might mobilise the Shiite populations in the Middle East and even within the kingdom.  
 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is based on a Lockean structure from Wendt’s role structure through 
a constructivist viewpoint. To Wendt, this form of rivalry is built upon the subjective 
perception of its ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. Gregory F. Gause III (2010: 39) challenges the realist 
and the typical western perspective on Iran as only a military threat, and states, “I think that 
the Saudi perspective on Iranian regional power is much more accurate than ours. It is not 
Iranian military power that gives Iran regional influence, but rather Iran’s political links to 
powerful actors in states where the central government is weak. Those links are based on a 
mixture of shared ideology, sectarian affiliation, common antipathy toward the United States 
and Israel […].” This argument suggests that the Saudi fear of Iran is not only premised on 
the belief of a realistic military threat, but also the constructivist viewpoint emphasising the 
ideology aspect as a threat. 
 
However, the Saudis fear the Iranian nuclear program as well. Lawrence Rubin (2014: 114) 
states, “Saudi Arabia clearly considers Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons capability a 
serious national security threat.” The Iranian nuclear fear applies according to a realist’s 
perspective, as it involves enormous military and deterrent capabilities, which would change 
the balance of power within the region. King Abdullah has, according to the former senior US 
diplomat Dennis Ross, in an article in Hareetz, Chemi Shalev (2012, May 30), previously 
stated, “If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.” The Saudi regime, 
therefore, perceives the Iranian nuclear program as a serious threat. However, the present 
conditions in the region suggest that the Saudis are more occupied and worried about Iranian 
political influence in areas such as Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. 
 
Moreover, one of the concepts within a Lockean anarchy is that the actors respect each other’s 
sovereignty. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly accused the Iranian revolutionary guard of 
intervening in Shiite populated countries. Therefore, the Saudi actions in Bahrain could, for 
this reason, have evolved from a desire to counter Iranian influence in Bahrain, but also, given 
the Shiite population in Saudi Arabia, inside the Saudi Kingdom. Anthony H. Cordesman 
(1997: 8) observes that, in the years prior to the Arab upheavals that the Iranians were, 
according to senior Saudi officials, “[…] trying to dominate the Gulf and export its own brand 
of revolutionary extremism.” This perspective is highlighted by HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal 
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(2013: 6) who states, “Right after the 1979 revolution in Iran, Khomeini began trying to 
export his revolution to all Muslim countries. […] Those who claim that the recent 
disturbances were not instigated by Iran forget that Khomeini’s creation, Hezbollah in 
Bahrain, still exists and that Iranian propaganda broadcasts beamed at Bahrain have never 
ceased.”  
 
This Saudi view gives the Iranian historical narrative of being a revolutionary force greater 
significance, and, therefore, strengthens the Saudi perception of the uprisings to be influenced 
by Iran. In addition, by following Wendt’s assertion of a Hobbesian role structure where he 
argues that if states think that other recognise their sovereignty, then survival is not at stake. 
However, if the Saudi regime perceive that Iran threatened their sovereignty, and did not 
recognise the Kingdom’s sovereignty, then survival is at stake, as outlined in the speech of 
Saʿud Al Faisal. Survival being at stake mandates aggressive foreign policy behaviour, 
according to Mearsheimer and his offensive realism perspective. Moreover, Mearsheimer 
argues that states do not behave aggressively purely because they are aggressive, but will 
under these circumstances need to gain more power as a strategy to ensure survival.  
 
Ana Echagüe (2014: 1) argues that the Saudis saw the uprisings as a risk for regional stability, 
and moreover, an opportunity to change the balance of power against Iran. From this 
perspective, the Saudi intervention in Bahrain could be explained by offensive realism, 
whereby great powers defend the balance of power, and undermine the balance when the great 
power sees an opportunity. Saudi Arabia seized its opportunity in Bahrain, with an aim of 
preventing its longstanding rival Iran from doing the same. This concept is also highlighted by 
Guido Steinberg (2014: 19) who states that, “At the same time, financial assistance, military 
invasion and political support made Manama increasingly dependent on Riyadh, turning 
Bahrain into a de facto Saudi Arabian protectorate.” This argument is also definitely 
supported by Mearsheimer and his offensive realism perspective, whereby great powers seek 
opportunities to gain power over its rivals, with hegemony as their ultimate goal.  
 
5.3 Sending a message  
    
The Saudi intervention also served as a message. The intervention confirmed that upheavals 
were not taking place in the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, as Waleed bin Talal stated. 
I would argue that there were two receivers of the intervention as a message. First, deterring 
76 
 
the Shiite population in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain taking part in the upheavals. Second, 
to reassure the other Sunni-ruled monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula.  
 
The military intervention in Bahrain was a strong message to the Shiite population to restrain 
themselves in taking part of the upheavals. Moreover, the intervention was a message that 
protests were not to be tolerated and would be rapidly crushed by the Saudis. The Saudi 
behaviour towards the protesting Shiites in Bahrain demonstrated its underlying connection to 
the Saudi domestic sphere. Prior to the intervention, the Saudi security forces had confronted 
the Saudi Shiite population in the Eastern part of the kingdom. However, the intervention led 
to a domestic spillover. Renè Rieger (2014: 3) states, “The Saudi engagement provoked the 
largest demonstrations in the Saudi Eastern Province since the beginning of the Arab Spring.” 
This particular example is a clear demonstration of the link between internal and external in 
foreign policy. 
 
The Saudis escalated the sectarian aspect to a new level by the end of 2014, as the military 
and economic instruments did not prove themselves to be a well-functioned means in stopping 
the ongoing Shiite uprisings in Bahrain and the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia. According to Ian 
Black (2014, October 16) in The Guardian, a Saudi death sentence was given to the 
prominent religious Shiite leader, Sheikh Nimr al-Baqir al-Nimr, considered to promoting 
sectarian hatred. Al-Nimr is a popular figure and serves as one of the leading voices among 
the Shiites in the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia. According to Ian Black (2014, October 16) 
Saudi state prosecutors asked for al-Nimr to be crucified as a punishment for his alleged role 
in urging sedition against the Saudi state. Al-Nimr was arrested in 2012, charged with 
‘disobeying the ruler’ and being a leader in the Shiite uprisings. However, al-Nimr had urged 
for peaceful demonstrations against the discrimination of the Shiite population. Moreover, Ian 
Black (2014, October 16) suggests that the Iranian foreign ministry stated in October 2014, 
that a potential execution would lead to “dire consequences.”  
 
On the other hand, the military intervention served as a powerful signal of Saudi’s support to 
the Sunni monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi support of the other Gulf monarchies is 
considered to be of great importance, as it demonstrates Saudi’s capabilities as a regional 
power. However, the Saudis did not engage militarily in other Gulf monarchies as 
precautionary means against the uprisings. Instead, the Saudis exploited their public 
diplomacy and economic capabilities in order to safeguard the other regimes as, for instance, 
77 
 
in Oman. Ana Echagüe (2014: 14) suggests that King Abdullah encouraged to establish a 
political rescue plan via a greater integration of GCC members into a Gulf Union. The idea 
was later dismissed in 2013, as the Omanis threatened to leave the GCC if the Gulf Union 
were to be established. For the Saudis, the Omani rejection was humiliating, according to Ana 
Echagüe (2014: 14). However, Oman has not witnessed any dramatic effects on its regime 
stability in the wake of the Arab upheavals, but rather served as a mediator between the 
Sunni-led Gulf monarchies and Iran. 
 
The realists’ thoughts of a state seizing the opportunity to become a regional hegemon, might 
also be transferable to the sub-regional level on the Arabian Peninsula. Bernard Haykel (2013: 
2) states that, “Clearly, Qatar is a country in search of a regional role, and the Arab Spring has 
presented the perfect opportunity to catapult it into a more prominent position.” There are 
several examples of Qatar seeking a greater sub-regional role, such as the opening of the news 
agency al-Jazeera in 1996, and, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, its pro-Muslim Brotherhood 
politics. Qatari aspirations for greater regional influence does threaten the Saudi perception of 
being a sub-regional key-player, even though the Kingdom of Qatar do not possess the 
capabilities as Saudi Arabia. The dynamic of Gulf-politics in the wake of the Saudi military 
intervention in Bahrain challenges Wendt’s perception of that anarchy may contain dynamics 
that lead to competitive power politics, but they also may not. In the case of the Arab 
upheavals, it did lead to competitive power politics among the great powers on the Arab 
Peninsula. However, the dynamic did not, as often proclaimed by the realist tradition, lead to 
military confrontations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, rather it unveiled itself in the 
Egyptian and Syrian revolutions towards questions about the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
armament of the Syrian opposition. 
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Chapter 6: Supporting the counter-revolution in Egypt 
 
Saudi engagement in Egypt had another counterrevolutionary aspect than it had in Bahrain. 
The Saudis gave political and economic support to the former Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak, and urged the US President Obama to maintain political support for Mubarak 
though, however, this did not take place. Both the Tunisian President Ben Ali, who was 
subsequently exiled to Saudi Arabia, and the Egyptian President Mubarak were deposed 
within a short revolutionary period. Their removal caused a high level of insecurity for King 
Abdullah and the royal family regarding their own position. Bernard Haykel (2013: 3) 
discusses the Saudi view when Mubarak was deposed, and states, “What was disturbing was 
how the leaders were deposed: mass mobilization in the streets, with the United States 
unwilling to offer unequivocal support to long-standing allies.”  
 
King Abdullah did not manage to safeguard the Egyptian President while the upheavals in 
Egypt took place. However, the Saudis supported the counter-revolution led by high-ranking 
Egyptian officers connected with the old regime in their fight against the newly elected 
Mohammed Morsi, and the Muslim Brotherhood in power. Gregory F. Gause III (2014: 17) 
states, “This combination of democracy and Islamists politics was unsettling to the Saudi 
leadership. The upheaval in Egypt had not only removed Saudi Arabia’s primary Arab ally, it 
also brought to power a regime that could credibly contest Saudi Arabia’s role as leader of the 
Sunni Muslim world, and even present an alternative form of Sunni Islamists politics to the 
Saudi monarchical model.” The argument favours a constructivist perspective of a perceived 
ideational threat that could potentially question the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy. 
Moreover, Andrew Hammond (2013: 8) states, “Saudi support for the coup against Morsi on 
3 July was immediate and absolute, exposing Saudi concerns about the Islamist trend at 
home.” The Saudis, therefore, reacted towards the threat and managed to remove the Muslim 
Brotherhood from power in Egypt by supporting the counterrevolutionary forces within Egypt 
promoting its economic and soft power capabilities.  
 
Saudi engagement against the democratically elected Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood falls under the first counterrevolutionary motivating factor: to counter 
threatening ideologies and political systems that pose a threat to the legitimation of the 
political alliance with the Wahhabi religious establishment and the House of Al Saʿud. The 
Saudi regime legitimised their role in Egypt, as that of preventing the radicalisation of the 
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Egyptian population. This policy falls under the second counterrevolutionary motivation; to 
counter any unstable political systems in order to maintain regional stability. The third 
motivation regards downplaying Iranian influence across the region. However, I would argue 
that Saudi foreign policy behaviour in Egypt was not predominately rooted in the strategy of 
downplaying Iranian influence. Iran did not enjoy a good relationship with the former 
Egyptian President, and the population in Egypt are mainly Sunni Muslims. These arguments 
are based on the historical alliances Iran has enjoyed through states and non-state actors, 
especially in Shiite populated countries. Yet, as both Iran and Saudi Arabia aspires to achieve 
regional hegemony, there aroused a possibility for Iran to gain access in Egypt with the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the upheavals was created, while Saudi Arabia wanted to 
continue its good relationship with an authoritarian pre-revolutionary Egypt.  
 
6.1 A new reality arises 
 
The fall of the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 might have been the 
catalyst for King Abdullah to break with his foreign policy doctrine of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries. Saudi Arabia has for decades maintained a good and well- 
functioning relationship with Egypt and the former President Mubarak, as both Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt have worked for regional stability. During a press conference with the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister in June 2013, the Saudi Foreign Minister Saʿud al-Faisal states, “To mention 
Saudi-Egyptian relations is to bring up a long, storied history between our two countries, a 
history that is firmly strung with unbreakable ties, mutual respect, and close ties on every 
level and all fields of cooperation that serve the two countries’ mutual interests, Arab and 
Muslim causes, and international security and peace,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013, June 1).  
 
As with Bahrain, the Saudi-Egyptian relationship was in all probability based upon Wendt’s 
socially constructed Kantian role structure. Whereby the logic is centred on the notion of 
friendship through “pluralistic security communities” and “collective security”. This is further 
confirmed by HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal (2013: 6) where he states, “Egypt holds a special 
place in Saudi security interests […]. Abandoning him or any close ally during a 
revolutionary uprising was not and will never be a policy option for the Kingdom, which must 
uphold and defend its values.”  
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Hosni Mubarak was forced to relinquish his position on February 11, 2011, i.e., prior to the 
military intervention in Bahrain. The statement from Al Faisal suggests that the Saudis were 
caught in a situation they never thought was going to happen – an efficient revolution that 
deposed a Saudi-friendly regime in the Middle East. Moreover, the speech from Al Faisal 
strengthens the argument of the Saudi regime breaking with its former non-interference 
strategy, as he clearly states how it will never be an option for the kingdom to desert any 
allies. According to Jason Burke (2011, June 29) in The Guardian, Dr. Mustafa Alani, from 
the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai, states that, “The calculation in Riyadh is very simple: you 
cannot stop the Arab Spring so the question is how to accommodate the new reality on the 
ground […]”. The Saudi regime, therefore, needed to find ‘new’ ways on how to orientate 
itself in the ‘chaotically’ political landscape of the region.  
  
After the removal of Mubarak, the Saudis became unclear of the potential for US support for 
the Saudi regime in the case, as in Egypt and Tunisia, of a massive domestic uprising. The 
Saudi (perceived) fear of the lack of U.S support in case of internal instability was confirmed 
by the U.S. President Obama in 2015. President Obama states, "I can send a message to them 
about the US's commitments to work with them and ensure they are not invaded from the 
outside…What I can't do, though, is commit to dealing with some of these internal issues that 
they have without them making some changes that are responsive to their people," according 
to Global Security (2015, April 6). This statement by Obama supports my previous argument 
of that the United States will support the kingdom in cases of an external threat, but not 
necessary in instances of domestic instability.  
 
The Saudi perspective towards the regional situation with the fall of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian Presidents in February 2011 was almost certainly based upon regime survival. 
Regime security has been the most important objective for the Saudi regime prior to the Arab 
Spring. Wendt argues that actors define their interests in the process of defining the situation, 
suggesting that, in light of the revolutionary wave, the notion of regime security was even 
more important. A situation of survival can lead to aggressive behavior, as, according to 
Mearsheimer, survival mandates aggressive behavior. The new reality might also have led to a 
more independent policy in Saudi Arabia in order to ensure regime survival. These ideas are 
highlighted by Guido Steinberg (2014: 17) where he states, “Behind the scenes the Saudi 
government maintained close contact with the Egyptian military leadership and hoped to 
prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from faring too well in the parliamentary elections, which 
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were held between November 2011 and January 2012.” King Abdullah saw his regime as 
being capable of countering the domestic revolution, and had, therefore, the capacity to focus 
on external threats and orientate and direct the regional politics in a favorable direction. I have 
argued that Saudi Arabia promoted its economic and military instruments in the case of the 
Saudi intervention in Bahrain, and moreover, the Saudi use of its economic and diplomatic 
instruments in the case of Saudi engagement in Egypt. However, the Saudis also used their 
intelligence services to a greater extent in the wake of the Arab upheavals. Austin Long 
(2015) states, “It underscored the potential for unrest and revolution and the perception (true 
or not) in the Gulf that the U.S. commitment to regional allies was ambivalent. It also created 
new opportunities for influence as U.S. influence waned and previously stable regimes fell, 
some of which was overt (such as aid to Egypt or military support to Bahrain) while some was 
undoubtedly covert and conducted by intelligence services.” 
 
 
6.2 The Saudi regime Versus the Muslim Brotherhood  
 
 
Old historical narratives of the Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological threat to the Saudi 
regime reappeared as the new reality began to sink into King Abdullah. In order to understand 
the Saudi attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood, one need to look at it from a historical 
perspective. Bernard Haykel (2013: 5-6) argues that there are four ideological disparities in 
the Brotherhood’s position that contribute to the Saudi regime perceiving the Brotherhood 
with animosity. First, Muslim Brotherhood members were welcomed and employed by the 
Saudi regime when the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected to brutal suppression in Egypt and 
Syria under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser and President Hafiz al-Assad. Under these 
conditions, some members of the Brotherhood and Saudis developed a group named the al-
Sahwa al-Islāmiyya (Sahwa), the ‘Islamic Awakening’, with the goal of overthrowing the 
Saudi regime. The ideology of the Sahwa was an ideological and religious mixture of 
Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood supported 
Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Saudi regime, therefore, perceived the 
Brotherhood as traitors. Third, both the Saudi regime and the Muslim Brotherhood compete 
within the sphere of political Sunni Islam. The royal family’s legitimacy rests on the notion of 
Sunni Islam, and its Wahhabi interpretation, while the Brotherhood also rests its legitimacy 
within Sunni Islam, but with a more moderate interpretation. In addition, the Muslim 
Brotherhood represents a Pan-Islamism movement, indicating the group to be present in 
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several Middle Eastern countries and other Muslim countries worldwide. A Pan-Islamist 
movement represents a significant competitive ideology for the Kingdom, perceiving itself as 
the heartland of Islam. Fourth, according to Bernard Haykel (2013: 6), “[…] the Muslim 
Brotherhood represents the only clandestine and organized political force in Saudi society, 
and therefore has the wherewithal to mobilize against the regime.” Lawrence Rubin (2014: 
122) suggests that one of the most important issues the Saudis has with the Muslim 
Brotherhood is that, “Moreover, Saudi Arabia blames the Brotherhood for infecting their 
Wahhabism with a Qutbist type [a former influential individual within the Brotherhood] of 
activism that produced the likes of Osama bin Laden – citizens who were educated by exiled 
Muslim Brotherhood members.”   
 
The Saudi fears of the Sahwa movement are supported by Stéphane Lacroix (2014: 1), who 
states, “The vast majority of the Sunni Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia is constituted by 
what is known as the Sahwa.” However, the Sahwa movement was not one of the Sunni 
Islamist groups that announced their participation in the day of wrath mentioned in chapter 
4.2. Yet, as I have argued, the Sahwa movement challenges the Saudi regime due to the 
combination of their own ideology of Wahhabism and their strong connection to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood represents a transnational movement, in 
addition to being present within the kingdom, might be the reason for the Saudis also to take 
action against the Brotherhood on a regional level. The Saudis have tried their best to reduce 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional influence and its position, while Qatar has done what it 
can to support the organisation. One of the reason for Qatari support for the organisation is, as 
Bernard Haykel (2013: 2) argues, “The Brotherhood has not had conflict with the Qatari 
regime (as it has with Saudi Arabia and UAE) because it has never threatened the regime’s 
legitimacy […].” Another reason for the Qatari support to the organisation is due to the sub-
regional rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, whereby Qatar has sought to gain regional 
influence through a transnational movement. 
 
Saudi Arabia accepted the new reality, but only to a certain degree. HRH Prince Turki Al 
Faisal (2013: 6) states that, “However, once President Mubarak resigned and the Egyptian 
people expressed their will, King Abdullah not only recognized the new reality, but he also 
extended the hand of friendship to the new leadership.” The Saudis did not appreciate the 
democratically elected new president and his political stance. In June 2012, the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Morsi, won the first democratic presidential election 
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in decades. Morsi and his government promised a long range of reforms implemented in 
Egypt, though only a portion of these reforms took place, making the Muslim Brotherhood 
less popular during its term. In addition, to the fact that the Brotherhood did not manage to 
implement the long range of promised reforms, there were great contrasts within the Egyptian 
political landscape. The political fractions encompassed Salafi movements, other moderate 
Islamist groups, democracy parties, and the strong military establishment. The disagreement 
and chaos led the military establishment to seize their opportunity. Morsi was in power at the 
presidential office on June 30, 2012 until July 3, 2013, when a coup led by military officers 
removed Morsi. 
 
The Egyptian Army Chief Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi was the leading figure in the military 
establishment. King Abdallah welcomed the coup by sending a telegram to the former head of 
Egypt’s Supreme Court, Adli Mansour thanking him and al-Sisi for saving Egypt, according 
to David Hearst (2013, August 20) in The Guardian. Guido Steinberg (2014: 18) suggests it 
remains unclear if the Saudi leadership and the military establishment had discussed the coup 
prior to July 3. However, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait did give a total of $12 billion in aid 
to Egypt the week later. The trilateral group that provided economic aid undermined Qatar as 
the prime economic donor to Egypt, thus reducing Qatar’s political influence in Egypt, 
according to Steinberg (2014: 19). The military establishment started to crack down on 
demonstrations in a similar manner to the pre-Mubarak period after the military-led 
government had taken the power in Egypt. The Egyptian military establishment and the 
security forces were largely in control over the situation, even though there was great political 
unrest with massive demonstrations. I would, however, argue that it was mainly due to 
massive foreign critique, and threats of stopping foreign economic and military aid, which led 
to a ‘softer’ treatment of the demonstrating masses.  
 
In addition, the Egyptian military establishment banned the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
representative political party, labelling it as a terrorist organisation, and thereby arrested 
several leaders, along with other members of the Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia supported these 
actions, and King Abdullah announced in August 2013, that, “We have followed with deep 
sorrow the events taking place in our second homeland, the brotherly Arab Republic of Egypt; 
events which only please enemies of Egypt's stability and security and its people, but at the 
same time pain all those who love Egypt and care for its stability and unity which are, today, 
targets for all evil wishers […]. The people and government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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stood and still stand today with our brothers in Egypt against terrorism, extremism and 
sedition, and against whoever is trying to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs and in its 
determination, power and legitimate right to deter every spoiler or whoever misleads the 
people of Egypt. Let it be known to those who interfered in Egypt’s internal affairs that they 
themselves are fanning the fire of sedition and are promoting the terrorism which they call for 
fighting,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013, August 
9) and in al-Arabiya English (2013, August 16). By this statement, King Abdullah gave the 
Egyptian military establishment full support. Moreover, the Saudi King indirectly states that 
the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the factors for bringing terrorism and extremism to 
Egypt. 
 
Davis Hearst (2013, August 20), in The Guardian suggests that King Abdullah’s statement 
about non-interference in Egypt was directed to Qatar and its important ally, the United 
States, whom Abdullah accused of creating internal sedition in Egypt. This is in accordance 
with the idea of Saudi Arabia engaging in a more independent foreign policy vis à vis United 
States. The United States, Qatar, and many other countries condemned the violent treatment 
of members of the Muslim Brotherhood by the newly established military government in 
Egypt. However, the Saudis perceive the Brotherhood as being a terrorist organisation as well. 
According to Madawi al-Rasheed (2014, February 4) in al-Monitor, less than a year later of 
Abdullah’s speech, on February 3, 2014 the Saudi regime issued, by a royal decree, a new 
terrorism law that prohibits Saudi citizens for fighting abroad, and membership in radical 
religious and political movements. These groups include al-Qaida, the Saudi branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Dāʿesh, and the al-Nusrah Front. The royal decree issued by 
Abdullah is a counter framing measure within the categorisation denial. The aim of this form 
of counter framing is to minimise the spread of the message of these ideational thoughts by 
not allowing discussion of the issues presented by the groups. The Saudi regime has supported 
the Egyptian military establishment in their drive for power against the Muslim Brotherhood, 
suggesting the countering of an ideological threat towards the Saudi regime on a domestic and 
regional level.  
 
6.3 Keeping the authoritarian system  
 
I have argued that the Saudi engagement in Egypt was different from that observed in 
Bahrain. This is also highlighted by Guido Steinberg (2014: 17), who states, “While the Saudi 
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Arabia’s support for Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Morocco was about preventing the 
revolution spreading to the monarchies, in Egypt it worked to restore the army and parts of the 
old regime to power.” This analysis suggests that Saudi engagement in Bahrain included 
preventive counterrevolutionary foreign policy, while the Saudi involvement in Egypt was an 
explicit counterrevolutionary behaviour according to the definition presented in section 3.3.3. 
As the region went into chaos, it created a political power vacuum in Egypt because there had 
not been any actual political competition for the authoritarian system in decades. The 
combination of an Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood in power, and great division in the 
Egyptian political landscape created room for a variety of external forces to gain potential 
influence. 
 
Qatar saw its opportunity and provided the Muslim Brotherhood its political and economic 
support. However, the Saudi regime was suspicious of possible Iranian influence inside a 
former Saudi close ally. Guido Steinberg (2014: 17) states, “Ultimately, Riyadh worried that 
Tehran could exploit unrest in Egypt to expand its influence there.” A shared point 
underscored by Lawrence Rubin (2014: 121) who states, “When Mohammed Morsi came to 
power, Saudi Arabia was concerned that Egyptian-Iranian relations would warm.” I do not 
totally share this view, and wish to offer a contrasting one, as the Iranians usually seek 
influence in Shiite populated areas. Prior to the Arab upheavals, the Iranians had not enjoyed 
political influence in Egypt, and there is no great Shiite population in Egypt worth 
mentioning. However, the Iranian regime has previously pursued its interest in politically 
unstable areas such as in Lebanon and Yemen. The Saudis may have perceived the situation 
in Egypt as similar cases, and therefore, a risk of losing it long-standing ally and political 
influence. 
 
I would argue that the Saudi regime wanted to keep the authoritarian status quo in order to 
maintain Egypt as an important ally, thus creating stronger Arab military opposition against 
Iran, rather than it being Saudi fears of a potential Iranian influence in Egypt. This argument 
is supported by the Saudi uncertainty of US support for the Saudi regime, as the United States 
had demonstrated towards its allies in Egypt and Tunisia. However, history has shown that the 
United States supports its allies and US interests against military threats, as they did in the 
Gulf war in 1991. From a Saudi perspective it, therefore, suggests that the Saudis perceived 
the US support as available in the case of a military threat, but not, unless it favoured US 
interests, in cases of a regime change. This is, moreover, partly supported by the US President 
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Obama statement above, and the US engagement against Dāʿesh, as I will discuss in the next 
chapter. 
 
Saudi Arabia maintains good relations with the Egyptian government in post-revolutionary 
Egypt. Ana Echagüe (2014: 15) states that, “[…] On 20 June 2014, King Abdullah was the 
first foreign head of state to visit Cairo and congratulate President Sisi on his inauguration.” 
Moreover, it was reported in Gulf News (2014, November 4) that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
other Gulf states were planning to set up a joint military force in order to intervene in states 
within the Middle East. The creation of the force has, according to the article, two purposes. 
First, to ensure the possibility for intervention against the Islamist threat in theatres such as 
Libya and Yemen. Second, to serve as a strong military force to counter Iran, according to 
Gulf News (2014, November 4). The statement validates the argument of the Saudi desire to 
keep Egypt as a close ally, rather than the Saudi fear of Iranian influence in Egypt. Egypt has 
engaged militant Islamist groups in air strikes in Libya after the publication of the article, but 
Saudi Arabia has not taken part in these actions. However, the joint Arab military was, 
according to Arab News (2015, March 26 a), formally established at the Arab Summit in 
Egypt, on March 25-26, where the Arab leaders had agreed to create a unified Arab military 
force. The creation of the force has its origins in the growing security threats in Yemen and 
Libya. Formal regional military cooperation between Sunni Muslim states has not been 
present for decades, and might be a signal for stronger cooperation in order to confront the 
serious range of events and challenges the region have.  
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Chapter 7: Turning the upheavals into a proxy war in Syria and Iraq 
 
The extensive Saudi economic and political support to Syrian opposition groups suggests that 
Saudi foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis does not have a counterrevolutionary aspect, as, 
following the definition used in the thesis, it had in Bahrain or Egypt. King Abdullah has not 
worked to restore the political landscape in Syria and Iraq which was in effect before the pre-
revolutionary period. Saudi strategies towards the theatres in Syria and Iraq has, in contrast, 
been to direct the politics in their favor as much as possible in order to downplaying Iranian 
influence. My argument that Saudi did not follow the counterrevolutionary path, in this case, 
contrasts with the mainstream opinion of Saudi Arabia as engaging in counterrevolutionary 
politics, as an overall foreign policy strategy in the wake of the Arab upheavals. 
 
King Abdullah urged the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to stop the killing machine in 
order to restore regional stability in August 2011, whereby the statement highlights the Saudi 
view of keeping regional stability. In addition, the Saudi regime has used high-diplomacy by 
encouraging the international community to stop the violence in the Syrian civil war. The 
Saudi ambassador to the UN stated in 2012, “The Security Council must resolve to end to end 
the violence, take all necessary means to stop the Syrian killing machine and save the 
civilians trapped in Homs, Hama and all Syrian cities […]. The countries of the GCC are 
ready to serve at the forefront of any joint effort that aims to save the Syrian people and 
strengthen its ability to protect itself from an authority that lost all its legitimacy once it’s 
started killing its people,” according to H.E. Abdallah Y. Al-Mouallimi, Permanent Mission 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (2012, March 2, p. 2-3).  
 
However, Saudi politics towards the Syrian crisis changed the year after King Abdullah’s 
speech to Bashar al-Assad. Gregory F. Gause III (2014: 15) states, “By the start of 2012, 
though, Riyadh was “all in” for the Syrian rebellion.” Saʿud al-Faisal states in late December 
2012, “Though this tragic scenario continues to play out for going on two years now, we do 
see a glimmer of hope today. A coalition of Syrian opposition has been formed that aims to 
bring the various factions of the Syrian opposition together under a singular leadership. […] I 
am heretofore pleased to announce that the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques will donate 100 million dollars in aid through the Syrian National Coalition,” 
according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012, December 16). The 
Saudi regime tried to unite a consistent opposition block against the Syrian President Bashar 
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al-Assad with the use of its economic capabilities. By 2012, the Saudis sought to strengthen 
the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). 
 
The extended use of harsher rhetoric by Saudi Arabia through diplomatic channels continued, 
whereby they criticised the UN Security Council for not doing enough to find a solution to the 
Syrian crisis. According to a Saudi diplomat to UN in 2013, who states, “The Syrian crisis 
continues without anon-partial and effective solution that realizes the aspirations of the Syrian 
people and reflects the will of the international community represented by the General 
Assembly and its adopted resolutions, which were not properly effectuated by the Security 
Council. All this reaffirms the danger manifested in the delay in taking appropriate timely 
decisions to achieve peace in the region and in the world; and the results manifested in the 
spread of chaos, wars, murder, and destruction,” according to H.E. Counselor Dr. 
Abdulmohsen Farouk Alyas Chargé D’affairesa.i. Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (2013, October 29, p.3).   
 
As diplomacy did not end the Syrian civil war, the Saudi regime raised the stakes by arming 
opposition groups. The Saudi involvement might have contributed to the further escalation of 
the conflict, turning it into yet another proxy war against Iran. By 2012, the Saudi engagement 
in the Syrian civil war may be categorised under the third motivation factor; Saudi Arabia 
possesses a high incentive to counter Iranian influence across the region. I have highlighted 
the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry that appeared after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Given 
the opportunity for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to increase its area of influence in light of the 
Arab upheavals, the two great powers did not change their perception towards each other, thus 
making the Lockean culture of rivalry to remain in the case of respect for each other 
sovereignty.  
 
Moreover, the rivalry may have gone so far that a Hobbesian anarchy unveiled itself in proxy 
theaters. This argument is based upon the idea of the extensive interests both Saudi Arabia 
and Iran have pursued in the conflict, which, in terms of human lives and tragedies, is one of 
most significant conflicts since the Second World War. In addition, the sectarian violence in 
the Middle East has increased in recent years and can be related to the geopolitical rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Saudi engagement in Syria and Iraq should, therefore, be 
seen through the prism of a ‘balance of power game’ between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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7.1 Challenging the Iranian ‘belt’ of influence 
 
 
Offensive realism suggests that aggressive behaviour occurs when great powers aspire to 
maximise their relative power, as it serves as an optimal way to ensure their security. In the 
case of Saudi engagement in Syria and Iraq, these provide good explanations for Saudi 
behaviour in their aspiration for regional hegemony. For years, Iran has been a close and 
valuable ally to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Iranians have, therefore, enjoyed a 
‘belt’ of political influence, stretching from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to the Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. Iranian influence increased in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 and further 
increased with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government from 2005 onwards. According to 
Lawrence G. Potter (2014: 16), “The fall of Saddam government in 2003 led to a major 
change in the status of Shiʿis throughout the region and enhanced the power of Iran. For the 
first time Iraq had a Shiʿi-led government, and Sunnis in Iraq, as well as the Gulf-monarchies, 
were on defensive.” The former defensive policy of the Gulf-monarchies and especially that 
of Saudi Arabia changed during the Arab upheavals, comprising of a more offensive policy 
towards the Shiite and Iranian influence in countries as Iraq and Syria. Ana Echagüe (2014: 
13) states that, “Over the last decade, Saudi’s lack of influence in the Levant, most notably in 
Syria and Iraq, or in Gaza (such as in 2009), was palpable and offered a start contrast to Iran’s 
maneuvering in Iraq, its alliance with Syria, and its support for Hamas and Hezbollah. In 
response to what it saw as Iranian attempts to achieve regional hegemony, Saudi Arabia 
attempted to bolster alliances with friendly states, Jordan and Egypt most notably […].” In 
reference to her argument, I have already highlighted the Saudi policy towards Egypt as being 
an attempt to re-establish the cooperation that decreased during the reign of Mohammed 
Morsi. 
 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has, for years, wanted to break the alliance between Iran and Syria in 
order to diminish Iran’s influence in the Levant. The revolution in Syria, therefore, created an 
opportunity for the Saudis to change this situation and reduce Iran’s position in the region. 
The Saudi calculation might been built upon the notion that, if Syria was to fall, the Iranians 
might have lost influence in Lebanon and Hezbollah, thus losing the grip over the Levant. The 
Tunisian and Egyptian President had recently been deposed, and the Saudis might think the 
Syrian President was to be the next deposed regime leader. The potential fall of al-Assad 
would have provided enormous opportunities for the Saudis to change the regional balance of 
power. Saudi engagement could, in this case, be perfectly explained by Mearsheimer’s view 
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of how great powers defend their balance of power. In addition, the Saudi involvement in the 
Syrian civil war explains how the Saudi regime tried to undermine the balance when the 
situation change in its own favour, as the Syrian President and his regime were under severe 
pressure on all dimensions; domestic, regional, and international.  
 
The Saudi perception of the Arab Spring has been highlighted as the essential notion of 
regime survival, yet also new challenges and opportunities. Mearsheimer suggests that 
survival under these circumstances mandates aggressive behaviour, thus suggesting states to 
act aggressively. However, Mearsheimer’s five assumptions that need to take place for states 
to strive for hegemony and behave aggressively were not all present in the case of Saudi 
involvement in Syria. The Saudis did not possess the offensive military capabilities needed to 
intervene on its own initiative in the civil war in Syria. The lack of offensive military 
capabilities suggests this to be another, and different, case than the Saudi actions in Bahrain. 
The Syrian regime, backed by both Iran and Russia, serves as a greater enemy and risk for 
military engagement than the case of the military intervention in Bahrain and the Saudi-led 
military campaign in Yemen, March 2015.  
 
However, there are IR-theories that explain how states engage in wars in order to increase 
domestic support. The theory is named ‘rally around the flag’, whereby state leaders, due to 
domestic pressure or loss of support, engage in wars to raise support. The Saudi population 
saw the Syrian regime as tyrannical for killing its population, but the Saudi regime had, 
during 2012, managed to counter domestic pressure for reform. As argued, the Saudis did not 
possess the capabilities to intervene on its own. Instead, the Saudi regime turned the Syrian 
civil war and the conflict in Iraq into proxy wars against Iran by using its public diplomacy, 
economic capabilities and sectarian narratives to promote its interests in Syria and Iraq. 
Bandar bin Sultan, one of the Saudis responsible for promoting Saudi interests abroad in Syria 
and Iraq, was appointed as head of the (GIP) in July 2012; a position he held until April 2014. 
There have been several rumors about the reason for his removal. The rumors have mainly 
centered around the idea that he was causing the deteriorating relationship with the United 
States by his critique of Obama’s failure to handle Syria and that no military intervention took 
place after Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013, according to Ian 
Black (2014, April 16) in The Guardian and Angus McDowall (2014, April 15) in Reuters. 
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For a long time, Qatar was one of the leading funders of Syrian insurgents in their fight 
against the al-Assad regime. However, the Qataris did not differentiate between the varieties 
of opposition groups on the ground. Both the Syrian Brotherhood fraction, Salafi-Jihadi 
groups, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), and others received political, economic and 
armament support from Qatar. The lack of consistent support and the overall Qatari 
engagement and policies towards the crisis, in contrast, fuelled the conflict with more 
weapons and increased the hostility between the anti-Syrian regime groups. Another view of 
the Qatari support is, “However, a perception is taking root among growing numbers of 
Syrians that Qatar is using its financial muscle to develop networks of loyalty among rebels 
and set the stage for influence in a post-Assad era,” according to Roula Khalaf and Abigail 
Fielding Smith (2013, May 17), in Financial Times. This assertion supports my argument of 
the sub-regional competition that evolved in the wake of the Arab upheavals, whereby both 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia saw arising opportunities for increased political influence.   
 
The Saudi reality was a growing Qatar, and a Syrian civil war not directed in favour of the 
Saudi regime. The Saudis, therefore, acquired the ‘new’ role; that of the main supplier for the 
Syrian rebels from 2013. Muhammad Ballout (2013, July 19), in al-Monitor, states that, 
“Yesterday [July 18], Saudi Arabia became the exclusive patron of the Syrian National 
Coalition.” The Saudi Crown Prince Salman received the leader of the SNC, Ahmad al-Jarba, 
in July 2013 in order to officially demonstrate Saudi support for SNC. However, the Saudi 
attempt to resolve and direct the Syrian civil war in a favourable direction proved to be 
challenging. Saudi Arabia and the United States had different perceptions on how to engage 
with the reality on the ground in Syria. Saudi Arabia wanted to provide extensive armament 
of Syrian rebels while the United States was strongly opposed to weapons to be handed over 
to radical anti-US movements. Lisa Watanabe and Christian Nünlist (2014: 3) states, 
“Similarly, the US reluctance to arm Syrian rebels is viewed as having enabled the forces of 
Bashir al-Assad’s regime to make gains of the ground. Frustrated with the US position, 
Riyadh is eager to provide rebels with anti-aircraft-missiles […].” It has, however, been 
highly difficult to find reliable sources that confirm whether the Saudis have provided 
opposition groups with this kind of military equipment.  
 
Moreover, another issue between United States and Saudi Arabia revolved around which 
opposition groups were to receive arms and economic support. While the US position was to 
support the secular opposition groups such as SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Saudis 
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saw little progress on the ground from SNC and FSA. The Saudi regime, therefore, initiated 
support to other, more radical groups. According to Gregory F. Gause III (2014: 15), “[…] the 
Saudis refocused support toward Islamists, and particularly Salafi, opposition groups, other 
than ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra.” Saudi Arabia has been a strong supporter 
of the Islamist group, Islamic Front in Syria. The group was created in late 2013 through the 
amalgamation of several Islamist groups. The Islamic Front rejects thoughts of democracy 
and wants to implement an Islamic state based on Sharīʿa. Edward Dark (2013, December 
11), in al-Monitor, argues that all the major players in the Middle East, except Saudi Arabia, 
agreed to create a coalition of opposition groups in order to confront al-Qaida as a necessary 
means to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis. Edward Dark (2013, December 11) 
further states that, “In terms of Saudi calculations, curbing Iranian influence in the Middle 
East is their number-one strategic goal. As far as Riyadh is concerned, a failed state ruled by 
Sunni extremists seems preferable to the existence of any Iran-friendly regime in Syria.” The 
Saudi calculation if accepted, suggests that the Saudis are willing to take great risks in their 
attempt to moderate Iranian influence throughout the region. This kind of aggressive 
behaviour coincides with the thought of offensive realism, whereby great powers are willing 
to take high risks, as in the case of the argument presented by Edward Dark, in order to ensure 
its survival and achieve a hegemonic position. 
 
The Syrian civil war escalated to an alarming level when the use of chemical weapons in 
proximity to the Syrian capital Damascus on August 21, 2013 became known. During this 
period, I was stationed in Riyadh, and closely monitoring the situation. Riyadh was ready to 
engage the Syrian regime with military means, either in a coalition with the United States or a 
coalition of Arab states. Madawi al-Rasheed (2013, September 2), in al-Monitor states, 
“Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal urged the Arab League to back a military strike 
against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime after the chemical attack on Ghouta in which 
hundreds of Syrians were killed.” The use of chemical weapons was described by Obama as a 
‘red line’ for al-Assad. The international community were tensely preparing for potential 
military attacks against the Syrian regime, and Saudi Arabia used harsh rhetoric supporting 
the use of military air strikes. However, as US military vessels were on alert and heading 
towards the Mediterranean Sea, the United States and, in particular, Russia, found a 
diplomatic solution in the UN and agreed to remove all Syrian chemical weapons, in order to 
prevent further escalation of the Syrian crisis. The Saudis appeared disappointed that the 
incident did not lead to a military intervention against the Syrian regime. The Saudi 
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perception of US reluctance to act in the Syrian crisis, combined with the new reality that 
emerged after the fall of Mubarak, may have been factors that led to a more independent 
foreign policy from Saudi Arabia regarding the US. Lisa Watanabe and Christian Nünlist 
(2014: 1) states that, “[…] Saudi Arabia’s relationship with its Western partners, particularly 
that with the US, had been tested due to differences over the handling of the Iranian nuclear 
program and the civil war in Syria, leading Riyadh to conclude that it had no option but to 
play a more assertive role internationally.” The Saudi regime showed, its more assertive 
international role by rejecting the temporary seat in the UN Security Council, the first country 
in UN history on November 12, 2013. Nawaf Obaid (2013) elaborates on the Saudi decision 
to reject the UN Security Council seat, and states, “This unprecedented decision also signals 
the coming of age of Saudi Arabia’s forceful foreign policy and the methods it is willing to 
pursue to achieve its objectives.” 
 
The Saudi regime used the Syrian revolution as an opportunity to challenge and reduce the 
Iranian influence in Syria. However, by gaining access to the Sunni Muslim populated areas 
in Iraq, the Saudis have been an active player in trying to achieve regional hegemony over 
Iran as well. Lawrence Rubin (2014: 115) states that, “Moreover, Saudi Arabia has also 
provided arms and material to Sunni groups in Iraq in their power struggle against Iranian-
backed militia and political organizations.” The Saudi policy in Iraq suggests that the Saudis 
have been willing to use the hard power instruments, in addition to the sectarian and 
ideological aspects, as means. Increased Iranian influence in Iraq through the Iraqi Shiite 
President Nuri al-Maliki has been perceived by the Saudis hugely detrimental. The United 
States withdraw their main forces from Iraq in late December 2011, and, between 2012-2014, 
there was a massive Sunni uprising in Iraq due to the Sunnis’ lack of influence in Iraqi 
politics. Lawrence G. Potter (2014: 19) states, “In Iraq, with the departure of US-troops, the 
Shiʿi government of Prime Minister Nuri-al-Maliki became increasingly authoritarian and 
continued to question the loyalty of Sunnis.” The repression of Sunni Muslims in Iraq, and 
that Iraq was influenced by Iran, might have been a catalyst for the Saudis to increase their 
focus on reducing the ‘belt’ of Iranian influence. According to Abdul Hannan Tago (2013, 
January 6), in Arab News, did the Saudi Foreign Minister stated that, "We are convinced that 
Iraq will not stabilize until it starts handling issues without sectarian extremism […]. Until 
these issues are addressed, we don't think there will ever be stability in Iraq, which pains us." 
This statement from Saʿud al-Faisal must have been addressed to al-Maliki and his pro-Shiite 
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politics that did not take the Sunnis into account as an underlying factor for the Sunni-uprising 
and the ensuing instability. 
 
7.2 Escalating the sectarian tensions  
 
During a meeting with Arab Foreign Ministers in 2012, the Saudi Foreign Minister Saʿud al-
Faisal states, “What is happening in Syria shows beyond any doubt that it is not ethnic, 
sectarian or guerrilla war. It is a collective clean-up campaign, harassing the Syrian people 
and imposing state control without any considerations of humanity or morals or religion,” 
according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012, February 11). The 
statement from the Saudi Foreign Minister suggests that the Saudis have rejected any ethnic 
or sectarian narratives within the Syrian civil war. However, the sectarian instrument has been 
used by the Saudi regime in Bahrain in order to prevent Iranian influence. Moreover, the 
Saudis have used the sectarian instrument more actively, and might have caused more damage 
than they wished in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The strategy of using the sectarian 
instrument needs to be addressed in the context of the Saudi desire to change the direction of 
the Syrian civil war in favour of the Kingdom. 
 
The sectarian violence in the Middle East started as a consequence of the chaotic situation 
after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, followed by the civil war, primarily based upon 
sectarian lines. However, the sectarian violence increased in the wake of the Arab upheavals. 
As the initial support from Qatar and other Gulf states created more division and chaos in the 
anti-Assad movements, it gave room for more radical groups. Patrick Cockburn (2014, July 
13), in The Independent states that, “The fatal moment predicted by Prince Bandar may now 
have come for many Shia, with Saudi Arabia playing an important role in bringing it about by 
supporting the anti-Shia jihad in Iraq and Syria […]. Prince Bandar, secretary-general of the 
Saudi National Security Council from 2005 and head of General Intelligence between 2012 
and 2014, the crucial years when al-Qa`ida-type jihadis took over the Sunni-armed opposition 
in Iraq and Syria.” Saudi intelligence worked to create a moderate Sunni block against al-
Assad and al-Maliki, but they failed in their attempt, thus developing sectarian tension to new 
levels. Moreover, Patrick Cockburn (2014, July 13) in The Independent states that, “The 
problem for the Saudis is that their attempts since Bandar lost his job to create an anti-Maliki 
and anti-Assad Sunni constituency which is simultaneously against al-Qa`ida and its clones 
failed.” Saudi Arabia experienced great challenges in reaching their goals in Syria and Iraq, as 
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they, in addition, provided support to Salafi groups, such as the Islamic Front. During the 
chaos among Syrian opposition groups, the terrorist group Dāʿesh took from the beginning of 
2014, the lead among the Sunni-opposition groups in both Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the terror 
group had the goal of removing the al-Saʿud from power alike, in their plan of creating a 
transnational Islamic caliphate. 
 
The Saudi religious establishment has played a key role in exacerbating the sectarian ‘war’ 
against Iran and the Shiites, both internally and externally, while the Saudi intelligence 
services contributed to escalating the sectarian tension abroad. The countermeasures 
undertaken by the Saudi state media, the religious establishment and the intelligence services 
have, in Lawrence Rubin’s categorisation of counter-framing, included denial, defence, and 
counterattack. A range of Saudi Fatwās, official opinions, and statements through social 
media that encourages anti-Shiite attitudes are available. According to an article in Gulf News 
(2014, September 10), has the conservative Saudi clerics, Abdul Rahman al-Barrak and 
Nasser al-Omar, with more than a million followers on Twitter, accused the Shiites “of 
sowing strife, corruption and destruction among Muslims.” Moreover, Catherine Shakdam 
(2014) argues that Saudi Arabia has conducted an anti-Shiite policy since the kingdom’s 
foundation, and this policy has intensified in the wake of the Arab upheavals. She highlights 
an example of this policy, where the leader of the congregation at the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca, Adel al-Kalbani, declared, during an interview with BBC Arabic in May 2009, “that 
all Shia Muslims were apostate, unbelievers, and as such should be hunted down and killed,” 
according to Catherine Shakdam (2014). A Saudi Wahhabi Sheikh and the faculty member at 
the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, Dr. Saad al-Durihim posted a tweet on 
Twitter on April 23, 2013 urging “jihadist fighters in Iraq […] and kill any Shiites they can 
get their hands on, including children and women,” according to Haytham Mouzahem (2013, 
April 28), in al-Monitor. These kind of statements by the Wahhabi establishment contributes 
to persist the existing problems towards other ideological and religious interpretations of 
Islam, as I outlined in the theory chapter. In addition, the terrorist group Dāʿesh has followed 
the anti-Shiite policy in their conquered territories in Syria and Iraq by killing those belonging 
to other Islamic sects or Christians. More interestingly, proclamations of anti-Shiite attitudes, 
has as shown, also been promoted by the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.   
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7.3 New threats arise 
 
The Saudi strategy in Iraq and Syria might have failed, and has not, in the short-term 
perspective manage to destroy the Iranian ‘belt’ of influence. Moreover, its foreign policy 
strategies may have contributed to the formation of new domestic threats against the kingdom. 
Christopher M. Blanchard (2015: 7) states, “However, if recent trends hold, the Islamic State 
may pose an even greater ideological and security threat to the kingdom’s stability.” 
Moreover, Patrick Cockburn (2014, July 13), in The Independent states, “As for Saudi Arabia, 
it may come to regret its support for the Sunni revolts in Syria and Iraq as jihadi social media 
begins to speak of the House of Saʿud as its next target.” The leader of Dāʿesh, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, proclaimed himself as caliph over the ‘Islamic State’ in June 2014. The terror 
group used references to the Islamic conquest in Islam’s initial phase, and Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi labelled himself as a caliph over all Muslims. The proclamation of an ‘Islamic 
State’ served as a major ideological and ideational threat towards the legitimacy of the royal 
family, who possess the title Custodian of the two Holy Mosques and perceive itself as the 
leading state within Islam. The Saudi regime and the Wahhabi clerics became, therefore, 
increasingly worried when the ‘Islamic State’ was established and Dāʿesh gained control over 
huge geographical areas in Iraq and Syria within a short time period during the summer of 
2014. 
 
An ideational threat needs to be assessed from a constructivism perspective. Moreover, it is 
important to note that ideational threats are socially constructed in terms of a perceived threat 
towards the justification for the existence of the Saudi monarchy. However, Dāʿesh also 
serves as a military threat close to the Saudi border. As Dāʿesh is a non-state transnational 
actor, the group needs to be assessed according to Christopher Hill’s basis for categorisation. 
The group seeks a territorial base and is built upon an ideological manifestation that seeks to 
promote certain ideas across national frontiers. The combination of its territorial ground and 
ideological basis suggests that Dāʿesh serves as both an ideational and credible military threat 
to Saudi Arabia. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi threatened Saudi Arabia in November 2014, through 
the propaganda channel of Dāʿesh (al-Furqan Media Foundation, November 13, 2014) and 
states, “[…] al-Baghdadi extolled what he describes as the purported expansion of the Islamic 
State to the “lands of al-Haramein” (two holy places) in addition to Yemen, Egypt, Libya and 
Algeria, through its acceptance of oaths of allegiance sworn by local militants to the self-
styled caliphate. Al Baghdadi’s mention of al-Haramein is notable in that it reflects the radical 
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Islamic proclivity for avoiding any reference to Saudi Arabia by name, and by implication, 
any indirect recognition of legitimacy of the Saudi royal family, instead…highlighting Islam’s 
two holiest sights at Mecca and Mdeina[…] Al Baghdadi issued a categorical call to arms: 
 He referred to the Saudi royal family as “the serpent’s head,” and the “stronghold of disease,’ 
and implored his Saudi subjects to attack the “al Saloul,” and “their soldiers,” according to 
R.C. Porter (2015).  
 
When the conflict in Iraq escalated after the establishment of the ‘Islamic State’ during the 
summer of 2014, Arabia deployed 30, 000 soldiers on its border to Iraq as a preventive 
measure, according to Gulf News (2014, July 3). In addition, President Barack Obama 
presented a strategy on how to neutralise the extremist group Dāʿesh on September 10, 2014. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia expressed the day after, on September 11 that they were willing to 
host training of moderate rebels in the civil war in Syria against Dāʿesh and the Syrian 
regime, according to Gulf News (2014, September 11). The Saudi Foreign Minister Saʿud al-
Faisal discussed on the instruments that could be used against the Dāʿesh in September, 2014, 
and states “The meeting today was a good opportunity to discuss this phenomena from all 
different aspects and perspectives, and to go deep in its roots and causes and reflected 
keenness to come up with a vision to combat it through military means, security means, and 
intelligence, as well as economic and financial means, and intellectual means also,” according 
to The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation (2014: 
1). The Saudi regime is, according to the statement from Saʿud al-Faisal, willing to use the 
whole spectrum of instruments and capabilities in order to neutralise the terror group. 
 
The Saudi focus towards the terror group has also undermined the Saudi strategy in Syria; 
removing the Syrian President from power, with the overall goal of diminishing the Iranian 
belt of influence. The new threat posed by Dāʿesh has united international society for 
collective military action against Dāʿesh in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the military campaign 
against Dāʿesh has might only lead to strengthening al-Assad’s position, as the international 
society’s primary focus is towards Dāʿesh, as the group serves as a greater regional and 
international terror threat. Obaid Nawaf (2014) states that, “Saudi Arabia’s active military 
participation in the international coalition against Dāʿesh is a clear sign of the country’s 
commitment to defeating this extremist group. It also signals Saudi Arabia’s intention to be 
the regional leader in the broader struggle.”  
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Saudi Arabia’s air force participated in the US-led bombing strikes against Dāʿesh targets in 
Syria and Iraq, according to and Gulf News (2014, September 24). The military operation in 
Syria, in addition to the military intervention in Bahrain and Yemen, is one of the three rare 
foreign incursions for Saudi Arabia’s military forces. Moreover, According to Amena Bakr 
and Angus McDowall (2014, September 23) in Reuters and Gulf News (2014, September 24), 
Saudi Foreign Minister Saʿud al-Faisal stated in a speech that the campaign against the 
terrorist group would take years, and will need hard work for all involved. Saudi Arabia was 
one out of five Arab countries participating in military actions towards the Islamic extremist 
group, Dāʿesh. The others were Jordan, Bahrain, and UAE, while Qatar had a supporting role. 
The Arab cooperation in the US-led military campaign is the first time since the 1991 Gulf 
War that the Arab states have made a common effort to join a US-led military campaign. 
 
King Abdullah rallied domestic support against the new threat. As the royal family has built 
its legitimacy on the religious basis of the Wahhabi interpretation, the heartland of Islam, and 
as the custodian of the two holy mosques, it has proven challenging for the kingdom to deal 
with religious competition from other Sunni Islamic branch. Abdullah, in addition to Saudi 
senior clerics, tried to counter the ideology of Dāʿesh and their religious interpretation of 
Islam. The Saudi campaign against perceived ideational threats posed by a variety of Islamist 
groups, commenced with the new anti-terror law imposed in February 2014. Abdullah 
addressed the challenges in an official speech, whereby the religious establishment followed 
with official statements on August 19, 2014. The official Saudi stance were an attempt to 
undermine the new threat. King Abdullah outlined extremism as contrary to Islam in July 
2014, and states, “These groups have become an easy tool for the enemies of Islam who use 
them to terrorize and kill innocent people through the distortion of the holy text and 
interpretation of Islamic law to serve their ends and personal interests,” according to The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation (2014: 7). 
Abdullah’s rhetoric is a counter framing measure of counterattack, where the aim is to 
undermine the threat and its validity.  
 
Moreover, King Abdullah addressed the Arab world and the international community in 
August 2014, and states, “I call on leaders and scholars of the Islamic nation to carry out their 
duty towards God Almighty, and to stand in the face of those trying to hijack Islam and 
present it to the world as a religion of extremism, hatred, and terrorism, and to speak the word 
of truth, and not fear anybody. Our nation today is passing through a critical, historic stage, 
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and history will be witness against those who have been the tool exploited by the enemies to 
disperse and tear the nation and tarnish the pure image of Islam,” according to The Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation (2014: 1). According to 
Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi (2014, August 20), in Al-Monitor, the King’s speech included a 
warning about the dangers posed by armed jihadist groups such as Dāʿesh as they, among 
other things, declared other Muslims as being infidels. Abdullah also publicly criticised the 
religious establishment for not making enough effort in preventing religious radicalisation that 
may threaten the kingdom itself. Open, and public criticism from both the royal family and 
the King towards the religious establishment is very rare, according to Abdulmajeed al-
Buluwi (2014, August 20), in Al-Monitor. 
 
The religious establishment quickly responded to the King and condemned Dāʿesh on August 
19, 2014, and thereafter gave the royal family its political support and validation through 
speeches and publication of fatwās, especially as the military campaign against Dāʿesh started 
in Syria and Iraq. Abdullah, therefore, gathered all possible resources in the kingdom’s fight 
against the new threat. In August 2014, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al al-Shaikh states, 
"The ideas of extremism, radicalism and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, but are 
the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as seen in the crimes of the so-
called Daash (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups,” according to The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation (2014: 1).   
 
In addition, Saudi Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, in reference to Dāʿesh 
announced that, “it is the duty of Muslims to fight them back to ward off their evil and keep it 
away from religion and people”, according to Gulf News (2014, September 7). He described 
the Dāʿesh and al-Qaida as Kharijites. This strategy of countering ideational threats belongs 
under the counter framing of counterattack where the aim is to undermine the source of the 
threat and to deny the claim’s validity. The article in Gulf News (2014, September 7) also 
highlights that the Saudi government had detained and sentenced several imams that urged 
people to fight with the Dāʿesh, glorified other extremist ideologies and urged Saudis to fight 
in Syria. This kind of policy remains under the counter-framing of denial, where the aim is to 
subvert and minimise the spread of the ideas from Dāʿesh. As I have already highlighted in 
chapter three, the kingdom has previously had problems with radicalisation and support for 
Islamist movements standing in stark contrast to the Saudi Wahhabi establishment and, 
therefore, posed a domestic and later regional security threat. 
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The more aggressive Saudi behaviour against the terrorist group could be explained by the 
ideological threat that Dāʿesh poses to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it suggests 
that the social constructed perception of the group may threaten the political alliance of the 
Wahhabi and monarchical systems of governance. In addition, the establishment of the 
‘Islamic State’ threatened the Saudi perception of being the leading Islamic State in the 
region, and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia has been in conflict with its own efforts to stop the 
extremists and the link between the ideology of Dāʿesh and the Saudi state Wahhabism, 
according to Bader al-Rashed (2014, September 29), in al-Monitor. Bader al-Rashed (2014, 
September 29) suggests there are several problems for the Saudis in proclaiming the terrorist 
group as Kharijites. The major problem is as he suggests; the terrorist group has distributing 
Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s books in the territories of their self-proclaimed ‘Islamic 
State’, in Syria and Iraq. Bader al-Rashed (2014, September 29), in al-Monitor further 
suggests that the group is explicitly declaring association with Wahhabism. The other problem 
is as he argues; the Kharijites belongs to a totally different school of jurisprudence to that 
which any Sunni-Jihadist group would associate itself with. In addition, there are severe 
contradictions in Saudi Arabia distancing itself from Dāʿesh, as there have been some 
elements within the Saudi religious establishment that, by urging Saudis to fight with them, 
have contributed to supporting the Dāʿesh, thereby further escalating sectarian tensions 
between Sunni and Shiite Muslims throughout the region.  
 
The Saudi aggressive actions towards Dāʿesh is an ongoing event, and as argued, may 
continue for a long time. In addition, the campaign needs a strategic perspective, as the Saudi 
Foreign Minister Saʿud al-Faisal states in a press conference with US secretary of state. 
 
 “Saudi Arabia underscores importance of this coalition in fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and 
stresses the importance of providing of the military means necessary to fight this challenge on 
the ground, and that the campaign should have comprehensive strategic perspective, fighting 
terrorism wherever it may be and whatever the organizations that stand behind it, in order to 
uproot terrorism,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015, 
March 5). Saudi involvement, in addition to a high number of actors in the Syrian and Iraqi 
internal affairs, has created more tension among the variety of opposition groups, which in 
return out of many factors have contributed to the rise of Dāʿesh. 
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Chapter 8: Yemen as a dodgy backyard 
 
Saudi engagement in Yemen offers a different perspective than that of the other cases used in 
this thesis. The Saudi regime has not engaged in Yemen to any great extent in the time period 
of 2011-2014. Instead, the Saudis have been preoccupied with the dangers to their northern 
borders, focusing on the Syrian civil war and the conflict in Iraq and the emergence of the 
Dāʿesh. Moreover, Saudi engagement in Yemen throughout the time period of 2011-2014 did 
not involve counterrevolutionary politics. King Abdullah rather created a political transition 
plan in cooperation with other GCC-members in an attempt to keep the stability of the 
neighboring country. However, the lack of Saudi engagement in Yemen changed drastically 
in March 2015 when the Saudi-led coalition of Arab States launched the military operation 
‘Decisive Storm’, against the country, in order to ‘de-liberate’ the Yemeni population from 
chaos and control by the al-Houthi group.  
 
In order to explain the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen within the framework of 
role structure from the viewpoint of constructivism, it needs be addressed from both a Kantian 
and Lockean role structure. The two countries have, from a Kantian perspective, perceived 
each other as being in a mutually-dependent relationship in many ways, as, given its close 
proximity, Saudi Arabia has worked for security and stability. The necessity of stability is 
partly due to the Yemeni history of civil wars and the several terrorist groups such as AQAP 
that have been operating inside the country. Saudi Arabia has become an important country 
for Yemen in terms of economic dependency, as several hundred thousand Yemenis work 
inside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia provides extensive economic aid to Yemen. In 
order to explain the Lockean culture marked by rivalry, Anthony H. Cordesman (1997: 9) 
states that, “Saudi Arabia has for long seen Yemen as a potential threat, in part because 
Yemen is an extraordinarily poor state with a population that has equalled or exceeded that of 
Saudi Arabia […].” These assertions are also supported by Simon Henderson (2015) who 
states that, “Many observers believe that Saudi population statistics are often skewed to show 
that the Kingdom is more populous than Yemen, thereby denting any Yemeni revanchism for 
historically territories.” However, Yemen as a nation-state has not been perceived as a great 
military threat towards Saudi Arabia. Rather, it is the challenges related to security issues 
posed by militant groups operating in Yemen that have proved a headache for the Saudi 
regime. 
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As the internal dynamic developed in Yemen after the Arab upheavals, it might have proven 
to become a nightmare for the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia has especially focused on two 
issues in Yemeni affairs during 2011-2014. First, Yemen is described as a failed state, and the 
Yemeni regime has not been able to create an effective security management in order to 
provide security for its population. The deteriorating Yemeni internal situation has led to 
different militant groups such as AQAP and the Shiite group al-Houthi operating freely. Since 
2003, Saudi Arabia has pursued an active domestic counter-terrorist campaign against radical 
Islamist groups, which has led many AQAP-members to operate from Yemen instead. As one 
of a range of strategies during the counter-terrorist campaign, Saudi Arabia has tried to ‘lock’ 
the 1, 800 kilometer long border with Yemen by building comprehensive safety measures 
such as walls, sensors, and armed border patrols. Second, Saudi Arabia has been profoundly 
concerned over the growing influence of the Shiite militant group al-Houthi and accused Iran 
of providing their support. During the time period of 2011-2014, it is observable that the 
Saudi regime has lost much of their former influence in Yemen to its longstanding rival Iran 
through the al-Houthi group. However, and perhaps surprisingly, the Saudis have done little 
do counter Iranian support for the al-Houthi’s in Yemen prior to March 2015.  
 
8.1 Strategy for keeping stability in Yemen 
 
The Saudi regime has not pursued a clear counterrevolutionary politics towards Yemen in 
respect to the definition of counterrevolution used in this thesis during 2011-2014. Moreover, 
Saudi Arabia and the GCC did not engage militarily in Yemen when the protests started as 
they did in Bahrain. Instead, the GCC with Saudi Arabia at the forefront, worked to create a 
transition plan for the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the Arab 
upheavals. The transition had the aim of establishing stability in Yemen. However, Abdullah 
had suffered severe difficulties in directing the internal Yemeni politics in favour of the 
Kingdom during 2011-2014.  
 
According to an article in al-Arabiya English (2011, November 23), “King Abdullah hailed as 
marking a “new page” in the impoverished country’s history.” The GCC-initiative of a 
transition plan received significant international support for developing a democratic 
transition in a rather chaotic region. However, the Saudi response to the Yemeni uprisings 
might have been regretful as the political developments have not favoured the Saudi regime. 
Bernard Haykel (2014: 4) states, “Riyadh’s top priority in Yemen has been to end the uprising 
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that erupted in 2011 and the chaos that it precipitated.” By following the logic of the Saudi’s 
top priority being to end the uprisings in Yemen, it can, in many ways, explain the Saudi role 
in promoting the transition plan in cooperation with GCC, though it has not proved to become 
a successful strategy.  
 
In an attempt to bring stability through a democratic process, Yemen held an election in 
February 2012. However, the election had only one participating candidate, Abu Rabuh 
Mansour Hadi, who won the election approximately a year after the upheavals took place and 
assumed the Presidential office on February 27, 2012. The new Yemeni President did not, 
however, represent a ‘new’ policy in Yemeni politics. Hadi had been former Vice President 
from 1994 to 2012, and, therefore, clearly closely linked to the previous government and 
President Saleh. The new President, proposed a plan to solve internal strife through: The 
National Dialogue Conference (NDC). The NDC was a transitional dialogue process that was 
a part of the Gulf States initiative, which created the transition plan for the former President 
Saleh to leave his office. GCC has worked for retaining the political stability after the 
transition plan as well, and The Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Dr Abdul 
Latif Al Zayan states, “The GCC States will continue to exert all efforts alongside regional 
and international parties to ensure the success of the political settlement in Yemen,” according 
to Gulf News (2014, February 6). The statement suggests that the GCC worked to create 
stability within Yemen, but they failed to estimate the degree of internal division, along with 
the enormous socio-economic problems the country had.    
 
The Saudis tried to keep internal stability in Yemen, by pursuing its economic capabilities, in 
addition to proposing the political transition plan. During a UN meeting in 2012, the Saudi 
Vice Minister Abdulaziz bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud stated, “As the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was keen to support Yemen in restoring economic, political, and security 
stability; and as the Government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah 
bin Abdul Aziz was keen to respond to the brotherly Yemeni people’s need in the crisis, the 
Kingdom’s contributions exceeded 3 billion U.S. dollars in the last 5 years,” according to 
Prince Abdulaziz Bin Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (2012, September 27).  
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8.2 Yemen falls apart 
 
The violence and the internal fighting have escalated in Yemen in the wake of the Arab 
upheavals, even with the GCC trying to restore stability and President Hadi’s 2013 attempt 
with the NDC to solve Yemen’s diverse problems. The al-Houthi’s rejected, however, the 
outcomes of the NDC. The al-Houthi leader states, “We have rejected it because it divides 
Yemen into poor and wealthy,” according to Gulf News (2014, February 11). In addition to 
political disagreement, the al-Houthi’s entered into a more intense conflict with the radical 
Sunni groups AQAP, and Dāʿesh, which claimed to have entered Yemeni territory within 
2014.  
 
Both AQAP and the al-Houthi group are labelled as non-state actors, and need to be assessed 
according to Hill’s categorisation. Both groups seek a territorial base and promote ideological 
ideas across national frontiers, rather than a primary focus on wealth creation. However, the 
groups differ drastically in the ideas they want to promote. The political narrative of the al-
Houthi group is similar to what the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iranian government 
promote. “The political narrative that Houthis have propagated is “Death to America, Death to 
Israel,” which is modeled on revolutionary Iran's motto,” according to Shahidsaless, Shahir 
(2015, February 12) in al-Monitor. In addition, Shahir Shahidsaless in al-Monitor (2015, 
February 12), states, “On Jan. 25 [2015], Hojatoleslam (a Shiite clerical rank just below that 
of ayatollah) Ali Shirazi, representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, said, “Hezbollah was formed in 
Lebanon as a popular force like Basij (Iran’s militia). Similarly popular forces were also 
formed in Syria and Iraq, and today we are watching the formation of Ansarollah in Yemen.” 
According to Shahir Shahidsaless (February 12, 2015) a brigadier General of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Corps claimed that, “Ansarollah is a similar copy of [Lebanese] Hezbollah in a 
strategic area.” The Iranian statements convey that the Iranians have seen Yemen as a 
potential target for extending their regional influence. Then again, AQAP is an affiliate to the 
central al-Qaida and possesses another ideological basis that stands in stark contrast to the al-
Houthi’s. AQAP is globally orientated to a greater extent, and has been known for targeting 
Westerners and is strongly opposed to the Saudi monarchy. AQAP has conducted several 
terrorist operations in the kingdom and has been responsible for several attacks in Yemen in 
the time period of 2009-2015. 
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By 2014, the civil war in Yemen included multiple lines of fighting, such as the internal battle 
between AQAP and Dāʿesh, in addition to the conflict between President Hadi and his 
governmental forces against the al-Houthi’s, which are both in opposition to the radical Sunni 
Islamist groups. The varied stakeholders all possess different views on how the future of 
Yemen should look, and create enormous challenges in creating stability within Yemen. As 
the country has become more instable in the wake of the Arab upheavals, Yemen has posed a 
great security threat to Saudi security, and Christopher M. Blanchard (2015: 7) states, “In July 
2014, AQAP reportedly attacked a remote Saudi-Yemeni border checkpoint, killing and 
wounding Saudi security officers.” The Saudis did, however, not focus towards the AQAP 
threat in which had attacked the Saudi border. As I have argued above, the lack of focus 
towards its Southern borders must be addressed towards the rising threats from its Northern 
frontiers.   
 
The international community saw the internal dynamics within Yemen in great turbulence in 
the beginning of 2015. A UN special advisor states, “The transition has encountered serious 
obstacles in the past, yet time and again Yemenis have managed to push forward. Today, 
Yemen is at a crossroad: either the country will descend into civil war and disintegration, or 
the country will find a way to put the transition back on track. This largely depends on the 
political will of Yemeni leaders. They all bear responsibility for the current status of affairs, 
as well as responsibility for finding a way to pull the country from the brink,” according to 
Jamal Benomar (2015).   
 
8.3 Loss of Saudi influence  
 
The Shiite insurgent group al-Houthi’s and their emergent role in Yemen might, in the case of 
Yemeni internal affairs, have worried the Saudi regime most. Saudi Arabia has military 
engaged the al-Houthi’s in 2009, when internal fighting between the Yemeni government and 
the Shiite-group had a spillover effect on the Saudi border. Lawrence Rubin (2014: 129) states 
that, “By 2009, the Houthi rebellion came to be seen largely as a larger struggle between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia along sectarian lines. Saudi Arabia’s military intervention was partly 
justified by accusations of Iranian support for the rebels.” The military campaign of 2009 was 
a rather humiliating affair for the Saudis, which did not prove to be an efficient engagement to 
stop the al-Houthi uprising. Moreover, the Saudi-led military campaign in March 2015 has its 
roots in preventing Iranian influence in their close proximity. 
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The al-Houthi group were in control of the country’s capital Sana'a from September 21, 2014. 
Simon Henderson (2015) states that, “President Mansour Hadi did not block their initial 
advance on the capital last September, apparently out of fear that he would be accused of 
human rights violations; whether he will lesson his customary caution is unclear.” However, 
Maysaa Shuja al-Deen (2014, October 22), in al-Monitor, suggests that the reason President 
Hadi didn’t prevent al-Houthi’s advance to the capital could be an attempt by President Hadi 
to allow the al-Houthi group to emerge to power in case the jihadist fighters from Dāʿesh may 
find a safe haven if the military campaign against them in Iraq and Syria escalates. Whatever 
the reason for Hadi accepting the influential role of the Shiite militant group in Yemen, the 
Saudi regime perceives it to be highly problematic. Simon Henderson (2015) states, “For 
Saudi Arabia, the events in Sana mean Riyadh must increasingly cope with two fronts: Sunni 
ISIS forces to the north, and Shiite Houthi forces – in Saudi terms, Iranian proxies – to the 
south.” With the emergence of two fronts in terms of both military and ideological threats 
against the kingdom, the Saudis have focused on its northern front rather than the southern in 
the time period of 2011-2014. The focus on its northern front may be explained by the fact 
that Saudi Arabia sees Dāʿesh as a greater threat from both a military and ideological 
perspective. The terror group seeks its legitimacy from the Sunni branch of Islam, and, 
therefore, serves as a greater threat towards its religious principles than the Shiite branch, far 
distanced from the Wahhabi-tradition.  
 
However, even though the thesis looks at the time period of 2011-2014, it is worth addressing 
the Saudi-led coalition with other GCC-states, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, which launched a 
military campaign in Yemen on March 25, 2015. An article in Arab News states, “Saudi 
Arabia and Gulf region allies have launched military operations including air strikes in 
Yemen, officials said, to counter Iran-allied forces besieging the southern city of Aden where 
the Yemeni president had taken refuge,” according to Arab News (2015, March 26 b). This 
may suggest that the ‘joint’ military coalition including Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and 
Egypt that was planned to be set up in November 2014, has been activated in order to serve as 
a strong military force against Iranian influence and the Islamist threats in the region. It was 
reported through Saudi state media that Saudi Arabia participated in the ‘joint’ operation with 
approximately 150, 000 soldiers stationed at the border areas, and that 100 planes participated 
in air-strikes. In addition to support from other Arab states, the Islamic organisation IOC 
supported the Saudi-led military campaign. “The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
has backed the military action in Yemen and slammed the Houthis for undermining the 
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country’s legitimate government,” according to Saeed al-Khotani (2015, March 27) in Arab 
News. The IOC support indicates that Saudi Arabia pursued its cultural diplomacy in order to 
gain wide support from the Sunni Muslim community. 
 
An official statement from Saudi Arabia and other GCC-states suggests that the intervention 
has the purposes of both reducing the Iranian influence and engaging the Islamist threat that 
has evolved in Yemen. The joint statements claims, “This sinful aggression executed by 
internal Militias supported by forces from within who sold their conscience and are only 
concerned about their self-interests, and also supported by regional powers, whose objective 
is to dominate this country and to make it a base for their dominance in the region. This threat 
is not only menacing the security of Yemen only, but also the security of the entire region as 
well as the world peace and security […] including military intervention to protect Yemen 
and its people from continuous Houthi aggression and deter the expected attack to occur at 
any hour on the city of Aden and the rest of the southern regions, and to help Yemen in the 
face of al-Qaeda and ISIS,” according to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2015, March 26). The joint statement accused regional powers of supporting the 
‘militia’, which are more precisely Iran supporting the al-Houthi group. 
 
However, Shireen T. Hunter (2015) explores the Saudi paranoia about Iran and states that, “It 
[Saudi Arabia] has justified its aggression against regional states on the grounds that Iran and 
its regional proxies are threatening its security by trying to entice Shia populations throughout 
the Middle East to rise against existing political orders.” The justification of an Iranian threat 
that provoked Saudi aggressive foreign policy behaviour is seen in both the case of Saudi 
engagement in Bahrain 2011, and, more recently, in Yemen 2015. Moreover, when 
considering the Saudi military campaign in Yemen March 2015 and how to explain the 
aggressive behaviour from an offensive realism perspective, I would argue that all five 
assumptions were present. First, the international system was anarchic, according to both the 
realist and constructivism definition. Second, Saudi Arabia possessed the offensive military 
capabilities it needed to undertake the campaign on its own. Third, Saudi Arabia was not sure 
about Iranian intentions in Yemen. Fourth, Saudi Arabia strived to maintain territorial 
integrity and the autonomy of the domestic political order in fear of the potential Iranian 
political influence in its proximity. Fifth, according to the realist thought of survival in an 
anarchic system, the Saudi intervention was a rational and strategic action in order to ensure 
its survival.     
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The Saudi ‘paradigm’ shift, from a cautious to a more aggressive and confrontational foreign 
policy, is related to the new challenges and opportunities conferred by the Arab upheavals. 
The Arab Spring led to pressure on Saudi Arabia on several fronts – internal, sub-regional, 
regional, and international. I do not follow the ‘law-given’ explanations for cause and effect, 
as usually seen through the prism of positivism. However, the Arab Spring is the most 
prominently observed cause for Saudi Arabia to undertake an aggressive foreign policy. This 
argument is based on observed foreign policy behaviour and the Saudi discourse, which 
contrasts significantly to that prior to the Arab upheavals. In the initial phase of the 
revolution, King Abdullah became uncertain about the potential for US support in the case of 
a massive domestic uprising along the lines of that of Egypt and Tunisia. The uncertainty led 
the kingdom to undertake a more assertive and independent regional and international role in 
order to ensure its regime security. However, the thesis shows that the aggressive foreign 
policy has to some extent contributed to creating new threats to the Saudi regime in terms of 
both ideational and military threats. These new threats need to be addressed in relation to the 
Saudi foreign policy, especially in the cases of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in the attempt to 
diminish Iranian influence. The threat posed by Dāʿesh is the most prominent example, where 
King Abdullah has gathered all possible capabilities to neutralise the group. The international 
community, along with several regional countries and Saudi Arabia, have gathered to 
collective military campaign against the group.  
 
In addition, there are many similarities in the roles played by King Abdullah and Prince 
Metternich. Abdallah strived to keep the status quo for the Middle Eastern monarchical 
regimes, in addition to that of its longstanding ally Egypt. The Saudi regime was in opposition 
to revolutionary aspirations for democracy and competitive ideologies within Sunni Islam, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, over the period of 2011-2014. Most academics and analysts 
following Saudi Arabia and its foreign policy agree that the behaviour of Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy follows counterrevolutionary politics. However, as the study shows, Saudi 
Arabia has not subsequently been following the academics’ ‘consensus-based’ 
counterrevolutionary politics. The Saudi regime has not tried to reverse the Arab Spring as 
much as possible, but rather orientated itself to the new political reality. 
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The decisive factors for Saudi Arabia to engage counterrevolutionary politics in the wake of 
the Arab Spring, are as the thesis shows, primarily based on three factors. First, its strong 
opposition to democracy, as shown in the case of Bahrain and Egypt. Second, it’s historical 
and present animosity to the Muslim Brotherhood, as shown in the case of Egypt. Third, 
Saudi Arabia’s desire to downplay Iranian influence through the region, as also shown in the 
case of Bahrain, Syria/Iraq, Yemen, and, to some extent, in Egypt. All these factors include 
the notion of Homeostasis, or the maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against 
external threats. Challenges which come from inside, such as demands for regional autonomy, 
are not the proper business of foreign policy until they become connected to the outside 
pressures. All three factors became connected to outside pressure as shown through the 
kingdom’s foreign policy behaviour within the four cases. 
 
The thesis shows that Saudi Arabia has pursued both its soft and hard power capabilities for 
reaching their national interests during the time period of 2011-2014. However, I have 
highlighted that regime security and the notion of survival could be seen from both a realism 
and constructivism perspective. As ideational and ideological threats can potentially 
undermine domestic stability and regime survival, I have found that Saudi Arabia has tried to 
counter-frame, especially to other Sunni Muslim groups. Groups, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Dāʿesh have been particularly targeted, even though the vast majority of 
Sunni Muslims distance themselves from Dāʿesh. The Saudi regime’s handling of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Dāʿesh has both an internal-external influence on the kingdom’s policy. On 
the other hand, from a realism perspective, Saudi Arabia has tried to remain influential in a 
regional context by cultivating its traditional allies and downplaying the Saudi traditional 
‘enemy’, Iran. Saudi Arabia has worked to limit Iranian influence throughout the Middle East. 
The Saudi politics to reduce or prevent Iranian influence also have an internal-external 
influence in its policy. The kingdom has officially stated that Iran tries to influence the Gulf 
and Saudi internal politics upon several occasions.  
 
The Saudi intervention in Bahrain is a prime example of Abdullah pursuing the 
counterrevolutionary path, as it crushed the democratic uprising. The intervention had a 
preventive character, as it worked to ensure the survival of the Al-Khalifa monarchy. 
However, the military intervention contained several other factors, such as deterring the Shiite 
population in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The kingdom also showed its capacity as a sub-
regional great power in safeguarding other monarchies. Perhaps the most important issue by 
110 
 
intervening in Bahrain was to prevent and reduce the potential Iranian influence in its close 
proximity. This notion strengthens the view of Saudi foreign policy actions to be assessed 
through the prism of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.    
 
Abdallah has pursued counterrevolutionary politics in Egypt by supporting the military 
establishment led by President al-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed 
Morsi. The Saudi strategy in Egypt focused on reversing the revolution that was in effect 
before the pre-revolutionary period. Moreover, the fall of the former Egyptian President 
Mubarak was perhaps the catalyst for King Abdullah to break with his foreign policy doctrine, 
previously described as cautious in its character. The Saudi regime needed, therefore, to 
orientate itself in the new Middle East, as the new reality became present for the Saudi 
monarch. Saudi involvement in Egypt has been focused on keeping the authoritarian system 
status quo in order to remain the role structure as a Kantian culture and a close regional ally. 
This policy has been done by countering the ‘unstable’ political system led by Mohammed 
Morsi for keeping regional stability with economic and diplomacy instruments, as Abdullah 
spoke of preventing radicalisation in Egypt. The other focus has been related to preventing the 
further growth of the Muslim Brotherhood, both regionally and domestically, as a political 
basis challenging the Saudi monarchy. Saudi foreign policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
remains as that of countering threatening ideologies and political systems that pose a threat to 
the legitimacy of the political alliance with the Wahhabi religious establishment and the royal 
family. 
 
Saudi Arabia has not pursued a counterrevolutionary politics in Syria and Iraq during 2011-
2014. Abdullah urged the Syrian President to initiate reforms when demonstrations started in 
Syria. The aim was to ensure regional stability in the initial phase of the Arab upheavals. 
Moreover, Abdullah has tried his best to depose the Syrian President al-Assad with the aim of 
downplaying Iranian influence in both Syria and Iraq. The Saudi strategy has focused on 
supporting opposition groups consisting of Sunni-Muslims against al-Assad and former Iraqi 
President al-Maliki. In addition, the Saudi regime has taken a distinct international role 
through its diplomacy related to the Syrian crisis. Saudi Arabia used harsh rhetoric for 
intervening military in the case of Syria, but did not possess the military capabilities it needed 
in order to engage alone. Instead, the Kingdom urged for collective military actions against 
the Syrian regime. As the collective military intervention did not take place, the Saudi regime 
has instead created a proxy theatre against its rival Iran, in Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia has 
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with great help from its religious establishment and media, escalated the sectarian violence in 
this theatre. 
 
Yemen is the other case that demonstrates that Saudi Arabia has not pursued 
counterrevolutionary politics in all instances in the wake of the Arab upheavals during 2011-
2014. The Saudi regime did not safeguard the former Yemeni President; but rather created a 
transition plan through cooperation with other GCC-members in order to keep and ensure the 
stability in the proximity of the Kingdom. Yemeni internal affairs did, however, develop into 
a nightmare to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Arab Spring. The country became defined as a 
failed state where anarchy flourished. Both the Sunni-radical group AQAP and the militant 
Shiite group al-Houthi fought for political/ideological and geographical influence in strong 
opposition to the Yemeni state, while Saudi Arabia was preoccupied with the situation in 
Syria and Iraq. The al-Houthi’s gained control over the Yemeni capital during September 
2014, and the internal fighting increased. By March 2015, the Saudis engaged militarily in a 
Saudi-led joint campaign towards the al-Houthi’s, with strong support in GCC, Egypt and 
other regional monarchies with the aim of reducing Iranian influence. 
 
The theory of realism, related to why states engage aggressively has not proven itself to be a 
great explanation of Saudi foreign policy in all the selected cases. The five causal 
assumptions, in order to explain aggressive behaviour, have been present to explain the Saudi 
intervention in Bahrain, but not in the case of Egypt, Syria/Iraq and Yemen in the period of 
2011-2014. However, the causal assumptions have proved to be a good explanation of the 
Saudi military campaign in Yemen March 2015. In the case of Egypt, Saudi Arabia utilised its 
economic and diplomatic instruments rather than its military means. Saudi Arabia used harsh 
rhetoric for military intervention in the case of Syria, but did not possess the military 
capabilities it needed in order to engage alone. Besides the significant concept of regime 
security, Saudi Arabia has a national interest to serve as a regional hegemon over Iran, and at 
the sub-regional level on the Arabian Peninsula over the other GCC-members. I will strongly 
argue that Saudi Arabia saw its opportunity to change the political discourse and direction in 
light of the Arab Spring. Prior to the Arab upheavals, the Saudi regime had lost much of its 
influence to Iran, such as in Iraq, and, due to the Iranian ‘belt’ of influence, lost its political 
power in the Levant. Abdullah, therefore, perceived the uprisings as a great possibility to 
achieve its goal of becoming a regional hegemon. This perspective can, in many ways, 
explain the aggressive Saudi foreign policy behaviour that took place in the Syrian revolution 
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and the increasingly more instable Iraq. Already in the early phase of the uprisings, Abdullah 
found itself capable of countering the domestic revolution. Due to its political stability, Saudi 
Arabia has been able to focus and promote its foreign policy interests to a greater extent. 
Moreover, the Saudi regime saw the need to reduce the regime changes in other Middle 
Eastern countries, which had earlier been close allies to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, the King Abdullah has tried to prevent other states such as in Bahrain, Egypt, and 
more recently in Yemen from emerging as Iran-friendly regimes.  
 
However, the theory of constructivism has revealed itself as a good explanation for the Saudi 
behaviour in all cases. The Saudi regime has acted against socially constructed threats such as 
democracy and aspirations within political Islam. Examples of ideational threats posed by 
transnational groups are that of Dāʿesh, the Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Houthi’s. The role 
structure between states, explored by Wendt, has shown that the Saudi regime has pursued 
counterrevolutionary politics towards countries the Saudis have enjoyed a Kantian role 
structure of diplomatic relations. The argument suggests that Saudi Arabia wanted to 
safeguard its allies by preventing regime changes and maintaining the Kantian role structure. 
The kingdom has enjoyed good diplomatic relations with both Bahrain and Egypt, built upon 
the notion of security and cooperation. Moreover, the Saudi regime has shown itself capable 
of exerting aggressive behaviour with military means towards countries that enjoy a Lockean 
role structure with Saudi Arabia. Examples of these cases involve the Saudi actions towards 
the Syrian regime, in Iraq, and in Yemen. All these actions have mainly concentrated on the 
Saudi strategy of reducing Iranian influence.   
 
My findings have not contributed towards a definitive conclusion regarding what results the 
paradigm shift has led to in a long term perspective. It is difficult to predict the future stance 
of Saudi foreign policy. However, based on the findings of the study, there is a reason to 
believe that the Saudi regime want stronger cooperation between allied Sunni-Muslims states 
to counter the Saudi fears of the Shiite-Iranian regime and its allies. The argument is partly 
supported by the latest event of the Saudi-led coalition in operation ‘Decisive Storm’ and the 
formal agreement in the Arab League to create a joint military force. Saudi Arabia has 
regarded the talks in P5+1 and the Iranian nuclear deal with great scepticism. The kingdom 
fears that Iran would have the possibility to engage more actively in regional politics if the 
economic sanctions are to be removed or reduced, and thereby possess greater economic and 
political freedom. The aggressive foreign policy behaviour in the period of 2011-2014 has, as 
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already argued, contributed to create severe challenges to the Saudi regime. These challenges 
need to be confronted, in both a short and also a medium term of perspective, in order to 
safeguard regime survival. Saudi military operations such as that in Yemen strengthens my 
argument that the aggressive foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is an ongoing event. In addition, 
the Saudi Foreign Minister confirmed that Saudi involvement in the campaign against Dāʿesh 
will continue as long as it takes to neutralise the threat. These lines suggest that Saudi 
aggressive behaviour may continue in a long-term perspective. 
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Appendix: Important Saudi decision-makers in the period 2011-2014 
 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1924-2015): The Saudi King from 2005-2015, and the 
head of the House of Saʿud until he died January 2015. 
 
Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1935- ): Crown Prince under King Abdullah. He became 
King of Saudi Arabia after his half-brother, King Abdullah died in January 2015. He served 
the prominent role as the Governor of Riyadh from 1963 to 2011, and was appointed as 
Minister of Defence in 2011.   
 
Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1949- ): Minister of Foreign Affairs during 1975-
2015, April 29.  
 
Abdulaziz bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1963- ): Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 2011-present. Has previously served in the Saudi National Guard in different positions 
for fifteen years. Has worked as a delegate of the Saudi King in regional issues, and held 
many files on international relations in political and diplomatic tasks.  
 
Bandar bin Sultan Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1949- ): Appointed as the Saudi Ambassador to US 
from 1983-2005, and head of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency from July, 19 2012 – 
April, 15 2014. He was the secretary general of the National Security Council from 2005 to 
January 2015. Served as director general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency from 2012 to 2014. 
He was appointed as King Abdullah`s special envoy on July 2014, which lasted until January 
2015.  
 
Sultan bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1928-2011): Served as the crown prince of Saudi Arabia 
during the period of 2005-2011. Appointed as Minister of Defence and Aviation during 1963 
to 2011, and was Second Deputy Prime Minister 1982-2005. 
 
Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1959- ): Nephew of King Salman. He was 
appointed as Crown Prince on April 25, 2015, in addition to hold the position as Minister of 
Interior from 2012-present. He was appointed by King Salman to be chair of the Council for 
Political and Security Affairs in January 2015.  
 
Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1934-2012): First Deputy Prime Minister from 2011-2012, 
and prior to this he served as Second Deputy Prime Minister from 2009-2011. Served the 
longstanding position as Minister of Interior during 1975-2012. 
 
Turki bin Faisal al-Saʿud (1945- ): Serves as the chairman of King Faisal Center for 
Research & Islamic Studies. He has previously been Director General of the General 
Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Saudi Arabia’s main foreign intelligence service, from 1977 
until 2001. In 2002 he was appointed as the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, a position he served until 2005, when he was appointed 
as Ambassador to the United States until 2006. He retired in 2007. 
 
Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1949- ): Deputy Minister of Defence 2011-
2013. 
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Mutaib bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saʿud (1952): Serves as the Minister of National 
Guard from 2013-present. Had previously the position as the Chief of National Guard during 
2010-2013. 
 
Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh (1941- ): A direct descendant of the founder of 
Wahhabism, Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Was appointed as the Grand Mufti in Saudi 
Arabia in 1999. He serves as the Chairman of the Saudi Council of Senior Ulama. In addition, 
he serves as the head of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas. 
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